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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Research Context 
Perceptions of fairness and social norms are ubiquitous in daily life. They guide how individuals 
interpret social contexts, and they affect intentions and behavior (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000; Elster, 1989; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Güth et al., 1982; Kahnemann et al., 1986; Ostrom, 
2000; Rabin, 1993). In economic research, this has been acknowledged later than in other fields 
of social sciences, such as sociology or psychology. Instead, for a long time, economists focused 
on the effects of monetary incentives, thereby neglecting further potential determinants of 
decision making. In that sense, economic preferences were usually modeled as “self-regarding”, 
and in the extreme version of that view, decision-makers were assumed to exclusively care about 
their own material outcome. 
 By now, it is no longer doubted that the spectrum of behavioral determinants shaping 
economic behavior goes far beyond the motive of material self-interest. That paradigm shift in 
economic research was accompanied by the establishment of social or other-regarding 
preferences, which capture the idea that individuals consider the social context they are 
embedded when making decisions. Today, there is vast empirical evidence for this class of 
preferences. For example, individuals have been observed to change the distribution of material 
outcomes at personal cost, e.g., by rewarding individuals who act cooperatively while punishing 
those who do not (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). This literature is accompanied by a range of 
further non-material aspects, including preferences for fairness, trust, and conformity, the 
desire to maintain a positive self-image, and the behavioral relevance of (various kinds of) 
social norms, to name just a few of these concepts.1 
 Acknowledging the fact that these (and many further) factors are necessary to understand, 
model, and predict economics decisions, led to the emergence of the discipline of behavioral 
economics. Using an interdisciplinary approach that connects economics with other social 
sciences, behavioral economics attempts to reconcile economic research with topics that have 
previously been neglected or delegated to other disciplines. My thesis is embedded in that 
 
 1 Note that, economists still produce models where subjects exclusively consider their own material outcome. 
By contrast to previous times, however, this is not due to the fact that other factors are assumed to be irrelevant, 
but rather constitutes an informed decision resulting from a trade-off between simplicity and accuracy of a model. 
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research context, but I mainly concentrate on two of the previously mentioned topics: fairness 
and social norms. In the next section, I elaborate on the research agenda with which I try to 
contribute to the existing lines of literature concerning these topics. 
 
1.2. Research Agenda and Connections between the Projects 
The research agenda that guides this dissertation is characterized by the three aspects specified 
in the title. First, all of the projects are experimental investigations. That is, we2 apply the 
method of incentivized economic experiments (Smith, 1976), and we try to answer research 
questions through the generation of behavioral data in the “laboratory”. This method is by now 
extensively used in economic research, as it provides an excellent means to study individual 
behavior in a controlled environment. In fact, laboratory experiments have been a growing field 
for decades, and the share of lab studies published in general interest journals has risen 
continuously since the 1980s (Falk and Heckman, 2009). As a result of that, results gained in 
lab experiments are by now an important source to inform economic theory and public policy 
(Nikiforakis and Slonim, 2015).3 
 Second, all of the experiments involve the elicitation of fairness perceptions or perceptions 
of social norms. Importantly, when examining perceptions of fairness and social norms, we are 
mainly interested in individual statements of participants. In some of the projects, these 
perceptions are examined along with other traits in a within-subject manner, for example by 
additionally eliciting social preferences, by eliciting different kinds of fairness perceptions, or 
by examining social norm perception in more than one context. We then use the data that we 
gained on the individual level and try to draw inferences on how the different traits relate to 
one another. In contrast to that approach, fairness and social norms can also be studied on an 
aggregate level. An example of that approach is examining the interdependence between the 
economic system in a society and average perceptions about a fair redistributive policy (e.g., 
Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).4 Such research would rather lie at the intersection between 
 
 2 For reasons of consistency, from now on, until Chapter 7 (the conclusion), the dissertation is written using the 
first-person plural personal pronoun (“we”), independent from whether the chapters report on single-authored 
projects or on collaborative projects. 
 3 Lab experiments have both advantages and disadvantages, and their magnitudes are regularly discussed in the 
literature. On the one hand, laboratory experiments provide excellent internal validity. On the other hand, it is 
argued that lab experiments (at least potentially) suffer from lack of external validity. However, one striking 
advantage of lab experiments is that they allow to examine a wide range of questions that are otherwise difficult 
to explore. In Chapter 5, in which we try to contribute to the methodological literature on lab experiments, we 
elaborate on that method. 
 4 Another example is Ariely et al. (2019), who examine long-term effects of living in a specific economic system 
on the propensity to engage in dishonest behavior. 
  
9 
economics and sociology since the main interest is devoted to analyzing variables that aggregate 
many individuals. Instead, I see that research to lie at the intersection between economics and 
psychology, as we concentrate on the individual level, attempting to understand how various 
individual level traits are related to one another. 
 Third, the experimental paradigms used in the projects represent allocation settings, where 
some active individuals decide about how resources are allocated, while some passive subjects 
depend on these decisions. This is explicitly the case in the projects contained in chapters 2 and 
4, in which some subjects decide about how to allocate money between themselves and other 
participants in the experiment. Also, it is implicitly the case in the projects contained chapters 
3, 5, and 6. In these chapters, subjects do not take allocation decisions themselves, but the 
elicited perceptions about fairness or social norms refer to allocation settings.5 
 Finally, there is a fourth aspect that connects the majority of my projects in this thesis 
through a methodical aspect. Except for the experiment contained in Chapter 2, all experiments 
contain coordination games, through which we try to draw inferences about the subjects´ traits 
on the individual level. The design of these experiments is inspired by the proposition of Krupka 
and Weber (2013) to use coordination games to measure social norm perception. In that 
approach, subjects are confronted with descriptions of behavior, and their task is to coordinate 
on appropriateness ratings. Assuming that social norms reflect shared perceptions about 
appropriate behaviors (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), the coordination outcome (i.e., the modal 
choice of all involved subjects) will reveal social norm perception within the participants´ 
population. 
 We adopt their approach in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, but we vary the set of available answers, 
such that it is suited to measure the kind of perceptions that we are interested in. Also, in Chapter 
3 and in Chapter 6, we propose variations of their approach, attempting to extend the scope of 
their idea to use coordination games to measure perceptions. Specifically, in Chapter 3, we 
argue that their technique is not only suited to identify social norm perception on the aggregate 
level but to measure any kind of subjective information on the individual level. In Chapter 6, we 
propose an extension of their method that is intended to measure the same kind of perceptions, 
but in a more precise manner. In that regard, my dissertation also attempts to contribute 
 
 5 More precisely, in Chapter 3, beliefs about behavior in the ultimatum game are elicited (the ultimatum game is 
a simple bargaining paradigm where behavior is significantly determined by fairness perceptions of the 
protagonists; Güth et al., 1982). In Chapter 5, social norm perception is elicited from inexperienced and 
experienced laboratory participants in a series of hypothetical allocation decisions. Finally, in Chapter 6, social 
norm perception about behaviors in daily life is measured, and these items also implicitly describe how resources 
(though not always monetary resources) are divided between individuals. 
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methodological insights to the proposition of Krupka and Weber (2013) to use coordination 
games to answer research questions. 
 To provide an overview about the research in that dissertation, I briefly summarize the 
motivation, research question, main results, and conclusions of each project in the next section. 
 
1.3. The Projects 
In Chapter 2, we start with research on fair procedures in allocation settings. Together with 
Stefan Trautmann, I investigate a problem that is inherent in many real-world situations: Several 
subjects have justified claims, but goods are indivisible, and therefore, outcome fairness is not 
feasible (e.g., one job but several applicants). However, from a prescriptive perspective, it is 
clearly desirable that the allocation procedure that determines outcomes adheres to process 
fairness. This concept reflects to what degree a process is deemed just, independent from the 
actual outcome. Our research starts at this point. We experimentally construct a setting where 
an allocator assigns indivisible resources between participants that have different degrees of 
similarity with the allocator in terms of political preferences. We then use the observed degree 
of favoritism (i.e., the extent to which the allocator favors the more similar recipient) as a 
measure to identify the degree of process fairness.6 In a subsequent step, we examine the extent 
of process fairness in different environments that are intended to capture real-world allocation 
settings. In particular, we are interested in understanding whether lack of process fairness 
results from subjects being not willing or not able to implement a fair process. 
 We draw three main results from our experiment. First, when allocators have full 
information about recipients, and when they have to determine the allocation themselves, we 
observe substantial favoritism. Second, when subjects are provided with explicit instruments 
that help them to avoid favoritism, they extensively use these tools, thereby significantly 
reducing the extent of favoritism. Third (this follows from the previous result), subjects are not 
unwilling to avoid favoritism and to establish a fair process. Instead, they are mostly not capable 
of implementing a fair process, when this would require to apply (internal) randomization 
themselves. Our main conclusion is that decision-makers in charge of allocation should be 
equipped with explicit tools that help implement process fairness, as they are making significant 
use of them. Specifically, randomization tools seem to be an effective tool in such settings. 
 
 6 Precisely, we use favoritism to indicate absence of process fairness. Note that the lack of fairness that we model 
is different from intentional discrimination, as it is less extreme. While discrimination suggests that a decision-
maker actively seeks to discriminate, the kind of unfairness inherent in our setting is more subtle. 
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 In Chapter 3, we make a methodological contribution. We put this project in this chapter 
because it motivates and helps understand the methodology applied in chapters 4 to 6 of this 
thesis. In that project, we propose two tractable methods to elicit subjective information, i.e., 
private data held by a subject. Fairness perceptions or perceptions of social norms are good 
examples for this kind of data, but it comprises various kind of other data held by individuals, 
such as beliefs, opinions, preferences, feelings, desires, and the like. Such data is of substantial 
importance in social science research, but accurately extracting private information is difficult, 
when the data cannot be verified objectively. This is because conventional experimental 
methods require to incentivize the subjects´ answers using some (verifiable) ground truth. If 
such ground truth does either not exist (as the data of interest is of purely subjective nature) or 
is not verifiable (e.g., for technical reasons or because the question at hand is hypothetical), 
conventional methods are limited in that regard. In that case, Bayesian revelation mechanisms 
(Prelec, 2004) are used, which provide a possibility to extract subjective data in the absence of 
objectively verifiable ground truths. 
 The motivation for the approaches proposed in Chapter 3 is that Bayesian revelation 
mechanisms have two problems. First, they require a set of (rather strong) assumptions, and it 
is questionable whether these hold in practice. Second, the scoring rules used to determine the 
recipients´ payments in these mechanisms are difficult to understand for participants. As a result 
of that, the mechanisms are difficult to implement, and experimenters therefore mostly rely on 
faith-based implementation. That is, they do not exactly explain the payment rules, but simply 
assure that truthful answering is optimal. This is a problem because the experimenter lacks 
control about whether subjects actually trust the experimenter (by indicating their true type) or 
whether they engage in gaming (by misstating their true type) in an attempt to maximize their 
earnings. 
 Both methods that we propose capitalize on the false consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977), 
i.e., individuals use their own traits when predicting the traits of others. In the mechanism 
Benchmark, we propose to use the elicitation of second-order beliefs to predict a subject´s own 
thoughts. In the mechanism Coordination, we propose to have subjects play coordination games, 
and to use an individual´s coordination choices to predict her actual thoughts. To test the 
mechanisms, we experimentally investigate the ability of the two mechanisms to detect first-
order beliefs about behavior rates in the ultimatum game. On the aggregate level, we find that 
both mechanisms accurately reveal mean first-order beliefs of the population. On the subject 
level, we find that the modal difference between probabilities elicited in either mechanism and 
12 
actual first-order beliefs is zero. We therefore conclude that subjects strongly anchor their 
statements in Benchmark and Coordination on their own thoughts. 
 In Chapter 4, we bring together two prominent topics of behavioral economics: social 
preferences and social norms. A huge body of literature indicates that social norms play an 
important role in social and economic decisions. In that context, one important distinction 
regarding the type of norms refers to injunctive social norms and descriptive social norms. 
Injunctive norms indicate perceptions about normatively appropriate behavior, while 
descriptive norms refer to prevalent or common behavior (Cialdini et al. 1990, 1991). 
Experimental studies find that both types of norms explain behavior, but also that the two are 
conceptually different constructs that independently affect intentions and behavior (e.g., 
Cialdini and Kallgren, 1993; Kallgren et al., 2000; Rivis and Sheeran, 2003). Specifically, the 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the competing relevance of injunctive and descriptive 
social norms is inconclusive. 
 We contribute to this literature by examining whether injunctive or descriptive social norms 
elicited using coordination games (Krupka and Weber, 2013) are more strongly related to social 
preferences measured in a series of dictator games. The data from our experiment provides us 
with three main results. First, we corroborate that the Krupka and Weber (2013) approach is a 
valid tool to elicit social norm perception on the individual level, as the individuals´ 
coordination choices (regarding both types of norms) are strongly related to their actual 
behavior. Second, we find that perceptions about descriptive social norms are significantly 
more strongly related to social preferences on the individual level than injunctive norms. Third, 
a comparison of the predictive power on the aggregate level indicates that average descriptive 
social norms are good predictors for actual behavior on the population level. This suggests that 
the elicitation of descriptive social norms using coordination games is a powerful approach to 
predict behavior in settings that are otherwise difficult to explore. We conclude that our data is 
consistent with the hypothesis that descriptive social norms are behaviorally more relevant than 
injunctive norms, which is in accordance with the view that changing perceptions about 
prevalent behavior is a more fruitful behavioral intervention than changing perceptions about 
appropriate behavior (e.g., Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). 
 In Chapter 5, Christiane Schwieren, Alec Sproten, and I use the Krupka and Weber (2013) 
approach and examine whether inexperienced and experienced subjects in economic laboratory 
experiments differ. For that sake, we conduct a laboratory experiment and compare the two 
groups in a series of items that measure social norm perception. Precisely, social norm 
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perception is measured (i) regarding allocation behavior in the lab, (ii) regarding a series of 
unsocial behaviors in the lab and the field, and (iii) regarding the evaluation of generalizability 
of behavior from the lab to the field. 
 We identify substantial differences between the two groups, both regarding injunctive and 
descriptive social norms in the context of participation in lab experiments. By contrast, social 
norm perception for the context of daily life does not differ between the two groups. We 
therefore conclude that learning seems to be more important than selection effects for 
understanding differences between the two groups. Conducting exploratory analyses, we make 
the interesting observation that behaving unsocial in an experiment is considered substantially 
more appropriate than in daily life. This appears inconsistent with the hypothesis that social 
preferences measured in lab experiments are inflated and indicates a distinction between 
revealed social preferences as measured commonly and the elicitation of normatively 
appropriate behavior. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 is again a methodological contribution. In that chapter, we propose the 
Point Beauty Contest, a tool that is suited to measure the distribution of focal points in 
coordination games on the individual level. The contribution is motivated by the fact that 
conventional coordination, where subjects can only bet on one alternative, only reveals which 
alternative is considered most focal. In contrast to conventional coordination, where subjects 
coordinate by choosing one alternative, in the Point Beauty Contest subjects are equipped with 
a budget of points that they can distribute among multiple alternatives. This allows for nuanced 
coordination strategies, as participants can invest in multiple alternatives at the same time and 
weigh their choice. We argue that this extension of modeling coordination settings is consistent 
with many real-world coordination settings.7 
 We experimentally compare the proposed mechanism with conventional coordination and 
report two main results. First, the data confirms the theoretical predictions regarding 
coordination behavior and demonstrates that the proposed technique is suited to identify the 
distribution of focal points on the individual level. Second, we find that the proposed 
mechanism identifies focal points on the group level more efficiently than conventional 
coordination. We conclude that the Point Beauty Contest is suited to identify the distribution of 
 
 7 For example, think about a bank run, where depositors might not only think about withdrawing none of their 
money or all of their money from a bank but want to engage in both strategies at the same time in a weighed 
manner. 
14 
focal points on the individual level and that it represents a framework for modeling coordination 
settings where fine-grained coordination strategies are feasible. 
 As shown at the beginning of that section, the projects are connected through their main 
topics (fairness and social norms), their methodology (experimental methods, coordination 
games), and the fact that allocation settings are involved in all experiments. In Chapter 7, I draw 
conclusions from the joint data by (i) connecting the results from the different projects, (ii) by 
discussing the limitations of the provided research, and (iii) by providing ideas about potentially 
interesting avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Implementing (Un)fair Procedures? Favoritism and Process 
Fairness when Inequality is Inevitable 
 
 
Robert J. Schmidt & Stefan T. Trautmann 
 
 
Abstract: We study allocation behavior when outcome inequality is inevitable but a fair 
process is feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job or award. We 
show that allocators may be influenced by inappropriate criteria, impeding the implementation 
of a fair process. We study four interventions to induce process fairness without restricting the 
allocator’s decisions: Increasing the transparency of the allocation process; providing a private 
randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and 
allowing the allocator to avoid information on inappropriate criteria. All interventions except 
transparency have positive effects, but differ substantially in their impact. 
 
Highlights: 
• We study favoritism and process fairness in a setting where inequality is unavoidable 
• Allocators exhibit a substantial degree of favoritism in one-shot decisions 
• Providing allocators with explicit tools to implement fair procedures is effective 
• We conclude that allocators are not unwilling but unable to implement fair procedures 
themselves 
 
Acknowledgments: We thank Emin Karagözoğlu as well as seminar audiences in Frankfurt, 
Heidelberg, Bremen, Vienna, Mannheim, Tilburg, Bocconi, Göttingen, Ulm, Shanghai, 
Nanjing, Dijon, Lyon, the Max-Planck Institute in Bonn, the ESA World Meeting in San Diego, 
the ESA European Meeting in Vienna, the HeiKaMax in Karlsruhe, the HeiKaMaxY in 
Mannheim, the Scandinavian Meeting in Gothenburg, and the Sabe/Iarep Meeting in London 
for very helpful suggestions. 
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2.1. Introduction 
Consider a committee’s choice between two candidates for a job. Both score equally good on 
various hard measures, thus there is little to guide the decision between the candidates. Other 
aspects can become influential at this stage, affecting the outcome of the decision. Such aspects 
may include the candidates’ gender, race, or political views. Importantly, the influence of such 
aspects may be undesirable to the committee itself, or to the organization for which the 
committee serves to select the candidate. They may still exert influence on the decision. 
Although the organization and the committee may thus aim to implement a fair selection 
process, biased outcomes can obtain and render the process unfair ex-post. 
 We show that when there are no clear economic criteria like performance or effort that 
could guide an allocation decision, softer criteria (in our case, overlap in political attitudes 
between allocator and recipients) have an overwhelming influence on how funds are allocated 
among two people. Despite its prevalence, we argue that the allocation on the basis of the 
political attitudes is not perceived as an appropriate criterion even by those who apply it. 
Moreover, irrespective of the decision-makers’ perception of the criterion, we take a 
prescriptive perspective and aim to reduce the influence of the political attitude information on 
the allocation outcome. To this end, we introduce a set of interventions in our setup and observe 
whether the adjusted decision environment is able to reduce the prevalence of allocation 
according to political views. In terms of the above example, even if some committee considers 
aspects like gender, race, or politics acceptable criteria absent clear differences between the 
candidates, the organization behind it may not do so, and may wish to reduce the incidence of 
its use.  
 Our experimental setup puts decision-makers in the position to allocate two outcomes, €8 
and €2, among two recipients. Similar to the case of selecting candidates for a job or to 
allocating an indivisible good or service to people in need (e.g., a donor organ among to people 
in need of a donation), there will be ex-post or outcome inequality. Absent clear criteria why 
one recipient should receive the more favorable payment, outcome inequality is typically 
assumed to be aversive (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). However, 
if outcome fairness is not attainable, a fair process may substitute for fair outcomes (Andreozzi 
et al., 2013; Bolton et al., 2005; Krawczyk, 2011; Trautmann, 2009; Trautmann and van de 
Kuilen, 2016; Trautmann and Wakker, 2010; Saito, 2013). In particular, randomly allocating 
the high and the low outcome can be interpreted as a fair process in our setting (Broome, 1990; 
Konow, 2003). Empirically, random allocation has been shown to be an important mechanism 
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employed by decision-makers (Bastek et al., 2018; Brock et al., 2013; Miao and Zhong, 2018; 
also Dwenger et al., 2016, in contexts other than fairness). In practical applications, an equal 
representation of candidates or recipients in terms of sex, race, or political orientation in the 
absence of clear differences in any hard criteria can be interpreted as evidence of a fair process. 
Fairness perceptions become especially important from the perspective of the decision-maker 
if recipients can react by rewarding or punishing fair or unfair processes (suing, filing complaint, 
recommending). Then, strategic and non-strategic reasons for implementing fair procedures 
become important to the decision-maker. We implement the possibility for reward and 
punishment in our setup.  
 In our allocation decision, there are no easily justifiable criteria (such as effort etc.) for 
which recipient should receive the higher payment. At the same time, the decision-maker has 
available a profile of the two recipients’ political attitudes (while recipients are uninformed 
about others’ political profiles). We find that in our baseline condition, about 90% of the high 
payoffs go to the recipient whose political profile is closer to that of the allocator. We then 
introduce four interventions with the aim to reduce the incidence of such favoritism. Each 
intervention condition deviates in one aspect from our baseline allocation condition: In 
Transparency we make all three political profiles in a group visible to each group member. 
Thus, favoritism becomes observable. In Private Lottery, the decision-maker allocates 
probabilities of receiving the high payoff to the two recipients, instead of outcomes directly. 
Recipients are aware of the procedure and learn about the resulting allocation, but do not know 
the exact probabilities chosen by the decision-maker. In Public Delegation, the decision-maker 
can publicly delegate the decision to a 50-50 random device; in three subcases, delegation is 
either for free or costly. Finally, in Information Avoidance, the decision-maker can decide not 
to see the information about the recipients’ political attitudes. In two subcases, whether the 
decision-maker avoided information or not before making her allocation decision is either 
observed or unobserved by the recipients. 
 An important feature of all four interventions is that a decision-maker who wants to allocate 
on the basis of the recipients’ political attitudes, has the freedom to do so. That is, the 
interventions are not trivial in the sense of simply restricting the use of the information or 
stipulating a decision, which would be unrealistic and undesirable in practice: decision-makers 
will typically hold specialized information relevant to the selection process, which the 
organization wants them to be able to use in determining the best allocation. Instead, the 
interventions provide an institutional environment aimed at reducing favoritism.  
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 In terms of the incidence of favoritism, we find that transparency has no effect. A private 
lottery works well, with the fair lottery being the modal choice to allocate the payments. 
Similarly, public delegation is taken up by a majority of decision-makers if for free; costly 
delegation is still taken up by a substantial share of decision-makers. Information avoidance is 
taken up by 12.5% of the decision-makers if privately known only, and by 52.3% when it is 
publicly known. Conditional on acquiring information, decision-makers are equally prone to 
allocate to the politically closer recipient as in Baseline.  
 We present the Baseline experimental design, procedures, and empirical measures in 
Section 2.2. Section 2.3 gives the results of the Baseline treatment. In Section 2.4 we define the 
interventions and report their effects on the decision-makers’ allocation behavior. Data on 
decision-makers’ beliefs are discussed where they help interpreting observed behavior. Data on 
fairness perceptions, the role of politics, and the behavior of the recipients aid our understanding 
of how favoritism affects the allocation decisions and how the interventions work. We present 
these results in the appendix, and refer to them in the main text where needed. Section 2.5 
discusses our results in the context of the related literature, and concludes with prescriptions 
for practical settings.  
 
2.2. Baseline Allocation Game and Experimental Design 
2.2.1. Experimental Paradigm 
The experimental paradigm is a simple 3-person (=1 group) allocation game in which the 
decision-maker (DM) allocates the two payments €8 and €2 to two recipients labelled A and B. 
Subsequently, after learning about the allocation, each recipient can costly reward or punish the 
DM by paying €0.10 for each €0.50 added or subtracted from the DM’s endowment of €5 
(which equals the average payoff of the recipients). Each recipient can reward or punish up to 
a maximum of €2 (at maximum cost of €0.40). Thus, the DM may end up with earnings between 
€1 where both recipients maximally punish, and €9 where they both maximally reward. 
Recipients may choose to neither punish or reward, and they make their decisions independently 
and simultaneously. Reward or punishment costs are deducted from the recipients’ earnings. 
While the DM makes her allocation decision, recipients provide their non-incentivized beliefs 
about the allocation (high versus low payment); while the recipients make their decisions, the 
DM provides non-incentivized beliefs about each recipients’ reward or punishment in terms of 
money destroyed/added. After all decisions are made, but before the DM is informed about 
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recipients´ choices, all three group members judge the fairness of the allocation process and the 
allocation outcome regarding the allocation of the €8 and €2 payments to recipients A and B 
(exact wording in Appendix A2.1). The DM is not informed about the recipients’ actions until 
after the questionnaire to prevent her fairness judgments reflect the recipients´ views as revealed 
by their rewarding decisions. 
 At the very beginning of the experiment, before receiving any instructions for the allocation 
game and before knowing their role in the game, subjects are asked five questions regarding 
their political attitudes. We informed subjects that their answers might be shown to other 
participants during the experiment (while maintaining full anonymity). All questions had binary 
answer possibilities and we instructed subjects to choose the answer options that best describes 
their attitudes. The five questions concern (i) their general political orientation (“rather left wing” 
or ”rather conservative”), and whether they support the (ii) unlimited inflow of refugees, (iii) 
female quotas in organizations, (iv) active euthanasia, and the (v) exit from nuclear energy. The 
original wording is provided in Appendix A2.1. In the Baseline treatment, before making her 
allocation decision, the DM is shown the political profile of recipients A and B. In contrast, the 
recipients do not learn about the profile of any other player. All players in the group are aware 
of the information available to other players at each stage of the game. 
 In appendix A2.3, we show that there is substantial variation of political attitudes in our 
total sample and also at the level of the 3-payer groups: on average, the two recipients within a 
group disagree on 2.03 of the 5 items of the political attitude questionnaire. We are interested 
in how similarity in attitudes affects the DM’s allocation in the absence of any other relevant 
information. We therefore define the following similarity or closeness measure. We compare 
the answers of recipient j = {A, B} with the answers of the DM and denote the number of items 
on which recipient j agrees with the allocator as 𝑆𝑗. Thus, higher 𝑆𝑗 indicates higher similarity 
between the allocator and recipient j. We then define the relative similarity 𝑆𝐴𝐵 = 𝑆𝐴 − 𝑆𝐵. 
Thus, if 𝑆𝐴𝐵 > 0 recipient A is more similar to the DM, and if 𝑆𝐴𝐵 < 0 recipient B is more 
similar to the allocator. For 𝑆𝐴𝐵 = 0 the similarity of recipients with the allocator is identical 
according to our definition. Note that 𝑆𝐴𝐵 = 0  implies only that recipients agree with the 
allocator on the same number of items. It does not necessarily imply that they have identical 
political profiles, and the exact items they agree on may differ between recipients. The average 
of the absolute value of the relative similarity measure 𝑆𝐴𝐵 across all groups in our experiment 
is 1.15 (see Appendix A2.3). 
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2.2.2. Treatments and Hypotheses  
The allocation game as described above forms our Baseline condition.8 We hypothesized that 
allocation decisions are affected by the political attitude information provided to the DM. In 
Section 2.3, we show that this was indeed the case. In Section 2.4, we present four interventions 
for which we hypothesized that they reduce the incidence of favoritism. Importantly, in each of 
the intervention treatments, the DM in principle has the possibility to allocate according to 
favoritism just as in the Baseline treatment. Our focus in the current study is prescriptive. That 
is, we assume that either (i) the DM would like to implement a fair allocation process but does 
not succeed to do so, or (ii) that some other entity would like the DM to apply a fair process. 
We aim to design an environment in which the DM then makes choices that imply a fair process. 
To understand the individual and strategic motivations of the different players, especially the 
DM, we add a condition Random, in which the decision-maker does not make a choice, but 
outcomes are allocated randomly with equal probability. The condition allows us to observe 
beliefs and rewards or punishments in the case a fair process is exogenously imposed, but 
outcomes are still unequal. 
 
2.2.3. Laboratory Procedures 
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruitment was done 
via hroot (Bock et al., 2014) and ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Across all treatments, 876 subjects 
took part in the experiment. Subjects were mainly undergraduate students from a wide range of 
different majors, with 35% having an economics background. A typical session lasted about 35 
minutes, and subjects earned on average about €8.10 including a show-up fee of €3. We 
conducted 48 experimental sessions at Heidelberg University (24 sessions) and Frankfurt 
University (24 sessions) between November 2016 and November 2017. Table 2.1 shows the 
number and location distribution of 3-person groups over all treatment conditions, and the 
number of groups with 𝑆𝐴𝐵 ≠ 0 in each condition. 
  
 
 8 An overview of all experimental conditions and a full set of instructions is available in the webappendix at 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/yig7lte2pnimcov/ST_2019_procfair_Webappendix_march10.pdf?dl=0. 
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Table 2.1. Number of 3-person Groups by Treatment and Location 
 Heidelberg Frankfurt 
# of groups 
total 
# of groups 
with 𝑆𝐴𝐵 ≠ 0 
Baseline 22 18 40 28 
Random 24 14 38 26 
Transparency 17 24 41 32 
Private Lottery 18 23 41 27 
Public Delegation 22 18 40 26 
Information Avoidance (private) 18 30 48 41 
Information Avoidance (public) 18 26 44 32 
  
2.3. Baseline Results: Strong Evidence for Favoritism 
In the baseline condition there were 28 out of 40 groups in which the two recipients had an 
unequal political distance to the DM, that is, 𝑆𝐴𝐵 ≠ 0. In 25 of these 28 cases (89.3%), the DM 
allocated the higher payment to the more similar participant, significantly more often than we 
would expect under random allocation (p < 0.001, binomial test against 0.5).9 Using relative 
similarity indicators based on individual dimensions (that is, defining Sj and SAB for each 
dimension separately), Table 2.2 shows that all dimensions except female quotas significantly 
added to this preferential treatment.10 
Table 2.2. Relative Similarity and Allocation Behavior in Baseline 
Dimension of similarity Assignment of high payoff 
Left-wing political attitude 0.387** (2.16) 
Support of unlimited refugee inflow 0.269* (1.76) 
Support of mandatory female quota 0.221 (1.49) 
Support of active euthanasia 0.791** (2.27) 
Support of exit from nuclear energy 0.715*** (2.81) 
Observations 38 
Notes: Marginal effects of probit regression reported, z-values in parenthesis. The 
number of observations is 38 as in two groups recipients are exactly identical. The 
explanatory variables are dimension specific relative distance measures. *, **, *** 
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
  
 
 9 All test statistics reported in this paper regard two-sided tests.  
 10  Analyses of pooled data for all conditions of the experiment replicate this finding with all dimensions 
significantly adding to favoritism (Appendix A2.3). 
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 Allocation according to similarity is consistent with social identity effects: differences in 
political views form a basis for interpretations of one recipient as ingroup and the other, less 
similar one, as outgroup (Chen and Li, 2009). However, to better understand the motivation of 
the DMs we consider their beliefs and fairness judgments. Table 2.3 shows the DMs’ beliefs 
about the rewards and punishments. We see that DMs expect moderately positive rewards in 
case of the Random treatment that guarantees a fair procedure. In Baseline, they expect 
significantly higher reward from the high payoff recipient, and a significantly higher 
punishment from the low payoff recipient. On average they expect a total reward of €0.25 in 
Random and €0.00 in Baseline, a marginally significant difference (p < 0.1, Mann-Whitney-U 
test). From a strategic perspective based on their own beliefs, it may thus be desirable for DMs 
to signal a fair procedure. 
Table 2.3. DMs´ Beliefs about Reward and Punishment in Baseline and Random 
 High payoff recipient Low payoff recipient 
Baseline €0.83### - €0.83### 
Random €0.39## 0.11 
Difference - €0.44** €0.94*** 
Notes: Entries are average beliefs about additions to / reductions from the DM endowment 
(at cost €0.10 per €0.50 addition / reduction). *, **, *** indicates significant difference 
between Baseline and Random conditions at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, Mann-Whitney-U 
test. #, #, ### indicates significant difference from zero, two-sided t-test. 
  
Appendix A2.2 discusses fairness perceptions in detail. There we show that DMs perceive the 
recipients’ outcome allocation as rather unfair in both Baseline and Random (2.43 vs. 2.84 on 
a scale from 1 to 7). At the same time, they perceive the allocation based on their own decision 
as substantially less procedurally fair than the random allocation (2.45 vs. 4.03, p < 0.001, 
Mann-Whitney-U-test). This suggests, that despite the clear evidence for favoritism, DMs do 
not seem to consider allocation according to political preferences as appropriate from a fairness 
perspective. Moreover, in an ex-post questionnaire (Appendix A2.5), DMs indicate that they 
feel they were influenced by the information, but did not intentionally favor one person. This 
interpretation is also consistent with findings by Dong and Huang (2018), who show that 
fairness considerations are stronger than ingroup preferences in an allocation game. In contrast 
to the current design, however, Dong and Huang’s (2018) decision-makers had the opportunity 
to implement outcomes fairly.  
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2.4. Interventions to Reduce Favoritism 
Given the absence of any strong difference in deservingness or merit, we argue that an 
allocation that gives equal chances to the two recipients is preferable in the current setting. This 
also seems to be supported by the DMs’ own fairness judgments, and from the perspective of 
their strategic incentives (beliefs). Still, we found clear evidence that the DMs use the 
information on political attitudes in their allocation decision. In almost 90% of the groups with 
differences in political attitudes, we find favoritism. We therefore introduce a set of 
interventions that aim to reduce the incidence of favoritism, without directly imposing a fair 
procedure as in Random. The reason is that a direct obligation to use a fair (random) procedure 
will often not be helpful in practice. In the current setting we know that there are no hard facts 
guiding the allocation decision, and all deviation from equal chances can be attributed to the 
effects of political attitudes. However, in practice it will often be less clear whether hard facts 
were exhausted, and when to impose a fair procedure on the DM. Rather, we would like the 
DM to freely choose to implement a fair procedure. These considerations guided the design of 
the following four interventions. 
 
2.4.1. Transparency 
2.4.1.1. Design and Hypotheses 
In this condition, we establish full transparency with respect to the political profiles between 
group members. That is, in contrast to Baseline, where only the decision-maker learns the 
recipients´ profiles, all three political profiles within a group are known by each group member. 
We hypothesized that the extent of favoritism will be reduced compared to Baseline. Recipients 
will now be able to assess the potential effect role of politics on the allocation (albeit with only 
1 data point). We thus conjectured that some DMs will use a contrarian strategy by choosing 
the less close recipient in the sense of positive discrimination, and that others may explicitly 
randomize “in their mind.” These two effects would lead to a more balanced allocation in terms 
of the similarity measure.  
 
2.4.1.2. Results 
In Transparency, we have 32 groups in which the recipients have different degrees of similarity 
with the allocator. The DM chooses the more similar recipient in 30 cases (93.8%), significantly 
more often than a random choice (p < 0.001, binomial test against 0.5). We thus do not find 
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reduced favoritism in an environment where recipients are able to identify it. Recipients 
anticipate the allocator´s choice behavior, as 89.1% of recipients expect the allocator to choose 
the more similar recipient (recipients are aware of the political profiles when providing their 
beliefs).  
 DMs fairness judgments in Transparency are indistinguishable from the Baseline condition 
(see Appendix A2.2): they consider both the outcomes and the process as unfair. DMs’ beliefs 
are slightly (insignificantly) less optimistic about the high-payoff recipient and slightly 
(marginally significantly) less pessimistic about the low-payoff recipient (Appendix A2.4). 
That is, it seems to be neither the case that DM consider it very appropriate to allocate to the 
more similar participant (which should have led to substantially more optimistic beliefs), nor 
do they expect stronger repercussions under transparent allocation towards a more similar 
recipient. Transparency does not work as an intervention to reduce favoritism. 
 
2.4.2. Private Lottery 
2.4.2.1. Design and Hypotheses 
In this condition, we allow allocators to distribute chances to receive the high outcome between 
recipients, rather than the outcome themselves. The DM is equipped with a randomization 
device allowing her to allocate a probability p of 100%, 90%, 75%, 60%, 50%, 40%, 25%, 10%, 
0% for the high payoff to one recipient, with probability 1-p allocated to the other recipient. 
Given the selected probabilities, the computer then determines the (still unequal) final outcome 
allocation. While in Baseline and Transparency only an implicit randomization by “coin flip in 
their mind” was possible for the DMs, the lottery procedure allows them to explicitly select a 
fair equal-chance procedure. However, asymmetric allocations of chances are also possible, in 
particular the allocation of a 100% chance to the politically closer recipient is still available (as 
in Baseline, only the DM knows the political profiles, and does so before making her allocation 
decision). Importantly, recipients do not learn which lottery the allocator selected, only the final 
outcome.  
 We hypothesized that the extent of favoritism will be reduced compared to Baseline, 
because a fair procedure (allocation of 50% chance to either participant) is directly available. 
Implicit randomization in their mind may be more difficult to implement for participants than 
a direct choice of the fair procedure. Moreover, the availability of the explicit randomization 
device may make the fair procedure more salient, even in the presence of other unfair 
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allocations (p50%). Moreover, for a modest degree of favoritism, a more nuanced way to 
allocate chances (90%, 75%, or 60%) is now available. That is, although only intrinsic 
motivations can guide to the DM allocation decisions absent public information about her 
allocation of chances, we predict that the incidence of “100%” allocation is substantially 
reduced in comparison to Baseline or Transparency.  
 
2.4.2.2. Results 
In Private Lottery, we have 27 groups in which the recipients have different degrees of 
similarity with the allocator. In these groups, the DM allocates a chance of 100% to the more 
similar recipient in 4 occasions (14.8%), and to the less similar recipient once (3.7%). Clearly 
handing out the higher €8-payment to either candidate is not a compelling option for DMs in 
this treatment. Figure 2.1 shows the full distribution of chance allocations for the 27 groups 
with unequal similarity measure, and for those 14 groups with equal similarity, i.e., 𝑆𝐴𝐵 = 0. 
Figure 2.1. Allocation of Chance to Closer Recipient 
 
Notes: X-axis shows the probability assigned by the DM to the more similar recipient (or one of the 
equally close recipients in case of equal similarity). Y-axis gives percentage of choices of each of 
these chance allocations over groups with unequal similarity measures, or groups with equal 
similarity measures, respectively. 
 
 In groups where recipients have different similarities, the modal allocation is the equal-
chance allocation, which accounts for almost half of all decisions. Still, the politically closer 
recipient receives on average a probability weight of 61.7%, which is significantly larger than 
the equal-chance allocation of 50% (p < 0.05, t-test); moreover, a recipients’ similarity score 𝑆𝑗 
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and her assigned probability of the €8-payoff are positively correlated ( = 0.3317, Spearman 
rank correlation, p < 0.05). However, favoritism is significantly reduced compared to Baseline 
and Transparency if we take the realized allocation probabilities of 89.3% and 93.8% in these 
conditions as a benchmark (p < 0.001 against Baseline and p < 0.001 against Transparency, 
two-sided t-tests). That is, there is only a very modest degree of favoritism. This also shows up 
in the data for the groups with equal similarity measure. Despite the equal similarity measure, 
in almost 30% of the cases, the DM allocates modestly different chances to the two recipients. 
These deviations from the equal-chance allocation may either be random, or may derive from 
differences on individual items of the political attitude questionnaire. The finding suggests that 
some modest degree of favoritism seems desirable to the DM. On balance, however, providing 
a private randomization device successfully reduces the incidence of favoritism in our setting 
by a substantial margin.  
 We can shed more light on the desirability of favoritism using the fine-grained chance 
allocations in the current treatment together with the political attitude measures of the DMs. In 
the 27 groups with 𝑆𝐴𝐵 ≠ 0 , DMs who are classified as left-wing
11  on average assign a 
probability weight of 65.8% for the high payoff to the closer participant, while subjects 
categorized as right-wing on average assign a probability weight of 50% to both recipients. The 
difference between the two groups is marginally statistically significant (p < 0.1, Mann-
Whitney-U test). 
 
2.4.3. Public Delegation 
2.4.3.1. Design and Hypotheses 
In this condition, we give the DM the opportunity to publicly delegate the allocation decision 
to a random device that assigns the payoffs with equal chances to the two recipients. Delegation 
may be costly for the allocator with the possible prices being €0.00, €0.50 and €1.00. We apply 
the strategy method in order to have allocators indicate for each price whether they want to 
delegate, or whether they want to make the decision themselves (knowing the recipients’ 
political profiles). If they choose to decide themselves for some price, they are also directly 
asked to indicate their allocation decision for that case. These decisions are all shown on one 
screen. Subsequently, one of the three prices is randomly selected, and the DM’s decision for 
that price is implemented. Recipients learn only about the payoff relevant decision. That is, for 
 
 11 Based on the answers to our 6 political questions, answering more than 50% of the questions in a typical left-
leaning way. For the exact definition of this measure, see Appendix A2.3. 
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the price that has been selected, they learn the price of delegation, whether the DM delegated 
or not, and what their payoffs is.  
 We hypothesized that public delegation allows (i) intrinsically motivated DMs to 
implement the fair procedure similar to Private Lottery, and (ii) strategically oriented DM to 
signal fair procedure (see comparison of DMs’ beliefs between Random and Baseline). We thus 
expected a strong reduction in favoritism (indicated by high take-up of delegation). However, 
we also expect DMs to trade-off the costs of delegation against its benefits (strategic or 
intrinsic). We thus expect a lower degree of delegation for higher prices. This effect is 
potentially moderated by the stronger signal to oneself and others of choosing delegation given 
a higher price.  
 
2.4.3.2. Results 
If delegation is costless, 70.0% of the DMs delegate the decision to the random device, a 
significantly larger share than we would expect if DM randomized (p < 0.05, binomial test 
against 0.5). As the price increases to €0.50, 32.5% of the DM delegate, a significant reduction 
(p < 0.001, sign-test). A further increase to a price of €1.00 leads to 20% of the DM selecting 
delegation, a significant further reduction (p < 0.05, sign-test). However, for 22.5% of the DMs 
we observe that they delegate if delegation is costless, and in the two costly cases they choose 
each recipient exactly once for the high payoff. That is, the strong price sensitivity may to some 
degree be driven by the fact that an alternative (but unobserved by recipients) “implied 
randomization device” was available through the strategy method. 
 To better understand the motivation to delegate, for the costless delegation case we asked 
the DMs’ about their expected rewards or punishments in case they delegate and in case they 
do not. We find that DMs expect significantly lower reward from the high payoff recipient and 
lower punishment from the low payoff recipient, with a positive but insignificant overall effect 
on the sum of rewards and punishments. These patterns of beliefs are consistent with those in 
Baseline versus Random. Regressing political attitudes (a left-wing index) on the delegation 
decision in the costless case does not suggest any political preference for public delegation (see 
Appendix A2.3. for details). 
 Overall, the opportunity for public delegation successfully reduces the incidence of 
favoritism. Counting delegation as non-favoritism (“50%”), we find overall 65.4% (for price 
€0), 73.1% (for price €0.50) and 78.8% (for price €1.00) of allocations of high payoffs towards 
the politically closer recipient (calculations include only groups with 𝑆𝐴𝐵 ≠ 0). That is, even 
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costly delegation can have a substantial effect in reducing favoritism. Interestingly, for costless 
delegation, the effect is comparable to the effect of Private Lottery, which led to a 61.7% 
likelihood of the closer recipient being allocated the high payoff. 
 
2.4.4. Information Avoidance 
2.4.4.1. Design and Hypotheses 
In this condition, before the allocation decision takes place, the DM has to decide whether she 
wants to be informed about the political profiles of the recipients before making her decision, 
or not. If the DM decides to learn the profiles of the recipients, the decision environment is the 
same as in Baseline. If she decides to stay uninformed, she does not learn the political profile 
of recipients and takes the allocation decision without having any knowledge about the 
recipients (i.e., de-facto allocating randomly) 
 We conduct two variants of this condition: private and public avoidance of information. In 
the first variant, the avoidance decision happens privately, i.e., recipients do not learn whether 
the DM wanted to remain uninformed about recipients’ politics. In the second variant, recipients 
are informed about the DM’s self-selected information status. Recipients always know that 
information avoidance was possible. 
 We hypothesized that it may be difficult for DMs to disregard information once they 
obtained it, but that they may prefer not to receive information that they do not want their 
decision to be influenced by. Moreover, public delegation or private randomization may 
sometimes be difficult to implement in practice, possibly because it is at odds with the idea that 
there exists an optimal allocation and the DM is tasked to identify and implement it. 
Withholding information that is considered irrelevant or inappropriate to use is potentially 
easier to justify. We further hypothesized that publicly observable information avoidance is 
more attractive to DMs as it combines intrinsic and strategic benefits. 
 
2.4.4.2. Results 
For private Information Avoidance, we find that 6 of the 48 DMs (12.5%) avoid information 
about recipients’ politics. Conditional on obtaining such information, we find a similar degree 
of favoritism as in baseline. Of the 42 groups where DMs obtained information, 𝑆𝐴𝐵 ≠ 0 in 36 
groups. In these groups, 32 DMs (88.9%) allocated the higher payoff to the closer recipient. In 
public Information Avoidance, we find that 23 of the 44 DMs (52.3%) avoid information about 
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recipients’ politics. Conditional on obtaining such information, we find a similar degree of 
favoritism as in baseline. Of the 21 groups where DMs obtained information, 𝑆𝐴𝐵 ≠ 0 in 17 
groups. In these groups, 16 DMs (94.1%) allocated the higher payoff to the closer recipient.  
 The difference in information avoidance between private and public conditions is 
substantial and statistically significant (p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney-U test). Counting 
information avoidance as non-favoritism (“50%”), we find overall 83.3% allocations of high 
payoffs towards the politically closer recipient in the private and 68.8% in the public condition 
(calculations include all DMs who avoid information and DMs who obtain information and 
observe 𝑆𝐴𝐵 ≠ 0). That is, public information avoidance has a somewhat lower but comparable 
effect to Public Delegation and Private Lottery. The private information avoidance opportunity 
does not work well. It seems that DMs have a strong preference for information, even if they 
later end up finding it unfortunate making use of it in the binary allocation decision. It seems 
more compelling for DMs to later resort to random allocation if given the opportunity, 
irrespective of its private or public nature, than to avoid information in the first place. We find 
no link between the political attitude of the DM and the decision to avoid information 
(Appendix A2.3). 
 
2.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper studies a setup common to many allocation problems: (1) a resource is indivisible; 
(2) objective criteria to guide the allocate decision are unavailable (in practice they may not 
help distinguish between people after an initial preselection of candidates); and (3) softer 
subjective criteria may be available to the allocator. We hypothesized that such softer criteria 
play an important role affecting the allocation. Importantly, we assume that often either the 
decision-maker or the institution employing or controlling the decision-maker, consider a 
decision on the basis of such soft criteria inappropriate (Shaw and Olson, 2014; Choshen-Hillel 
et al., 2015). 
 Because a fair allocation of outcomes is unattainable, establishing process fairness may be 
desirable (Moorman, 1991; Organ and Ryan, 1995). Decision-makers or organizations may 
have an intrinsic preference for process fairness (Krawczyk, 2010; Saito, 2013; Trautmann, 
2009). They may also fear repercussions (legal, sabotage) from the affected agents if the 
allocation process is not perceived as fair (Dickinson et al., 2017; Grosch and Rau, 2017; see 
also Appendix A2.2), or vice versa, expect higher acceptance of unfavorable outcomes if 
fairness is signaled (e.g., by delegation, Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Coffman and Real, 
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2018). More generally, process fairness can make undesirable organizational outcomes and 
procedures more acceptable (Adler et al., 1983; Brockner, 2002; Garonzik et al., 2000; Kessler 
and Leider, 2016; Skarlicki and Folger, 1997). An organization may therefore want to induce 
the allocator to employ a fair process. However, any mechanism inducing process fairness 
should be such that the allocator can freely choose to allocate fairly: in most settings, only the 
decision-maker will be able to judge which criteria can be used as hard facts, and whether they 
help to distinguish among candidates. 
 In a Baseline condition, we replicate empirical evidence that favoritism is strong in 
situations where an indivisible resource has to be allocated among multiple parties (Hong et al., 
2016; Robin et al., 2012). About 90% of the decision-makers allocate according to the soft 
criterion provided by the political attitude measures. Given that political similarity is the only 
available information, and that an unfair outcome allocation cannot be prevented, it is not 
surprising that the attitudes determine the allocation. However, evidence on fairness judgments 
and expected rewards in comparison to a controlled Random allocation condition suggests that 
allocation according to political attitudes is not perceived as appropriate. That is, in Baseline, 
decision-makers do not prefer to allocate according to politics, but there is little to prevent such 
a result to emerge. Irrespective of whether the allocators find the use of politics to guide their 
decision appropriate, we emphasize that the entity designing the allocation process may find it 
undesirable. We therefore design four interventions with the goal to reduce favoritism, that is, 
aiming for a 50% benchmark for the allocation of the better outcome to the politically closer 
participant, but without enforcing random choice. Moreover, given the above considerations 
regarding repercussions if processes are perceived as unfair, the intervention should also 
improve fairness judgments. 
 A simple measure to compare the interventions is provided by the implied share of 
favoritism. The politically closer recipient is allocated the better outcome in the following share 
of groups: 93.8% when full transparency is provided; 61.7% if a private random lottery can be 
employed to distribute chances rather than outcomes directly; between 65.4% and 78.8% if 
public delegation is available (depending on the cost of signaling the fair procedure); and 68.8% 
respectively 83.3% if information can be avoided before making a decision and this is either 
communicated to recipients or not.  
 We make a few observations. All interventions except Transparency have some effect 
reducing the incidence of favoritism, but none of the interventions fully eliminates favoritism. 
The possibility to signal the intention to apply a fair procedure is important for its success. 
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Higher cost of implementing a fair procedure reduce allocators willingness to apply a fair 
procedure. Making an indivisible resource flexibly “divisible” by using allocation according to 
probability shares has a stronger effect than any of the process-fairness signaling interventions, 
despite the private nature of the mechanism. This is consistent with the result that none of the 
interventions attains a clearly positive judgment of process fairness: unfair outcomes matter for 
the assessment of the process (Baron and Hershey, 1988; König-Kersting et al., 2018). That is, 
although there is a process-fairness effect on outcome fairness evaluations (which we may dub 
an inverse outcome bias, see Appendix A2.2), the effect is too modest to make a compelling 
case for equal-chance random allocation. These findings replicate previous work showing that 
random allocation of indivisible outcomes may not be as convincing empirically as the 
theoretical process fairness perspective predicts (Elster, 1989, p. 55; Keren and Teigen, 2010). 
The success of the flexible Private Lottery condition suggests that equal-chance random 
allocation (as in Public Delegation or Information Avoidance) may be too strong. Allowing 
allocators a modest degree of favoritism (by allocating unequal probabilities) works better than 
the more stringent interventions. As a final observation, we note that the take-up of Information 
Avoidance, either private or public, seems too modest in comparison to the observed preference 
for process fairness in Private Lottery and Public Delegation. We interpret the finding as a 
preference for knowing (e.g., Loewenstein, 1994, but see Hertwig and Engel, 2016), with 
allocators not anticipating the possibly undesirable degree of influence on their decisions.  
 Apart from Private Lottery, the interventions discussed here have close counterparts in 
practical settings. Transparency and delegation to a neutral entity are classic solutions in many 
domains. Information Avoidance has been proposed in public discourses as a remedy for biased 
selection in labor or rental markets. Our results suggest that transparency may not work when 
each decision-maker makes only one decision, and coordination across decision-makers is not 
easily attainable. How would companies coordinate to attain a close to equal share of male and 
female CEOs? The possibility to publicly delegate or avoid certain types of information is 
supported by our results as an effective tool. Interestingly, the most successful intervention, 
namely a weighted random selection if candidates are very close, has been proposed as a tool 
to implement justice in distribution processes in an early contribution by Edgeworth (1890). He 
suggested using graduated lotteries in the context of permission to the civil service, i.e., lotteries 
calibrated with regard to merit, for example, examination scores. Merit would be accounted for, 
and feelings of injustice by the candidates, stemming from the possibly arbitrary character of 
the examination, would be mitigated. Boyle (1998) argues that such lotteries help implement 
fairness in selection processes in organizations, incorporating both efficiency and equity 
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considerations, and avoiding biases and corruption. Despite these theoretical foundations, 
weighted lotteries are, to the best of our knowledge, not a tool used in practice. We believe that 
this is due to the possibly questionable normative status of the mechanism. If one candidate is 
preferable, she should be allocated the better outcome. If there is no clear ordering of candidates, 
an equal share allocation seems most compelling.12 A weighted random allocation allowing for 
inclusion of soft criteria is not convincing from this perspective. However, if the mechanism 
works best for imperfect, worldly decision-makers, it may be the right intervention to achieve 
our empirical goal: procedural fairness.  
  
 
  
 
 12 Alternatively, more information should potentially be collected to find the best candidate. While this may not 
always be feasible in practice, the possibility of random allocation may be problematic if it leads to too little 
information collected in the first place.  
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Appendix 2 
A2.1. Questionnaire Details 
A2.1.1. Original German wording in political-attitudes questionnaire 
The original wording of the political attitudes questionnaire taken at the beginning of the 
experiment was as follows: 
Bitte beantworten Sie zunächst den folgenden Fragebogen zu verschiedenen politischen 
Themen, indem Sie die Antwortmöglichkeit auswählen, die am ehesten auf Sie zutrifft 
(die Fragen beziehen sich jeweils auf Deutschland). 
Ihre Antworten werden möglicherweise an andere Teilnehmer bei diesem Experiment 
weitergeleitet. Ihre Anonymität bleibt jedoch selbstverständlich während des gesamten 
Experimentes und auch bei der Auswertung der Daten gewahrt. 
1. Wie ist Ihre politische Ausrichtung? [„Eher Links“ / „Eher rechts“] 
2. Sind Sie für oder gegen die unbegrenzte Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen? ["Dafür" / 
"Dagegen"] 
3. Wie stehen Sie der Einführung von Frauenquoten in Unternehmen gegenüber? 
["Positiv" / "Negativ"] 
4. Sind Sie für oder gegen die Einführung der aktiven Sterbehilfe? ["Dafür" / 
"Dagegen"] 
5. Wie beurteilen Sie den Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie? ["Sinnvoll" / "Nicht sinnvoll"] 
 
A2.1.2. Wording of the fairness-perception questionnaire 
The wording of the outcome and process fairness evaluations regarding the allocation of 
payments to player A and B was follows: 
Outcome Fairness [German wording ] / [ translation ] 
 [ „Als wie fair beurteilen Sie die Auszahlungen, die für Spieler A und Spieler B aus 
dem Verteilungsprozess resultieren?“ ] / [ „How fair do you evaluate the payments that 
result for Player A and Player B?” ] 
Process Fairness [German wording ] / [ translation ] 
 [ „Als wie fair beurteilen Sie den Sie den Verteilungsprozess?“ ] / [ „How fair do you 
evaluate the allocation process?” ] 
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Participants answered the questions on a 7-point-Likert scale, with point 1 labeled as “very 
unfair” and point 7 labeled as “very fair”, and point 4 representing a neutral judgment).  
 
A2.2. Fairness Perceptions 
This appendix provides details on the players’ perceptions of process fairness and outcome 
fairness. Table A2.1 shows fairness perceptions in the Baseline condition, and compares them 
to the perceptions in the forcedly fair Random condition, the Transparency condition, the 
Private Lottery condition, and the Private Information Avoidance condition. Results are shown 
by player type and pooled over all player types.  
 
Table A2.1. Fairness Perceptions  
Condition DM 
High Payoff 
Recipient 
Low Payoff 
recipient 
All 
Players 
 
Process 
Fairness 
Outcome 
Fairness 
Process 
Fairness 
Outcome 
Fairness 
Process 
Fairness 
Outcome 
Fairness 
Process 
Fairness 
Outcome 
Fairness 
Baseline 2.45### 2.43### 3.15### 2.55### 2.10### 1.85### 2.57### 2.28### 
Random 4.03 2.84### 3.53 2.66### 4.32 2.50### 3.96 2.67### 
Δ Random 1.58*** 0.41 0.38 0.11 2.22*** 0.65** 1.39*** 0.39** 
Transparency 2.44### 2.20### 2.85### 2.37### 2.56### 2.37### 2.62### 2.31### 
Δ Transparency -0.01 -0.23 -0.30 -0.18 0.46 0.52** 0.05 0.03 
Private Lottery 3.05### 2.63### 3.37## 2.93### 2.71### 2.20### 3.04### 2.59### 
Δ Private Lottery 0.60** 0.20 0.22 0.38 0.61** 0.35 0.47*** 0.31** 
Private Information 
Avoidance  
2.88### 2.33### 2.98### 2.48### 2.40### 2.17### 2.75### 2.33### 
Δ Private Information 
Avoidance  
0.43 -0.10 -0.17 -0.07 0.30 0.32 0.18 0.05 
Notes: The table contains evaluations about process fairness and outcome fairness measured on a 7-point-Likert 
scale (1=“very unfair“; 7=“very fair“). Δ Name indicates differences between condition Name and Baseline. #, #, 
### indicates significant difference from the value of 4 (which indicates neutrality on the fairness scale), two-sided 
t-test, and *, **, *** indicates significant difference between Baseline and Name condition, Mann-Whitney-U test, 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
 Table A2.2 considers the role of public delegation and public information avoidance for 
fairness perceptions. We find that delegation and information avoidance lead to higher 
perceptions of process fairness. Note that only for the DM the situation is self-selected; the 
recipients are exposed to the situation as determined by the DM. 
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Table A2.2. Fairness perceptions in Delegation and Public Information Avoidance  
Condition DM 
High Payoff 
Recipient 
Low Payoff 
recipient 
All 
Players 
 
Process 
Fairness 
Outcome 
Fairness 
Process 
Fairness 
Outcome 
Fairness 
Process 
Fairness 
Outcome 
Fairness 
Process 
Fairness 
Outcome 
Fairness 
No Delegation 
(n=23) 
3.39## 2.39### 3.74 3.04## 2.17### 1.91### 3.10### 2.45### 
Delegation (n=17) 4.41 2.47### 4.65 3.18# 4.65 3.24 4.57## 2.96### 
Δ Delegation 1.02 0.08 0.91 0.14 2.48*** 1.33*** 1.47*** 0.51** 
Information publicly 
not avoided (n=21) 
2.57### 2.33### 2.81### 2.29### 2.10### 2.00### 2.49### 2.21### 
Information publicly 
avoided (n=23) 
3.52 2.00### 3.04### 2.17### 3.17# 2.83### 3.25### 2.33### 
Δ Information 
publicly avoided  
0.95 -0.33 0.23 -0.12 1.07* 0.83 0.76** 0.12 
Notes: The table contains evaluations about process fairness and outcome fairness measured on a 7-point-Likert 
scale (1=“very unfair“; 7=“very fair“). Δ Delegation and Δ Information publicly avoided indicates differences 
between groups in which the DM delegated / avoided information, and those where she did not. #, #, ### indicates 
significant difference from the value of 4 (which indicates neutrality on the fairness scale), two-sided t-test, and *, 
**, *** indicates significant difference between delegation and non-delegation, respectively information 
avoidance and non-avoidance, Mann-Whitney-U test, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
 Table A2.1 and A2.2 show that there is some tendency for self-serving process and 
outcome fairness evaluations. High payoff recipients report higher process fairness judgments 
than low payoff recipients in conditions Baseline (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney-U test), Private 
Lottery (p < 0.1, Mann-Whitney-U test), Private Information Avoidance (p < 0.05), and in 
Delegation (but only when the DM does not delegate, p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney-U test). Low 
payoff recipients perceive higher process fairness in Random (p < 0.1, Mann-Whitney-U test). 
Likewise, high payoff recipients report higher outcome fairness judgments than low payoff 
recipients in conditions Baseline (p < 0.01, Mann-Whitney-U test), Private Lottery (p < 0.01, 
Mann-Whitney-U test) and Delegation (but only if the DM does not delegate, p < 0.05, Mann-
Whitney-U test). Overall the evidence for self-serving fairness perceptions suggests the 
existence of an outcome bias in fairness judgments. Table A2.1 and A2.2 also show that 
increased perception of process fairness often coincides with higher perceptions of outcome 
fairness, despite the constant degree of outcome inequality in payoffs across all conditions of 
the experiment. Pooling data of all treatments and all players, we find a significant positive 
correlation between outcome and process fairness evaluations at the individual level (= 0.5716, 
Spearman rank correlation, p < 0.001). Figure A2.1 shows the relationship graphically for all 
players pooled (effects are very similar for all three player types). With process fairness 
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judgments affected by treatment conditions and outcome inequality fixed, we observe what we 
may term a process bias in outcome fairness judgments. 
 
Figure A2.1. Relationship Between Process and Outcome Fairness Perceptions 
(all subjects pooled) 
 
 We finally assess whether fairness perceptions correlate with recipients’ punishment or 
retaliation behavior. Table A2.3 shows the results of simple regression analysis of the rewarding 
behavior across all conditions, as a function of the recipients’ process and outcome fairness 
judgments. We find no significant relationship of process or outcome fairness judgments of 
high payoff recipient with their behavior. For low payoff recipients, rewarding behavior 
correlates strongly with their process fairness judgments, but not with outcome fairness 
judgments. 
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Table A2.3. Regression analysis of fairness perception on reward/retaliation behavior 
 
Impact on DM´s payoff 
from high payoff recipient 
Impact on DM´s payoff 
from low payoff recipient 
Process Fairness 
Judgment 
0.002 
(0.042) 
0.211*** 
(0.044) 
Outcome Fairness 
Judgment 
-0.061 
(0.050) 
0.001 
(0.056) 
Constant 
1.000*** 
(0.130) 
-0.844*** 
(0.131) 
N 292 292 
Notes: Process Fairness and Outcome Fairness are judged on a 7-point-Likert scale, with the value 
of 1 being labeled as “very unfair” and the value of 7 being labeled as “very fair.” The impact on 
DM´s payoff ranges from –€2 to +€2, with incremental steps of €0.50. OLS regressions; all 
conditions pooled; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01, standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
A2.3. The role of politics 
This appendix sheds more light on the role of political attitudes in the current allocation setting. 
Pooling the data from all treatments (876 subjects), Table A2.4 shows the distribution of 
answers for each of the 5 political attitude questions. The data shows a large degree of variation 
over recipients, as 92.5% of recipients within a group differ on at least one item. On average, 
recipients within one group chose different answers in 2.03 items.13 
Table A2.4. Summary Statistics on Political Attitudes 
Item Distribution among respondents (n=876) Correlation 
General political attitude Left wing: 61.5% Conservative: 38.5% 1 
Support of unlimited inflow of refugees Yes: 50.3% No: 49.7% 0.26*** 
Support of female quota in organizations Yes: 63.6% No: 36.4% 0.15*** 
Support of active euthanasia Yes: 77.7% No: 22.3% 0.14*** 
Support of exit from nuclear energy Yes: 86.6% No: 13.4% 0.09*** 
Notes: The last column shows the correlation with the general political attitude question. * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The exact wording of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix A2.1. 
 
 
 Table A2.5 shows the distribution of the similarity score Sj between recipients and DM, 
and the distribution of |SAB| over all groups in the experiment. The distribution of |SAB| provides 
 
13 We note that in the post-experimental questionnaire, 96.0% of the respondents indicate having answered the 
questions in the political questionnaire truthfully. 
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a direct measure for the potential for favoritism. The larger |SAB|, the more recipients differ in 
their similarity to the DM. 
Table A2.5. Distribution of Sj and |SAB| 
Distribution of similarity score Sj 
Sj 0 1 2 3 4 5 
# 6 61 116 207 144 50 
Distribution of absolute value of relative similarity score SAB 
|SAB| 0 1 2 3 4 5 
# 80 121 64 22 4 1 
 
 We next look at the role of political similarity for allocation decisions. Table A2.6 
replicates Table 2.2 for the whole sample of decisions for all conditions with an active allocation 
and known attitudes (i.e., DM does not delegate or avoid information; probabilities in Private 
Lottery larger 50% coded as assigning higher payoff). We find that all dimensions contribute 
to the preferential treatment of more similar recipients by the DM. 
Table A2.6. Relative Similarity and Allocation Behavior (all Conditions with Active 
Allocation and Known Attitudes) 
Dimension of similarity Assignment of high payoff 
Left-wing political attitude 0.461*** (5.51) 
Support of unlimited refugee inflow 0.389*** (5.13) 
Support of mandatory female quota 0.272*** (3.62) 
Support of active euthanasia 0.584*** (5.15) 
Support of exit from nuclear energy 0.543*** (4.08) 
Observations 167 
Notes: Marginal effects of probit regression reported, z-values in parenthesis. The 
explanatory variables are dimension specific relative distance measures. *, **, *** 
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
 We next study how the DM’s political attitudes correlate with her allocation behavior. For 
this purpose, we define a left-wing index as the share of left-wing stereotype answers in the 
political attitudes questionnaire (left answers in Table A2.4). The index can take the values 0, 
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1. Its median in the whole sample is 0.8. Subjects with index 0, 0.2, 0.4 
or 0.6 are classified as below median left-wing (n=441 in the total sample), and subjects with 
index 0.8 or 1 are classified as equal/above median left-wing (n=435 in the total sample).  
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 Table A2.7 shows that there is tendency for above-median left wing DMs to show more 
pronounced favoritism. This effect is insignificant for the Baseline condition on the basis of 
only 28 groups, but highly significant in the whole sample with 195 groups considered. 
Table A2.7. Left Wing Index and Favoritism 
 Favoritism No favoritism  
Panel a: Baseline    
Left-wing index below median 12 3 15 
Left-wing index equal/above median 13 0 13 
Fisher exact test, p = 0.226 25 3 28 
Panel b: All conditions    
Left-wing index below median 54 48 102 
Left-wing index equal/above median 69 24 93 
Fisher exact test, p < 0.01 123 72 195 
Notes: Contingency table shows the number of DMs by political attitude choosing the closer recipient in 
Baseline and Transparency, not delegating and then choosing the closer recipient in Delegation, not avoiding 
information and then choosing the closer recipient in Information Avoidance, for the higher payment; 
assigning higher probability for the higher payment to the closer participant in Private Lottery; only groups 
with SAB  0.  
 
 We finally study how the DM’s political attitude affects her decision to delegate (if 
delegation is costless) and to avoid information (Table A2.8). We find that there is no effect of 
DM’s politics on the decision to delegate or to avoid information (irrespective of whether 
avoidance is publicly revealed).  
Table A2.8. Left Wing Index and Delegation and Information Avoidance 
 
Delegation 
(if costless) 
Avoid 
information 
(if private) 
Avoid 
information 
(if public) 
All three 
conditions 
pooled 
Left-wing index -0.134 (-0.33) -0.221 (-1.49) 0.194 (0.57) -0.162 (-0.83) 
Female -0.139 (-0.86) 0.086 (1.14) -0.202 (-1.29) -0.088 (-0.97) 
Age 0.001 (0.04) 0.011 (0.74) -0.007 (-0.38) 0.011 (0.81) 
Economics -0.131 (-0.73) 0.322* (1.72) -0.223 (-1.29) 0.051 (0.49) 
# Observations 40 48 44 132 
Notes: Marginal effects of probit regressions reported, z-values in parenthesis. The left-wing index indicates 
the share of left-wing stereotype answers in the questionnaire. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level. 
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A2.4. Recipients’ behavior and DM´ beliefs 
This appendix summarizes recipients’ rewarding and punishment behavior, and the DM’ beliefs 
regarding the recipients’ behavior. We first report recipients’ behavior in the different 
conditions, and then the DM’s beliefs regarding the recipients’ behavior. All analyses report 
the (belief in the) monetary impact on DM’s payoffs caused by each recipient (i.e., not the costs 
involved by the recipient for punishing or rewarding). 
Table A2.9. Recipients´ Impact on DM’s Payoff 
Condition  High payoff recipient Low payoff recipient 
Baseline 1.41### - 0.30# 
Random 0.43### 0.43## 
Δ Random - 0.98*** 0.73*** 
Transparency 1.00### - 0.60### 
Δ Transparency - 0.41* - 0.30 
Private Lottery 0.56### - 0.13 
Δ Private Lottery - 0.85*** 0.17 
Private Information Avoidance  0.88### - 0.49### 
Δ Private Information Avoidance  - 0.53*** - 0.19 
Notes: Entries are average additions to / reductions from the DM endowment (at cost €0.10 per €0.50 addition 
/ reduction). *, **, *** indicates significant difference between Baseline and the respective intervention at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, Mann-Whitney-U test. #, #, ### indicates significant difference to the value of zero, two-
sided t-test. 
 
 
Table A2.10. Recipients´ Impact on DM’s Payoff by 
Delegation and by Information Avoidance 
Condition  
High payoff 
recipient 
Low payoff 
recipient 
No Delegation (n=23) 1.02### - 0.67### 
Delegation (n=17) 0.26 0.26 
Δ Delegation - 0.76*** 0.93*** 
Information publicly not avoided (n=21) 0.90### -0.38# 
Information publicly avoided (n=23) 0.93### -0.17 
Δ Information publicly avoided  0.03 0.21 
Notes: Entries are average additions to / reductions from the DM endowment (at cost €0.10 per €0.50 
addition / reduction). *, **, *** indicates significant difference between no delegation and 
delegation, respectively information non-avoidance and avoidance, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
Mann-Whitney-U test. #, #, ### indicates significant difference to the value of zero, two-sided t-test. 
 
 Table A2.9 shows rewarding and punishment by recipient and condition, and differences 
with Baseline. In all conditions, high payoff recipients reward less than in Baseline. For low 
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payoff recipients there are few statistically significant differences; the only effect observed is 
lower punishment in Random than in Baseline. Table A2.10 shows rewarding and punishing 
depending on the publicly known delegation and information avoidance. We observe that high 
payoff recipients reward less, but low payoff recipients punish less (send insignificantly 
positive rewards) when DM’s delegate. At the end of the experiment, we ask recipients, about 
their maximum willingness-to-pay for delegation, if they were to be in the role of DM and find 
that low outcome recipients state a significantly higher WTP (p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney-U test). 
Finally, Information avoidance has no effect on rewarding behavior. 
 
Table A2.11. DM’s Beliefs about Recipients´ Impact on Their Payoff by Delegation and by 
Information Avoidance 
Condition High payoff recipient Low payoff recipient 
Baseline 0.83### - 0.83### 
Random 0.39## 0.11 
Δ Random - 0.44*** 0.94*** 
Transparency 0.73### - 0.54### 
Δ Transparency - 0.10 0.29* 
Lottery 0.49### - 0.50### 
Δ Lottery -0.34 0.33* 
Avoidance (private) 0.66### - 0.41### 
Δ Avoidance - 0.17 0.42** 
Notes: Entries are average beliefs about additions to / reductions from the DM endowment (at cost €0.10 per 
€0.50 addition / reduction). *, **, *** indicates significant difference between Baseline and the respective 
intervention at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, Mann-Whitney-U test. #, #, ### indicates significant difference to the 
value of zero, two-sided t-test. 
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Table A2.12. DM’s Beliefs about Recipients´ Impact on Their Payoff 
Condition 
High payoff 
recipient 
Low payoff 
recipient 
No Delegation 0.50### - 0.83### 
Delegation 0.08 - 0.22# 
Δ Delegation - 0.42*** 0.61*** 
Information publicly not avoided 0.57### - 0.68### 
Information publicly avoided 0.31### - 0.31### 
Δ Information publicly avoided  - 0.26* 0.37** 
Notes: Entries are average beliefs about additions to / reductions from the DM endowment (at 
cost €0.10 per €0.50 addition / reduction). *, **, *** indicates significant difference between no 
delegation and delegation, respectively information non-avoidance and avoidance, at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, two-sided t-test. #, #, ### indicates significant difference to the value of zero, 
two-sided t-test. All DM were asked about both scenarios, i.e., delegation and no delegation as 
well as information avoidance and no information avoidance. 
 
 Tables A2.11 and A2.12 show the DM’s beliefs for the behavior shown in tables A2.9 and 
A2.10. DM’s anticipate the general pattern that high payoff recipients become less rewarding 
and low payoff recipients become less punishing. However, they are too pessimistic in their 
judgment, expecting too strong a decline in rewards and too weak a decline in punishment. 
Table A2.12 shows a similar pattern. DM’s believe that both delegation and information 
avoidance will have an effect on rewards and punishment. They do not fully anticipate the 
strength of the effects for the low payoff recipients. Moreover, they seem to be less well 
calibrated for the case of no delegation and no avoidance. We report the following additional 
result not shown in the tables. We test whether beliefs are different for those DMs who delegate 
and those who do not. We do not find substantial qualitative or quantitative differences. That 
is, expected monetary awards cannot explain differences between these two groups of players. 
 At the end of the experiment, we also ask DMs whether they would appreciate delegation 
if they were to be in the role of a recipient. We find that stating that they would appreciate 
delegation in that case strongly correlates with opting for costly delegation (p < 0.001 for both 
prices). This further supports the conclusion that the motivation to pay for delegation is rather 
intrinsic than extrinsic. 
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A2.5. Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
This appendix provides the post-experimental questionnaire questions in Table A2.13, and the 
results in Table A2.14. 
Table A2.13. Post-Experimental Questionnaire – Questions 
 Question Answer options 
(1) Do you think that the DM´s decision was influenced by the information about the 
recipient? (Recipient version of the question) 
Was your allocation decision influenced by the information about the recipient? 
(DM version of the question) 
Yes/No 
(2) Do you think that the DM intentionally favored one of the two recipients? 
(Recipient version of the question) 
Did you intentionally favor one of the two recipients? (DM version of the 
question) 
Yes/No 
(3) Do you think that the [recipient with the high payoff] feels intentionally favored 
or disadvantaged? (Only DM) 
Favored/ 
Disadvantaged/ 
Neither nor 
(4) Do you think that the [recipient with the low payoff] feels intentionally favored 
or disadvantaged? (Only DM) 
Favored/ 
Disadvantaged/ 
Neither nor 
(5) How important is it to implement a fair process, even when this is costly? (All) Likert-Scale from 1-7 
(1=unimportant; 
7=important) 
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Table A2.14. Post-Experimental Questionnaire – Results 
 
Type (1): 
Yes/No 
(2): 
Yes/No 
(3): 
Favored/ 
Disadvantaged/ 
Neither 
(4): 
Favored/ 
Disadvantaged/ 
Neither 
(5) 
Baseline 
DM 36/4 21/19*** 31/3/6 2/33/5 5.7 
High 35/5 19/21***   5.7 
Low 38/2 29/11***   5.8 
Transparency 
DM 37/4 11/30*** 25/1/15 0/34/7 5.2 
High 37/4 14/27***   5.5 
Low 38/3 20/21***   5.8 
Private Lottery 
DM 22/19 13/28*** 14/3/24 5/15/21 5.3 
High 34/7 22/19***   5.5 
Low 31/10 27/14   5.6 
Private Info 
Avoidance 
DM 36/6 17/25*** 27/0/21 0/32/16 5.3 
High 47/1 21/27***   5.4 
Low 46/2 28/20***   5.6 
Delegation 
DM 9/8 5/12 1/1/15 1/1/15 5.1 
High 10/7 5/12**   5.5 
Low 10/7 4/13***   6.2 
No Delegation 
DM 17/6 12/11* 12/0/11 0/11/12 5.4 
High 20/3 14/9**   5.6 
Low 21/2 17/6**   5.6 
Public Info 
Avoidance 
DM - - 3/1/19 0/2/21 5.3 
High - -   5.9 
Low - -   5.2 
No Public Info 
Avoidance 
DM 19/2 12/9*** 17/0/4 0/17/4 6.0 
High 21/0 8/13***   5.5 
Low 21/0 13/8***   5.4 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significant difference between (1) and (2), at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, two-sided 
t-test. 
 
 We test whether items 1 and 2 differ from one another and find that in almost all cases, 
both the recipients as well as DMs do more strongly agree to the statement that the DM is 
influenced by the information about recipients, than to the statement that the DM explicitly and 
intentionally favors one of the recipients. This corroborates the idea that it is not intentional 
nepotism that drives the strong degree of favoritism, but the inability to disregard available 
information even if the DM does not intend to use it. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Capitalizing on the (False) Consensus Effect: 
Two Tractable Methods to Elicit Private Information 
 
 
Robert J. Schmidt 
 
 
Abstract: We propose and experimentally test two tractable methods to incentivize the 
elicitation of private information: Benchmark and Coordination. Both mechanisms capitalize 
on the false consensus effect, a well-documented phenomenon that follows Bayesian reasoning. 
That is, individuals use their own type when predicting the type of others. Since it is not feasible 
to incentivize the elicitation of private information using facts, when these are not verifiable, 
we incentivize the respondent to reveal her perceptions about others and use that statement to 
predict the subject´s private information. The stronger the relationship between a subject´s type 
and her perception about the type of others, the more effective the mechanisms are in revealing 
the subject´s privately held information. In an experiment, we apply the mechanisms to reveal 
beliefs about probabilities. On the aggregate level, both mechanisms accurately reveal mean 
first-order beliefs of the population. On the subject level, the modal difference between 
probabilities elicited in either mechanism and actual first-order beliefs is zero. The results 
indicate that subjects strongly anchor their statements in Benchmark and Coordination on their 
private information. 
 
Highlights: 
• Two tractable methods to elicit private information are proposed 
• The methods serve as (simple) alternatives to Bayesian revelation mechanisms 
• In an experiment, both mechanisms accurately reveal first-order beliefs 
 
Acknowledgments: I thank Aurelien Baillon, Dietmahr Fehr, Christian König, Christiane 
Schwieren, Christoph Vanberg, Jens Witkowski as well as seminar audiences in Frankfurt, 
Heidelberg, the HeiKaMaX in Heidelberg, the HeiKaMaXY in Heidelberg, and the Bayesian 
Crowd Conference in Rotterdam for very valuable comments and suggestions.  
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3.1. Introduction 
The elicitation of private information, such as preferences, beliefs, feelings or opinions, is key 
for social sciences (Turner and Martin, 1985), policymakers (Veenhoven, 2002), corporations 
(Monroe, 1973) and for public opinion research (Price and Neijens, 1997).14 The value of such 
data requires that subjects exert effortful thinking when the question at hand is non-trivial and 
that subjects do not bias their answer towards social desirability (Li, 2007; Manski, 2004; Zizzo, 
2010). Therefore, various methods have been proposed that condition a respondent´s answer on 
some observable fact and monetarily reward the subject for accuracy. 15  If the monetary 
incentive is sufficient, the mechanism is incentive compatible, as the subject is induced to 
honestly report her type (Smith, 1976).16 
 Incentivizing accurate reporting by conditioning on facts, however, limits a mechanism to 
the elicitation of private information about verifiable questions.17 By contrast, the elicitation of 
unverifiable questions lies beyond the scope of this approach. This comprises questions that are 
hypothetical, counter-factual, technically unverifiable, or which refer to subjective tastes.18 
Therefore, so-called truth serums have been developed, which aim at increasing the quality of 
the elicitation of private data compared to non-incentivized procedures (Prelec, 2004).19 The 
core assumption of these methods is that individuals are subject to the false consensus effect 
(Ross et al., 1977), a well-documented phenomenon that follows Bayesian reasoning (Dawes, 
1989). 20  That is, individuals use their own private information when predicting private 
information of others.21 Given that a set of behavioral assumptions holds, truthfully answering 
the question is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and maximizes the recipient´s payoff. 
 
 14 In particular, this kind of data is essential for corporations that offer online platforms to gather and provide 
customer evaluations, e.g., about restaurants, hotels, or other services. 
 15 See Schlag et al. (2015) and Schotter and Trevino (2014) for literature reviews. 
 16 The term type is meant to represent the respondent’s trait that is of interest to a researcher. This might be a 
respondent´s preference, belief, taste, opinion, and the like. 
 17 For example, a health scientist might ask a respondent about the risk of smoking or an economist about the 
current inflation rate. The respondent is then paid based on the objective precision of the answer. 
 18 In these cases, interviewers are usually limited to the elicitation of non-incentivized statements. 
 19 Indeed, there is evidence that incentives for truth-telling induce subjects to report socially desirable behavior 
less often (Barrage and Lee, 2010), admit wrong-doings more often (John et al., 2012; Loughran et al., 2014), state 
their future behavior more accurately (Howie et al., 2011), increase accuracy in recognition tasks (Prelec and 
Weaver, 2006), and increase the coherence between elicited beliefs and observed behavior (Trautmann and van 
der Kuilen, 2014). 
 20 In the title, we put the word “false” in parentheses, in order to remark that it is not necessarily false to derive 
beliefs about others using the signal that stems from one´s own type (Dawes, 1989). Instead, rational belief 
formation requires that (to some degree) subjects use their own type as a valid source when predicting the type of 
others (see also Prelec, 2004). Section 3.3.1.2 elaborates on that. 
 21 This assumption is also common in various Bayesian settings (e.g., Cremer and McLean, 1988; d'Aspremont 
and Gerard-Varet, 1979; Johnson et al., 1990; McAfee and Reny, 1992; McLean and Postlewaite, 2002). 
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 However, the application of this group of mechanisms comes with two difficulties. First, 
they require several behavioral assumptions, such as common knowledge about a shared 
common prior belief, common knowledge about respondents updating their belief in an 
impersonally informative manner, subjects being able to identify that truth-telling represents a 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium and trusting others to play according to that Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium, too.22 Second, the scoring rules applied in Bayesian revelation mechanisms are 
complicated. This makes it hard to implement the mechanisms transparently by informing 
subjects about the exact scoring system. As a result of that, most empirical applications have 
relied on faith-based implementation, without explaining the actual scoring rules in detail, but 
by assuring participants that truth-telling would be optimal (e.g., Barrage and Lee, 2010; Howie 
et al., 2011; John et al., 2012; Prelec and Weaver, 2006; Shaw et al., 2011). 
 In this paper, we propose two tractable methods that intend to solve these problems: 
Benchmark and Coordination. Like Bayesian revelation mechanisms, both methods rely on the 
false consensus effect. While it is not possible to incentivize the elicitation of private 
information when there is no ground truth, it is feasible to incentive compatibly elicit a subject´s 
perception about others. Therefore, both mechanisms provide direct incentives for respondents 
to make statements that depend on their beliefs about the type of their peers. Following the idea 
of the false consensus effect, the elicited statements are then used to predict the respondent´s 
own type. The stronger the relationship between a subject´s type and her beliefs about others, 
the more effective the mechanisms are in revealing the subject´s private information. 
 In the first mechanism, Benchmark, a two-step approach is applied. First, a subject is asked 
about her private information in an non-incentivized manner. That statement is then used to 
serve as a benchmark for the elicitation of second-order beliefs (Perner and Wimmer, 1985) 
from another respondent, who has to guess the private information of the previously asked 
subject. The existence of a benchmark allows incentivization using ordinary scoring rules, such 
that the second respondent is induced to engage in second-order reasoning in an effortful 
manner. The stronger the relationship between a subject´s own thought and second-order belief, 
the better of a proxy the elicited statement will be for her type. 
 In the second mechanism, Coordination, respondents are provided with a question and 
various answer alternatives. The subjects´ task is to coordinate on an answer, and each subject 
 
 22 Impersonal informativeness implies two aspects. First, a subject´s own type is informative, i.e., it provides 
evidence about population frequencies. Therefore, subjects expect over proportionally large shares of their own 
type among their peers. Second, this inference is impersonal, i.e., respondents of the same type draw identical 
inferences about the population, thereby arriving at identical posterior beliefs (Prelec, 2004). 
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is paid based on the precision with which she anticipates the coordination outcome. The 
mechanism is inspired by the concept of focal points (Schelling, 1960), an approach to predict 
behavior in coordination settings with multiple equivalent equilibria. The concept postulates 
that participants in pure coordination settings exhibit shared perceptions about salient 
alternatives. Thereby, focal points emerge absent from payoffs and provide an implicit 
coordination device (Sudgen, 1995). Since the recognition of focal points requires subjects to 
form beliefs about the perception of saliences in other individuals, it involves higher-order 
reasoning (Camerer et al., 2004). Consequently, an individual´s coordination choice reflects her 
belief about the perception of others and, therefore, is informative about her own perception 
about the question at hand.23 
 The main advantage of the two methods is that they are tractable. The scoring and the 
payout function are easy to understand, such that participants are provided with a clear task that 
they have to solve. Therefore, the mechanisms are easy to implement for experimenters. By 
contrast to Bayesian revelation mechanisms, there is no theoretical necessity that subjects reveal 
their private information. However, it is reasonable to expect valid signals about the 
respondent´s thoughts. In section 3.4, we discuss how the mechanisms need to be implemented 
to maximize the discriminatory power of the two measures. 
 In an experiment, we mimic the elicitation of beliefs about unverifiable probabilities.24 
Subjects are provided with instructions about an ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) conducted 
by Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014), and we elicit beliefs about proposer and responder 
behavior. Applying both a between-subject and a within-subject design, we elicit beliefs using 
the mechanisms Benchmark and Coordination as well as actual first-order beliefs by 
conditioning payments on factual probabilities. In the between-subject comparison, we find that 
both mechanisms accurately reveal mean first-order beliefs of the population. In the within-
subject comparison, we find that the modal difference between probabilities elicited in either 
 
 23 As we will show in section 3.3.2.2., the mechanism represents a generalization of the Krupka and Weber 
(2013) approach to identify social norms using coordination games. They propose to use coordination games to 
identify social norms on the aggregate level, while we argue that coordination games are suited to identify any 
kind of private information on the individual level. Indeed, there is evidence that individual coordination choices 
about social norm perception are related to a subject´s preferences. Schmidt (2019b) finds that injunctive and 
descriptive social norms elicited using coordination games predict revealed social preferences in a series of dictator 
games. 
 24 Belief about probabilities are an essential form of private information in the social sciences. For example, in 
psychology beliefs about probabilities are used to understand fear diseases (Slovic et al., 1980), in health sciences 
to understand risky health behaviors (Khwaja et al., 2006, 2009; Schoenbaum, 1997) and in economics to 
understand saving and investment behavior (Guiso et al., 1992, 1996). 
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mechanism and actual beliefs is zero. We therefore conclude that, in the given setting, subjects 
strongly anchor their statements in Benchmark and Coordination on their first-order beliefs. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on 
methods to elicit private information. Section 3.3 explains Benchmark and Coordination, and 
also provides a theoretical background for each mechanism. Section 3.4 illustrates how the 
mechanisms need to be implemented to maximize the discriminatory power. In section 3.5, we 
present the experiment to test the mechanisms in the area of probabilistic beliefs, and in section 
3.6 we formulate testable hypotheses. Section 3.7 presents the results. Section 3.8 discusses 
advantages and disadvantages compared to Bayesian revelation mechanisms. Section 3.9 
summarizes and concludes. 
 
3.2. Related Literature 
The seminal contribution to eliciting unverifiable subjective information is Prelec (2004), who 
introduces a truth-inducing scoring system that includes two additive parts. First, an 
information report that refers to information privately owned by a respondent (her type). The 
information report is scored based on the degree to which it is surprisingly common in the 
population.25 Second, subjects make a prediction report. This report refers to the subject´s belief 
about the distribution of types in the population, and it is scored based on accuracy. Given a set 
of behavioral assumptions, such as common knowledge about a shared prior belief, impersonal 
informativeness, Bayesian reasoning and a sufficiently large sample of participants, truthfully 
reporting the own type represents a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
 Since Prelec´s (2004) innovation, various refinements have been proposed. Prelec and 
Seung (2006) demonstrate how to use the mechanism even when the majority of respondents 
are wrong. Witkowski and Parkes (2012a) propose the Robust Bayesian Truth Serum, which 
corrects Prelec´s (2004) drawback to operate properly only on large samples. In the Robust 
Bayesian Truth Serum, three subjects are sufficient to establish Bayesian Nash incentive-
compatibility, but the mechanism is restricted to the elicitation of binary information. The 
modifications of Radanovic and Faltings (2013, 2014) allow the elicitation of non-binary 
 
 25 The surprisingly common criterion exploits Bayesian reasoning, as subjects should and usually do make use 
of their own type, when predicting the prevalence of their own type in the population (Marks and Miller, 1987; 
Ross et al., 1977). Consequently, subjects anticipate that the actual prevalence of their own type is underestimated 
by their peers, which renders truthful reporting optimal regarding the surprisingly common principle. Rewarding 
answers that are more common than predicted avoids to bias a report in the direction of mainstream answers, since 
it equivalently rewards subjects with minority answers. 
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signals, while still being incentive-compatible for small populations. Baillon (2017) proposes 
Bayesian markets, a method that simplifies previous mechanisms. Subjects make only one 
decision, namely whether or not to trade an asset whose value represents the share of affirmative 
answers to a question. Bayesian markets are thus more transparent and tractable for participants, 
but they are suited for binary questions only. 
 Our paper is also related to the peer prediction method (Miller et al., 2005), a scoring 
system that is based on the comparison of reports. Subjects state a report and are scored 
concerning the precision of their implied posterior belief about the report of another subject, 
such that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Unlike the previously mentioned 
mechanisms, however, the peer prediction method makes the assumption that a common prior 
belief is not only shared by agents but also known to the mechanism. Witkowski and Parkes 
(2012b) propose a modification that allows to relax the common prior assumption. Jurca and 
Faltings (2006) show that paying a subject based on comparison with a sufficiently large 
number of agents minimizes the budget required for incentive compatibility. 
 Finally, our paper is related to Carvalho et al. (2017) who discuss mechanisms that are 
based on the assumption that respondents exhibit social projection, a strong form of the false 
consensus effect.26 They theoretically analyze payment structures that reward agreements and 
demonstrate that risk-neutral agents maximize their expected reward by honestly reporting their 
private information. In an online experiment involving text content analysis, the subjects´ task 
is to review short texts under the criteria of grammar, clarity, and relevance. Their results 
support the hypothesis that agents report more accurate answers than when there are no 
incentives for honest reporting. 
 
3.3. Benchmark and Coordination 
Two methods are proposed to elicit private information in case of unverifiability: Benchmark 
and Coordination. In both methods, subjects are incentivized to make statements that depend 
on perceptions about private information of others. In section 3.3.1, we explain Benchmark, and 
in section 3.3.2, we explain Coordination. In both subsections, we provide theoretical 
backgrounds that illustrate why the methods are suited to predict a respondent´s type. 
 
 
 26 Social projection implies that subjects believe that their private answer equals the most popular answer of the 
remaining respondents. 
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3.3.1. Benchmark 
3.3.1.1. The Mechanism 
Benchmark consists of two steps and requires at least two subjects, a benchmarker and a 
respondent. In step 1, the experimenter asks the benchmarker about some private information 
in a non-incentivized manner, and her answer is then considered the benchmark. In step 2, the 
respondent (who is of actual interest to the researcher) is asked to guess the answer of the 
benchmarker, and she receives a payment that depends on the accuracy of her second-order 
belief.27 Creating a benchmark in the first place circumvents the problem that scoring against 
an objective criterion is not feasible when an answer is unverifiable. Using the benchmark to 
condition the respondent´s guess allows the application of ordinary scoring rules, thereby 
inducing her to engage in second-order reasoning in an effortful manner. The closer the 
relationship between the respondent´s first-order and second-order belief, the better the 
prediction about her private information.  
 
3.3.1.2. Theoretical Background: The False Consensus Effect 
Benchmark capitalizes on the false consensus effect, a well-documented phenomenon that 
describes the tendency to perceive the own traits, such as preferences, habits, behaviors, choices, 
or opinions to be correlated with the corresponding traits of peers (Ross et al., 1977). As a result, 
subjects of a particular type expect over proportionally large shares of subjects similar to them 
in the population. Indeed, there is ample evidence that individuals overestimate the prevalence 
of their own characteristics (Bellemare et al., 2011; Bennett, 1999; Blanco et al., 2014; Charness 
and Grosskopf, 2001; Marks and Miller, 1987; Mullen et al., 1985; Toussaert, 2018).28 Also, 
there is experimental evidence that the false consensus effect is robust to information provision 
(e.g., Ambuehl et al., 2019; Engelman and Strobel, 2012). 
 The term false consensus effect accounts for the fact that subjects tend to overestimate the 
similarity between them and others. By now, however, the conclusion that consensus reasoning 
 
 27 We use the common definition that a subject´s first-order belief describes what she thinks about real events, 
while a second-order belief refers to what a subject believes about another subject´s thought (Perner and Wimmer, 
1985). 
 28 The false consensus effect is of particular interest for models of psychological game theory. Ellingsen et al. 
(2010) argue that correlation between behavior and second-order beliefs do not necessarily represent evidence for 
guilt aversion, but can partially be explained by false consensus. Bellemare et al. (2011) find that controlling for a 
consensus effect halves the extent of guilt aversion. Blanco et al. (2014) conclude that the false consensus effect 
explains correlation between first-mover and second-mover cooperation in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. A 
more general analysis of the implications of false consensus on psychological game theory is done by Vanberg 
(2019). 
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would be false per se has been put into perspective (Dawes, 1989, 1990; Engelman and Strobel, 
2012; Vanberg, 2019). Since the own type in fact constitutes a valid signal about the population, 
using that signal reflects a mere facet of Bayesian reasoning and is thus consistent with rational 
belief formation. Note that it is secondary for the argument made in Benchmark whether the 
false consensus effect is actually an artifact from rational belief formation or whether subjects 
put irrationally strong emphasis on the informational value steaming from their own type. It is 
simply necessary that the described relationship between a subject´s own type and her second-
order belief does exist. Therefore, the stronger the degree of consensus reasoning inherent in a 
subject, the better of a proxy the elicited statement in Benchmark will be for her type. 
 
3.3.2. Coordination 
3.3.2.1. The Mechanism 
In Coordination, several subjects receive the same question, and they have to coordinate on the 
answer. Subjects are compensated based on their ability to anticipate the coordination outcome, 
which is determined as a function of all coordination choices. In case of verbal answers, this is 
usually the modal answer (e.g., Mehta et al., 1994a, 1994b; Krupka and Weber, 2013). In case 
of coordination with numbers, this could be the average, the median, or the mode.29 The higher 
a subject´s accuracy in anticipating the coordination outcome, the higher her payment. 
 Coordination is different from Benchmark in three aspects. First, by contrast to Benchmark, 
it does not require two steps since the elicitation of private information and the creation of the 
coordination outcome happen simultaneously. Second, while in Benchmark two subjects are 
needed to make the mechanism work, this is not necessarily the case in Coordination. 
Specifically, the mechanism requires that subjects perceive the coordination outcome to be 
exogenous, i.e., a single participant is not able to influence the coordination outcome.30 This 
requires that the number of participants is sufficiently large. Third, Benchmark and 
Coordination differ in the potential depth of reasoning required in the settings (Camerer et al., 
2004; Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995;). Benchmark only requires the formation of 
second-order beliefs (beliefs about the thoughts of others). By contrast, coordination games are 
complex, and subjects might engage in the formation of even higher-order beliefs, in order to 
 
 29 For example, in Fehr et al. (2019), subjects have to coordinate by stating a number between 0 and 100. The 
smaller the distance between a respondent’s number and the average of all numbers, the higher her payment. 
 30 This is relevant, because subjects shall reveal their best guess about the coordination outcome. If they were 
able to influence the outcome, they might engage in strategically affecting it. 
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anticipate the coordination outcome in a more sophisticated manner. This, however, does not 
pose a threat to the proposed mechanism, as long as beliefs of higher-order depend on a 
subject´s first-order belief, i.e., her own thought about the question at hand. The mechanism 
Coordination thus relies on the assumption that a subject´s first-order belief tends to be 
correlated with beliefs of all orders (Dawes, 1989, 1990; Engelman and Strobel, 2012; Vanberg, 
2019). 
 
3.3.2.2. Theoretical Background: Focal Points in Coordination Games 
Coordination capitalizes on the theory of focal points, a concept proposed by Schelling (1960) 
to understand behavior in pure coordination settings. Schelling (1960) argues that in pure 
coordination games with multiple equivalent equilibria, subjects perceive varying degrees of 
saliences of the available alternatives, and they assume that their perception is shared by the 
remaining participants (Sudgen, 1995). As a result, subjects use their own perception about 
salient choices to make predictions about how saliencies are perceived by other participants.31 
This creates focal points that emerge absent from payoffs, thereby constituting an implicit 
coordination device.32 
 The proposition to infer private information from coordination choices is a generalization 
of the Krupka and Weber (2013) approach to use coordination games to identify social norms. 
In their mechanism, subjects are confronted with the description of a particular behavior, and 
their task is to coordinate on appropriateness ratings. Assuming that social norms reflect shared 
perceptions about appropriate behaviors (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), focal points will be 
determined by social norm perception of subjects. As a result, the coordination outcome 
indicates the perception of social norms within the players´ population. In their experiment, 
Krupka and Weber (2013) find that social norms elicited using coordination games predict 
behavior shifts across different versions of the dictator game. While Krupka and Weber (2013) 
conclude that coordination games are suited to identify social norms on the aggregate level, we 
 
 31 Importantly, these saliences are assumed to be meaningful (to a researcher), i.e., they are induced by the 
question at hand. For example, in the original version of the Keynesian beauty contest (Keynes, 1936), respondents 
have to coordinate on the most attractive pictures of women. According to Schelling´s concept, such choices might 
reveal prevalent beauty ideals within the guessers´ population. 
 32 Since Schelling (1960), both experimental and theoretical work has corroborated the relevance of focal points 
in a variety of coordination settings, e.g., Binmore and Samuelson, 2006; Casajus, 2000; Crawford et al., 2008; 
Fehr et al., 2019; Isoni et al., 2013, 2014, 2019; Janssen, 2001, 2006; Metha et al. 1992, 1994a, 1994b; Pope et al., 
2015; Sudgen, 1995; Sugden and Zamarrón, 2006. Schmidt (2019a) proposes how to measure the distribution of 
focal points on the individual level. 
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argue that their approach is suited to extract any kind of private information on the individual 
level. 
 
3.4. Maximizing Discriminatory Power in Benchmark and Coordination 
3.4.1. Discriminatory Power 
We argue that, based on the phenomenon of false consensus, a subject´s choice in Benchmark 
and Coordination yields an informative signal about the respondent´s type. In order to 
maximize the informativeness stemming from the two mechanisms, the task should be 
constructed such that subjects which are of different types respond to the task in different ways. 
In test theory, this feature is referred to as discriminatory power and it has been extensively 
studied in that domain (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 1968; Ferrando, 2012; Hankins, 2007; Loevinger, 
1954). Discriminatory power measures the degree to which a test score varies with the level of 
the measured trait and thus reflects the effectiveness of a test detect differences between 
participants concerning the respective trait.33 To illustrate this, imagine a test that is either 
extremely easy or extremely hard. In both cases, the variance will be low, as the average 
performance will be either close to the minimum or close to the maximum number of points. 
To render the distribution of scores informative, the test shall be likely to yield higher scores 
for more capable subjects and lower scores for less capable subjects. That is, the test shall yield 
variable results, given that the test-takers are indeed different. Therefore, the difficulty of the 
test needs to be calibrated such that average performances correspond to an expected number 
of solved tasks lying in the middle of the total number of items. If the difficulty of the task is 
appropriate, it becomes likely that heterogenous test-takers receive varying scores. 
 We argue that this design feature is also crucial when applying Benchmark and 
Coordination. In particular, we claim that inducing variability in the respondents´ answers is 
generally feasible, such that a subject´s choice is related to her type in a meaningful manner. If 
that holds, then the direction in which the answer of one subject differs from the answer of 
another subject is informative about the difference between the underlying types of the two 
recipients. 
 
 
 33 Therefore, in addition to validity and reliability, discriminatory power is an important feature of the design of 
tests (Lumsden, 1976). 
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3.4.2. Example: Eliciting Minority Opinions using Numerical Questions 
We illustrate this with the elicitation of minority opinions. Assume that an experimenter wants 
to elicit beliefs about the probability that, in a sports match, Team A wins against Team B. The 
experimenter is aware that it is common knowledge among recipients that Team A is 
significantly weaker than Team B. Let us assume that the participants have diverging opinions 
about the probability that Team A wins, but the median first-order belief about the probability 
that Team A wins is 10%. If the experimenter asks whether Team A or Team B would win, 
then there would not be variation, since no participant in Benchmark or Coordination would 
think that Team A is a promising bet in that setting. However, if the experimenter had a reliable 
prior about the distribution of first-order beliefs, she could calibrate the question accordingly, 
for example by asking whether or not the probability that Team A wins is smaller or larger than 
10%. If the experimenter’s prior is accurate, the rephrased question can be expected to induce 
variability in answers, which would allow to draw discriminatory inferences about the subjects´ 
types. 
 That approach, however, requires the experimenter to have a reliable prior about the 
distribution of first-order beliefs in the population. Another possibility is to provide subjects 
with numerical answers in a more nuanced way. In the above-described example, the 
experimenter could have subjects state percentage points for the probability that Team A wins. 
In the case of Benchmark, the experimenter would first elicit the first-order belief of the 
benchmarker, who states an integer between 0 and 100 that shall represent the probability in 
percent that the event occurs. The respondent is then asked to guess the integer stated by the 
benchmarker and is then paid based on the accuracy of her second-order belief. Equivalently, 
in Coordination subjects could coordinate on an integer between 0 and 100. The coordination 
outcome is determined as a function of the coordination choices, e.g., the mean, the median, or 
the mode. Each participant is then paid based on the distance between her coordination choice 
and the coordination outcome.34 The significant advantage of using numerical scales is that, by 
design, it is likely to receive variation in the respondents´ answers, since many numbers are a 
potentially promising bet in the settings of Benchmark and Coordination. 
 
 
 34 One potential threat for coordination with numbers results from artefactual focal points, i.e., focal numbers 
within the set of feasible choices (these could be numbers such as 0, 1, 10, 50, or 100). This, however, is not a 
problem, when other signals that induce focality, are more prominent. In an experimental setting similar to ours, 
Fehr et al. (2019) examine whether “sunspots”, i.e., external signal about the true state of the world, affect 
coordination choices, when subjects coordinate on integers between 0 and 100. They find that, when external 
signals are available, the relevance of artefact focal points diminishes. 
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3.5. Experimental Design and Procedure 
We mimic the elicitation of unverifiable beliefs and examine whether the proposed mechanisms 
are suited to reveal subjects´ first-order beliefs.35 The participants´ task is to estimate empirical 
probabilities of events in an ultimatum game conducted by Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014), 
hereafter TK.36 At the beginning of our experiment, subjects learn that it is their task to estimate 
probabilities about behavior in an ultimatum game that has already been conducted. For that 
sake, subjects receive detailed information about TK´s ultimatum game. They are then 
instructed about their tasks in the respective treatments and the scoring mechanisms. In section 
3.5.1, we elaborate on the rules of TK´s ultimatum game. In section 3.5.2, we present the design 
of our treatments and in section 3.5.3 the procedure of our experiment. 
 
3.5.1. The Ultimatum Game of Trautmann and Van De Kuilen (2014) 
In TK´s ultimatum game, the proposer could choose between six alternatives that determined 
how a fixed pie of 20€ would be divided between herself and a responder. Responders had to 
indicate via strategy method (Selten, 1967) for each of the possible allocations, whether they 
would accept that allocation, or not. After every subject took the respective decision, the 
computer randomly matched proposers and responders. If the responder indicated acceptance 
for the proposed allocation, the respective allocation was implemented. If the responder 
indicated rejection, both subjects received nothing. 
 We pay significant attention to make sure that subjects understand the rules of TK´s 
ultimatum game and to make clear that it is not their task to play the game themselves but to 
assess observed behavior rates of others in that game. Subjects are provided with the original 
wording of TK´s instructions and answer a series of comprehension questions. 37  Also, 
participants in our experiment receive information about the general setting of TK´s 
experimental procedure (computerized laboratory experiment, show-up fee of 5€, random 
 
 35 By mimicking the elicitation of unverifiable beliefs, we intend to simulate a situation that is equivalent to the 
measurement of beliefs about unverifiable events. This requires the assumption that subjects are unaware of the 
factual probabilities that they have to assess. 
 36 The experiment of TK consisted of two stages. In stage 1, subjects play the ultimatum game. In stage 2, the 
authors elicit beliefs from participants using different scoring rules. As subject are paid randomly either for stage 
1 (ultimatum game) or stage 2 (belief elicitation), there is no reason to assume that the stages affect each other. 
Therefore, in our study, we do not mention stage 2 of TK, but only explain the rules of the ultimatum game in 
stage 1. 
 37 Subjects are also explicitly told, that these instructions correspond to the original wording used by TK. 
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assignment of roles, anonymous interaction, etc.). Table 3.1 shows the available allocations as 
well as empirical probabilities of proposer choices and responder acceptance rates in TK. 
Table 3.1. Ultimatum Game of Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014) 
 Available Allocations in the Ultimatum Game 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Proposer Payoff 20€ 16€ 12€ 8€ 4€ 0€ 
Responder Payoff 0€ 4€ 8€ 12€ 16€ 20€ 
 Proposer behavior (n = 103) 
Choice Probability 6% 20% 66% 7% 2% 0% 
 Responder behavior (n = 103) 
Acceptance Probability 14% 43% 90% 95% 92% 88% 
 
3.5.2. Treatments and Scoring 
Treatments. Four main treatments are conducted: SURVEY, BELIEF, BENCHMARK, and 
COORDINATION. Additionally, we conduct CONTROL, a control treatment that is intended 
to capture the degree of noise inherent in the elicitation of beliefs in the given setting. Subjects 
are instructed about the task in the respective treatment, i.e., whether their task is to state first-
order beliefs, second-order beliefs, or whether their task is to coordinate. Probabilities are 
separately elicited for the 12 possible events in TK´s ultimatum game. Precisely, subjects state 
for each of the six possible allocations (i) how probable it was that a proposer chose a particular 
allocation and (ii) how probable it was that a responder accepted a particular allocation. Our 
design is intended to compare first-order beliefs, second-order beliefs, and coordination choices 
both in a between subject-manner and in a within-subject manner (see table 3.2). 
 • SURVEY: In treatment SURVEY, first-order beliefs are elicited in an non-incentivized 
manner. Subjects asses the probabilities of the 12 events of TK´s ultimatum game and receive 
a fixed payment of 12.50€ for their participation in the experiment. Treatment SURVEY is 
intended to yield non-incentivized beliefs that are then used to score second-order beliefs 
elicited in BENCHMARK.38 
 • BELIEF: In treatment BELIEF, first-order beliefs are elicited in an incentivized manner. 
Subjects are instructed that their payment depends on the precision of their first-order beliefs 
 
 38 Note that, for the purpose of using the results from that treatment for BENCHMARK, the number of participants 
is irrelevant, since the number of participants in a treatment does not affect the expected outcome, as long as 
subjects are drawn from the same population. 
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about the factual probabilities in TK. At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly 
draws one item, and the performance in that item determines a respondent´s payoff. 
 • BENCHMARK: BENCHMARK consists of two independent parts. In the first part, 
subjects are instructed, that their task is to assess how other respondents previously estimated 
the results of TK. Also, subjects are informed that their payment depends on the accuracy of 
their second-order beliefs about the previously elicited estimations of the other respondents. In 
the second part, subjects have to state their first-order beliefs and are scored as in treatment 
BELIEF, i.e., based on objective accuracy. One randomly drawn item of the two stages 
determines the payment. 
 • COORDINATION: COORDINATION consists of two independent parts. In the first part, 
subjects are instructed that their payment is based on the ability to anticipate the coordination 
outcome. The coordination outcome is the average number stated by the participants in a session. 
That is, the closer their stated probability is to the coordination outcome, the higher their 
payment. In the second part, subjects have to state their first-order beliefs, as is in BELIEF. One 
randomly drawn item of the two stages determines the payment. 
 • CONTROL: Treatment CONTROL is identical to BELIEF except that the treatment 
consists of two stages, both of which elicit first-order beliefs. That treatment serves as a control 
condition for the treatments BENCHMARK and COORDINATION, in order to identify the 
degree of noise that is inherent in the elicitation of beliefs in the given setting. 
 Scoring. In each treatment (except SURVEY) subjects are paid based on accuracy regarding 
the respective task, and performance is evaluated relative to the other subjects within a session. 
Subjects within a session are ranked from highest to lowest accuracy regarding the respective 
task. In BELIEF, subjects are ranked according to the accuracy of their first-order belief in one 
randomly drawn item. In BENCHMARK, subjects are ranked according to the accuracy of their 
second-order belief. In COORDINATION, subjects are ranked according to their ability to 
anticipate the coordination outcome. The subject with the highest accuracy earns 15€. Payment 
then linearly diminishes by 0.75€ by each rank. That is, the subject with the second-highest 
performance earns 14.25€, the subject with the third-highest performance earns 13.50€, and so 
forth.39 Since all sessions were conducted with 20 participants, the incentives created through 
 
 39 We opted for this payment scheme for the sake of simplicity for participants. In the experiment, subjects are 
handed a sheet of paper showing which relative rank yields which payoff. Another advantage of the relative scoring 
regime we apply is that the incentives for accuracy are high. By contrast, in static scoring rules incentives for being 
accurate are limited. In the quadratic scoring rule, for example, moderate inaccuracies have only relatively small 
effects on the respondent´s payoff, while the subject´s payoff diminishes exponentially when the degree of 
inaccuracy becomes large. 
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the relative payment scheme are identical. In addition to that payment, subjects receive a show-
up fee of 5€. By contrast to these treatments, in treatment SURVEY, subjects receive a show-up 
fee of 12.50€.40 
 After instructing subjects about their specific task and the scoring mechanisms, they answer 
a series of control questions. This way, we make sure that they understand their task, and how 
their compensation would be determined in the respective treatments. Table 3.2 summarizes 
the structure of treatments and illustrates the between-subject and the within-subject 
comparisons that the experiment allows. 
Table 3.2. Treatment Overview and Content 
Treatment n Stage 1 Stage 2 
Survey 20 First-order belief (non-incentivized) - 
Belief 60 First-order belief - 
Benchmark 60 Second-order belief First-order belief 
Coordination 60 Coordination First-order belief 
Control 40 First-order belief First-order belief 
 
3.5.3. Procedure 
The computerized experiment (z-Tree; Fischbacher, 2007) was conducted at the experimental 
laboratory of Heidelberg University (Germany). 240 participants were recruited from the 
general student population via hroot (Bock et al., 2012) and participated in 12 experimental 
sessions between January and June 2019. Mean age was 23.4 years, 53.8% were female, and 
30.4% had an economics background in their studies. Pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests indicate 
that the composition of participants´ gender, age, and field of study does not differ between 
treatments. A typical session lasted about 45 minutes, and subjects earned on average about 
€12.80 including a show-up fee of €5.41 
 
3.6. Hypotheses 
A simple model of second-order beliefs in Benchmark and coordination choices in 
Coordination is set up to formulate testable hypotheses. Denote subjects as 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 and 
 
 40 In expectancy, the payment between the five treatments is (almost) identical. The expected payoff in the 
treatments with relative payments is 12.88€. 
 41 A replication package, including instructions in German and English language, raw data, and data analysis 
files is available at the repository for research data of Heidelberg University: https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de. 
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events as 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚 . Subject 𝑖 ´s first-order belief about the probability that event 𝑗 
materializes is 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 . Second-order beliefs elicited in Benchmark are denoted as 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗  and 
coordination choices elicited in Coordination as 𝐶𝑖𝑗 . All statements 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 , 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗  and 𝐶𝑖𝑗  are 
expressed as integers between 0 and 100, representing the probability in percent that an event 
materializes. Accordingly, average first-order beliefs of the population about the probability 
that event 𝑗  materializes are 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = (∑ 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛 , average second-order beliefs are 𝑆𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
(∑ 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗)/𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1  and average coordination choices are 𝐶𝑗̅̅ ̅ = (∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛. 
 We model second-order beliefs and coordination choices as a function of first-order beliefs: 
𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵  and 𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶 . The error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵  and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶  capture the difference 
between a respondent´s statement in the respective mechanism and her actual first-order belief. 
One way to interpret these error terms is that they result from an anchoring and adjustment 
procedure (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974).42  That is, subjects anchor their statements in 
Benchmark and Coordination on their first-order belief, and they then adjust it deepening on 
their perception about the coherence between their own perception and their best guess about 
the perception of others (Epley et al., 2004).43 Accordingly, averages of the population can be 
formulated as 𝑆𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜀𝑗
𝑆𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅  and 𝐶𝑗̅̅ ̅ = 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜀𝑗
𝐶̅̅ ̅ . 44  The model illustrates when the 
mechanisms Benchmark and Coordination work best, namely when 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵 and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶  are small. The 
following hypotheses formulate how 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵 and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶  as well as 𝜀𝑗
𝑆𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅ and 𝜀𝑗
𝐶̅̅ ̅ look like. 
 Hypothesis 1A refers to average second-order beliefs 𝑆𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  made in Benchmark and 
Hypothesis 1B refers to average coordination choices 𝐶𝑗̅̅ ̅  made in Coordination. We 
hypothesize that the average statements made in the two mechanisms about a particular event 𝑗 
do not differ from average first-order beliefs 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ elicited in Belief. This implies that 𝜀𝑗
𝑆𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅ and 
𝜀𝑗
𝐶̅̅ ̅ do not differ from zero. 
Hypothesis 1A. Average second-order beliefs about the probability of event 𝑗 do not differ 
from average first-order beliefs: 𝑆𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 
 
 42 The “anchoring and adjustment heuristic” describes the strategy to make judgments under uncertainty by 
anchoring on information that comes to mind and adjust it until a plausible estimate is reached. 
 43 Epley et al. (2004) propose to model perspective taking as an anchoring and adjustment procedure. People 
derive beliefs about others by initially anchoring their beliefs in an egocentric manner, and subsequently 
accounting for potential differences between themselves and others. In a series of experiments, the authors find 
evidence for this hypothesis. 
 44 Note that the model is intended to be simple and yield tractable hypotheses, therefore it is not the aim to model 
what kind of processes shape error terms. 
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Hypothesis 1B. Average coordination choices about the probability of event 𝑗 do not differ 
from average first-order beliefs: 𝐶𝑗̅̅ ̅ = 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 
 Hypothesis 2A refers to individual second-order beliefs 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗 elicited in Benchmark and 
Hypothesis 2B refers to individual coordination choices 𝐶𝑖𝑗  elicited in Coordination. We 
hypothesize that the individual statements made in the two mechanisms about a particular event 
𝑗 do not differ from individual first-order beliefs 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 elicited in Belief. This implies that 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶  do not differ from zero. 
Hypothesis 2A. Individual second-order beliefs about the probability of event 𝑗 do not differ 
from individual first-order beliefs: 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗. 
Hypothesis 2B. Individual coordination choices about the probability of event 𝑗 do not differ 
from individual first-order beliefs: 𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗. 
 
3.7. Results 
3.7.1. Between-Subject Analysis of Averages 
We start with aggregate level analysis by comparing average first-order beliefs with (i) average 
second-order beliefs and (ii) average coordination choices. Figure 3.1 shows average first-order 
beliefs elicited in BELIEF, average second-order beliefs elicited in stage 1 of BENCHMARK, 
and average coordination choices elicited in stage 1 of COORDINATION. Items C1 to C6 refer 
to probabilities of proposers-choices and A1 to A6 refer to acceptance-rates of responders. 
Mann-Whitney-U tests are conducted to test for equality of averages. Before correcting for 
multiple testing, item C6 differs between BENCHMARK and BELIEF (p < 0.05) and the same 
item differs between COORDINATION and BELIEF (p < 0.01).45 Both significances vanish 
when correcting for multiple testing using the Bonferroni procedure.46 We therefore cannot 
reject hypotheses 1A and 1B, which state that the average probabilities elicited in 
BENCHMARK and COORDINATION are identical to average first-order beliefs elicited in 
BELIEF. 
 
 45 In Appendix A3.2, the reader finds a graph with the results from treatment SURVEY. Graphical analysis 
suggests that non-incentivized beliefs elicited in SURVEY tend to differ from incentivized beliefs elicited in 
BELIEF. This is not implausible, given the lack of incentivization to carefully read the instructions and exert 
effortful thinking in that treatment, since subjects were informed about their fixed compensation at the beginning 
of the experiment. Note, however, that our study is not intended to test whether non-incentivized elicitation differs 
from incentivized elicitation of beliefs. 
 46 We account for the fact that multiple items are used to detect treatment differences. In order to take care of the 
inflation of the overall type-I-error rate, we therefore multiply the p-values by the number of items (i.e., by twelve). 
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Result 1. In a between-subject analysis, average second-order beliefs and average coordination 
choices do not differ from average first-order beliefs. 
Figure 3.1. Between-Subject Comparison of Elicited Probabilities 
 
Notes: Numbers are percentage points. C1-C6 refer to probabilities for choice behavior of proposers and A1-
A6 refer to probabilities for acceptance behavior of responders. The numbers in BENCHMARK and 
COORDINATION are elicited in the first stage of the treatments, i.e., using the respective mechanisms. 
 
3.7.2. Within-Subject Analysis of Averages 
To examine differences in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION to first-order beliefs on the 
individual level, we start by comparing average outcomes between stage 1 and stage 2 in these 
treatments. Remember that in stage 1, the respective mechanisms are applied, i.e., subjects state 
their second-beliefs in stage 1 of BENCHMARK, and they coordinate in stage 1 of 
COORDINATION. In stage 2, first-order beliefs are elicited in the same manner as in BELIEF. 
By contrast to the above section, we now compare the outcomes of the mechanisms with first-
order beliefs in a within-subject manner. Panel A of Figure 3.2 compares averages of stage 1 
and stage 2 in BENCHMARK, and Panel B compares averages of stage 1 and stage 2 in 
COORDINATION. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests are conducted to detect differences between 
averages. Before correcting for multiple testing, item C1 (p < 0.1) and item C4 (p < 0.05) differs 
between stage 1 and stage 2 in BENCHMARK. In COORDINATION, item C2 (p < 0.05), item 
A1 (p < 0.05) and item A4 (p < 0.1) differ between stage 1 and stage 2. Again, these 
significances vanish after the correction procedure. The results are thus consistent with those 
reported in the previous section, i.e., average second-order beliefs elicited in BENCHMARK 
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and average coordination choices elicited in COORDINATION do not differ from average first-
order beliefs of subjects. 
Result 2. In a within-subject analysis, average second-order beliefs and average coordination 
choices do not differ from average first-order beliefs. 
Figure 3.2. Within-Subject Comparison of Elicited Probabilities 
Panel A. Benchmark Panel B. Coordination 
  
Notes: Numbers are percentage points. C1-C6 refer to probabilities for choice behavior of proposers and A1-A6 
refer to probabilities for acceptance behavior of responders. The straight line in Panel A indicates average second-
order beliefs elicited in stage 1 of BENCHMARK and the straight line in Panel B indicates average coordination 
choices elicited in stage 1 of COORDINATION. The dashed lines in both panels indicate average first-order beliefs 
elicited in stage 2 from the same participants. 
  
3.7.3. Correlations 
We now analyze to what degree probability statements elicited in BENCHMARK and 
COORDINATION are related to first-order beliefs of individuals by conducting correlation 
analyses. Looking at the combined data of all items, we find that the statements in stage 1 and 
stage 2 are strongly and statistically significantly correlated in both treatments (r = 0.87 in 
BENCHMARK; r = 0.90 in COORDINATION; p < 0.00001 in both treatments; Pearson 
correlation).47 That result is consistent with the idea promoted in section 3.4, i.e., that the 
statements extracted in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION vary with the underlying first-
order belief of individuals. Likewise, the correlation between stage 1 and stage 2 is strongly 
 
 47  The correlation coefficients are based on 720 observations in BENCHMARK, 720 observations 
COORDINATION and 480 observations in CONTROL. Conducting correlation analyses separated by items also 
yields strongly positive and significant correlations. 
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positive and statistically significant in treatment CONTROL (r = 0.89; p < 0.00001; Pearson 
correlation), but the correlation is not higher than in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION. 
Result 3. Second-order beliefs, as well as coordination choices, are significantly positively 
correlated with first-order beliefs. 
 
3.7.4. Analysis of Error Terms 
We proceed by analyzing the congruence between numbers stated in stage 1 and stage 2 of 
BENCHMARK and COORDINATION. For that sake, we examine the distribution of error terms 
𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵 and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶  defined in section 3.6, which emerge when a subject states different numbers in 
stage 1 and stage 2 for the same item.48 It is reasonable to expect that subjects will exhibit noise 
when stating their beliefs for 12 items two times in a row. To have a baseline to compare the 
distribution of error terms with, we use the error terms observed in treatment CONTROL, which 
provide a measure for the degree of noise that occurs when subjects state first-order beliefs. 
 In order to get an impression about that measure, Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of 
individual error terms based on the combined data of all items.49 The distribution is centered 
around zero, and the modal error term, as well as the median error term in each treatment, equal 
zero (see Table 3.3). Two-sided t-tests are conducted to test if mean error terms on the item 
level differ from zero.50 We do not find that error terms in any item differ from zero, neither in 
BENCHMARK nor COORDINATION.51 The fact that error terms do not differ from zero is 
consistent with Hypotheses 1A and 1B. 
 To investigate Hypotheses 2A and 2B, we analyze means of absolute error terms: |𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵| and 
|𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶 |.52 Two-sided t-tests are conducted to test if mean absolute error terms on the item level 
differ from zero.53 We find that in all three treatments, in most items mean absolute error terms 
are significantly different from zero on the 5%-level.54 After the correction procedure, still, 
 
 48 In BENCHMARK, error terms are defined as the difference between a subject´s second-order belief and first-
order belief: 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵 = 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 . In COORDINATION, error terms are defined as the difference between a 
subject´s coordination choice and first-order belief: 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶 = 𝐶𝑖𝑗 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 . 
 49 The number of data points per treatment equals the number of participants multiplied by the number of items. 
 50 In Appendix A3.1, Table 3.5, Panel A, we report mean error terms on the item level.  
 51 Likewise, error terms in CONTROL do not differ from zero. 
 52 Absolute error terms |𝜀𝑗| are the absolute values of error terms 𝜀𝑗. The average absolute error term |𝜀𝑗|̅̅ ̅̅ of item 
𝑗 is calculated as |𝜀𝑗|̅̅ ̅̅ = (∑ |𝜀𝑖𝑗| 
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛. 
 53 In Appendix A3.1, Table 3.5, Panel B, we report mean absolute error terms on the item level.  
 54 Precisely, in BENCHMARK and CONTROL, in 11 of the 12 items mean absolute error terms differ from zero 
with p < 0.05; in COORDINATION, in 10 items mean absolute error terms differ from zero with p < 0.05 (see 
Appendix A3.1). 
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most items remain significantly different from zero on the 5%-level. This result is not consistent 
with Hypotheses 2A and 2B. In order to identify what part of these differences is due to noise, 
we compare mean absolute error terms in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION with mean 
absolute error terms observed in treatment CONTROL. Conducting Mann-Whitney-U tests to 
identify differences between treatments, we do not find that BENCHMARK or 
COORDINATION differs from CONTROL in terms of absolute error terms. 
Result 4. Mean error terms do not differ from zero in either treatment. 
Result 5. Mean absolute error terms significantly differ from zero in each treatment. However, 
mean absolute error terms observed in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION do not differ from 
mean absolute error terms in CONTROL. 
Figure 3.3. Distribution of Individual Error Terms (all Items) 
 
Notes: Error terms are percentage points stated in stage 1, minus the percentage points stated in stage 2 for 
identical items. The graph indicates the relative frequency of each possible value of error terms. The data of 
the graph comprises all 12 items of treatments. 
 
Table 3.3. Error Terms and Absolute Error Terms (all Items) 
 Error Terms 𝜺𝒊𝒋 Absolute Error Terms |𝜺𝒊𝒋| 
 Mode Median Mean Mode Median Mean 
Benchmark (n = 720) 0 0 0.25 0 2 9.57 
Coordination (n = 720) 0 0 -0.86 0 3 9.03 
Control (n = 480) 0 0 -2.21 0 2 8.45 
Notes: Numbers are percentage points. The data of the table comprises all 12 items of treatments. In 
Appendix A3.1, we report mean error terms and mean absolute error terms on the item level. 
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3.7.5. External Validity 
Figure 3.4 (Appendix A3.2) indicates a high external validity of all mechanisms, as subjects are 
accurately assessing the patterns of proposer choices and responder acceptance rates in each 
treatment. To evaluate external validity, mean Brier scores (Brier, 1950), i.e., average squared 
deviations between factual data and elicited beliefs, are calculated and reported in Table 3.4. 
Before the correction procedure, Brier scores of item C6 differ between BENCHMARK and 
BELIEF (p < 0.05), and the same item differs between COORDINATION and BELIEF 
(p < 0.01). None of these differences survive the correction procedure. That is, external validity 
in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION does not differ from the degree of external validity 
that is obtained when first-order beliefs are elicited in an ordinary manner. 
Table 3.4. Mean Brier Scores 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Belief 0,05 0,06 0,04 0,06 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,10 0,12 0,05 0,05 0,06 
Benchmark 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,10 0,02 0,02* 0,03 0,08 0,08 0,05 0,04 0,06 
Coordination 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,09 0,02 0,01** 0,02 0,09 0,10 0,04 0,05 0,04 
Notes: The table contains mean Brier scores. Items C1-C6 refer to choice-probabilities of proposers and 
items A1-A6 refer to acceptance-probabilities of responders. Lower scores represent higher levels of 
accuracy. *, ** indicates significance at the 5%, and 1% level compared to the respective score in treatment 
BELIEF. 
 
3.7.6. Discussion of Results and Evaluation of Hypotheses 
We cannot reject the hypotheses 1A and 1B that the average outcomes in Benchmark and 
Coordination correspond to average first-order beliefs. This result holds both in a between-
subject analysis and in a within-subject analysis. In accordance, mean error terms do not differ 
from zero in either treatment. The gathered evidence therefore supports the idea that both 
methods are effective in revealing mean beliefs on the population level. The correspondence of 
averages between mean second-order beliefs elicited in BENCHMARK and coordination 
choices elicited in COORDINATION implies that the mechanisms yield an unbiased measure 
about a subject´s first-order belief. Still, when comparing individual choices made in 
BENCHMARK and COORDINATION with first-order beliefs on the individual level (i.e., mean 
absolute error terms), we find them to be significantly larger than zero. 
 However, two considerations put the results on absolute error terms into perspective. First, 
the mean of absolute error terms is significantly larger than the median of absolute error terms 
in both treatments (see Table 3.3). Almost half of the estimations extracted in BENCHMARK 
and COORDINATION are identical with first-order beliefs, and also the median differences 
  
67 
indicate negligible deviations between statements extracted in the two mechanisms and actual 
first-order beliefs. In the given setting, the median difference is more informative, since the 
mean is strongly affected by few subjects that enter strongly diverging numbers in the two 
stages (thereby strongly increasing the mean of absolute error terms). Second, as seen in 
treatment CONTROL, the degree of noise inherent in the setting equals the extent of error terms 
in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION. The deviations on the individual level thus seem to 
be driven by subjects being ambiguous about their actual first-order belief, thus creating noise. 
 Altogether, the observed differences between stage 1 and stage 2 in BENCHMARK and 
COORDINATION are not distinguishable from treatment CONTROL. Also, the correlation in 
CONTROL between the two stages is not higher than in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION. 
We therefore cannot reject hypotheses 2A and 2B that the statements extracted in the two 
mechanisms correspond to first-order beliefs on the individual level. 
 
3.8. Advantages Compared to Bayesian Revelation Mechanisms 
Compared to Bayesian Revelation Mechanism, we see three main advantages of Benchmark 
and Coordination. First, they require fewer behavioral assumptions. Precisely, it is sufficient to 
assume that a subject´s perceptions about others are correlated with her own type. Second, the 
scoring systems of both mechanisms are less complicated. This makes it easier for participants 
to understand the scoring system and, therefore, it simplifies a tractable and transparent 
implementation for experimenters. Third, it is easier for subjects to understand their “challenge” 
in the game, i.e., to comprehend the task necessary to maximize earnings. Subjects learn that 
their specific challenge is to foresee a particular outcome (either a statement by another person 
or a coordination outcome). Therefore, respondents know that their payment is conditioned on 
that particular value and that their payments monotonically increase with the precision of their 
guess about that specific value. This makes the task tangible for respondents. 
 By contrast, in empirical applications of Bayesian revelation mechanisms, subjects often 
do not learn how the calculation of their score, and thus their payoff, exactly look like. If 
subjects lack comprehension of the underlying mechanisms, it is plausible that subjects deviate 
from their true thought if they believe that they might “know better” how the profit-maximizing 
statement looks like. This might lead subjects to engage in an attempt to game the mechanism, 
which is problematic because it is not observable by the experimenter and thus cannot be 
controlled for. Likewise, even if participants fully understand the mechanisms and are aware of 
the Bayesian Nash equilibrium inherent in the setting, it is unclear whether they trust in other 
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subjects to play Bayesian Nash, too. Obviously, it is rational to play according to the Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium only if one is confident that the remaining players also play according to that 
concept. Therefore, as in weakest-link games, lack of trust regarding Bayesian Nash play of 
other subjects might refrain a subject from playing Bayesian Nash herself (Knez and Camerer, 
1994). 
 One further advantage is that the mechanisms, especially Benchmark, might be suited to 
elicit questions about shameful traits. In Bayesian Revelation Mechanisms, subjects are usually 
directly asked about their own type. Therefore, submitting shameful answers comes at a cost 
when admitting one´s own (shameful) type, either to oneself or to the experimenter. By contrast, 
this is avoided, when subjects are asked about potentially shameful traits of others (as is done 
in Benchmark). 
 The fact that the proposed methods are more tractable and transparent comes at the cost 
that truth-telling is not a theoretical necessity. By contrast, this is the case in Bayesian revelation 
mechanisms, given that all assumptions hold. Therefore, Bayesian revelation mechanisms 
potentially yield more accurate information if the subjects´ behavior adheres to all necessary 
assumptions. 
 
3.9. Summary and Conclusion 
We propose two tractable methods to incentivize the elicitation of unverifiable private 
information: Benchmark and Coordination. In both mechanisms, participants are incentivized 
to reveal their perception about others, and these statements are then used to predict the 
subjects´ own thoughts. The stronger the relationship between a subject´s type and her 
perception about others, the more effective the mechanisms are in revealing the subject´s private 
information.  
 The main advantage of the two methods is that scoring and payout functions are simple to 
understand, such that participants are provided with a clear task that they have to solve. This 
makes the mechanisms easy to implement for experimenters. The methods thus provide simple 
alternatives to Bayesian revelation mechanisms, when an experimenter is interested in eliciting 
non-verifiable, private information from subjects. 
 In an experiment, we mimic the elicitation of beliefs about unverifiable probabilities. In a 
between-subject comparison, we find that both mechanisms accurately reveal mean first-order 
beliefs of the population. In a within-subject comparison, we find that the modal difference 
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between probabilities elicited in either mechanism and actual beliefs is zero. We therefore 
conclude that subjects strongly anchor their statements in Benchmark and Coordination on their 
first-order beliefs. 
 The paper also contributes to the literature on the elicitation of social norms using 
coordination games, initiated by Krupka and Weber (2013). Our results suggest that the two 
methods Benchmark and Coordination yield identical results, which indicates that incentivized 
elicitation of social norms using coordination games is also feasible through the elicitation of 
second-order beliefs. As a result, it allows eliciting such data without the necessity to establish 
an infrastructure for coordination. This simplifies data collection in contexts other than 
laboratory experiments, for example in (online) polls with laypeople, while still maintaining 
the feature of incentivization. 
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Appendix 3 
A3.1. Error Terms and Absolute Error Terms on the Item Level 
A3.1.1. Mean Error Terms 
Panel A of Table 3.5 shows means of error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑗 on the item level. The average error term 
𝜀?̅? of item 𝑗 is calculated as 𝜀?̅? = (∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛. Two-sided t-tests are conducted to test if mean 
error terms on the item level differ from zero. We do not find that error terms in any item differs 
from zero neither in BENCHMARK or COORDINATION nor in CONTROL. 
 
A3.1.2. Mean Absolute Error Terms 
Panel B of Table 3.5 shows means of absolute error terms |𝜀𝑖𝑗| on the item level. The average 
absolute error term |𝜀𝑗|
̅̅ ̅̅̅of item 𝑗  is calculated as |𝜀𝑗|
̅̅ ̅̅̅ = (∑ |𝜀𝑖𝑗| 
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛. Two-sided t-tests are 
conducted to test if mean absolute error terms on the item level differ from zero. We find that 
in all three treatments, in most items mean absolute error terms are significantly different from 
zero on the 5%-level. Precisely, in BENCHMARK and CONTROL, in 11 of the 12 items mean 
absolute error terms differ from zero with p < 0.05; in COORDINATION, in 10 items mean 
absolute error terms differ from zero with p < 0.05. Mann-Whitney-U tests are conducted to 
test for differences between treatments. Before the correction procedure, item C6 differs 
between BENCHMARK and CONTROL (p < 0.05) and items C3 (p < 0.1), C5 (p < 0.01) and 
A1 (p < 0.05) differ between COORDINATION and CONTROL. None of these differences 
survives the correction procedure. 
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Table 3.5. Analysis of Error Terms on the Item Level 
Panel A. Mean Error Terms 𝜀?̅? 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Benchmark -2,5 -2,7 0,0 2,4 -0,9 -1,7 1,4 0,3 3,0 3,3 2,5 -1,9 
Coordination 0,5 -3,6 0,5 1,0 1,2 -0,2 -5,4 -1,2 -2,6 -1,0 -2,0 2,3 
Control -1,6 -0,6 -1,5 1,4 0,1 -0,2 -0,2 -4,5 -3,1 -3,3 -5,2 -7,9 
Panel B. Mean Absolute Error Terms |𝜀𝑗| 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Benchmark 10,0 12,8 10,8 9,0 6,6 3,7 1,8 13,3 14,6 12,6 9,7 10,0 
Coordination 7,9 15,0 12,7 15,5 8,1 3,7 6,1 12,0 11,0 8,1 5,3 3,0 
Control 5,4 13,8 9,7 8,2 3,6 0,5 0,5 10,6 12,6 11,4 11,1 13,9 
Notes: Numbers are percentage points. Error terms are defined as the difference between statements in stage 1 
and stage 2 in treatment BENCHMARK, COORDINATION, and CONTROL. Absolute error terms are the 
absolute values of error terms. Panel A and Panel B report the means of these two measures on the item level. 
 
A3.2. Results of Treatment Survey 
Graphical analysis (figure 3.4) as well as mean Brier scores (Table 3.6) indicate a lower external 
validity of SURVEY, compared to BELIEF, BENCHMARK, and COORDINATION. The 
number of participants, however, is not sufficient to draw statistical inferences on that question. 
Figure 3.4. Extracted Beliefs and Factual Data of TK (2014) 
 
Notes: Numbers are percentage points. C1-C6 refer to probabilities for choice behavior of proposers and A1-
A6 refer to probabilities for acceptance behavior of responders. The numbers in BENCHMARK and 
COORDINATION are elicited in the first stage of the treatments, i.e., using the respective mechanisms. 
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Table 3.6. Mean Brier Scores 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Belief 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Benchmark 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.06 
Coordination 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Survey 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.13 
Notes: The table contains mean Brier scores on the item level. Items C1-C6 refer to probabilities for choice 
behavior of proposers and A1-A6 refer to probabilities for acceptance behavior of responders. Lower scores 
represent higher levels of accuracy. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Do Injunctive or Descriptive Social Norms Elicited Using 
Coordination Games Better Explain Social Preferences? 
 
 
Robert J. Schmidt 
 
 
Abstract: We experimentally study the relationship between social norms and social 
preferences on the individual level. Subjects coordinate on injunctive and descriptive norms, 
and we test which type of norm is more strongly related to behavior in a series of dictator games. 
Our experiment yields three insights. First, both injunctive and descriptive norms explain 
dictator behavior and recipients´ guesses, but perceptions about descriptive social norms are 
behaviorally more relevant. Second, our findings corroborate that coordination games are a 
valid tool to elicit social norm perception on the subject level, as the individuals´ coordination 
choices are good predictors for their actual behavior. Third, average descriptive norms on the 
population level accurately predict behavior on the population level. This suggests that the 
elicitation of descriptive social norms using coordination games is a potentially powerful tool 
to predict behavior in settings that are otherwise difficult to explore. 
 
Highlights: 
• The relationship between social norms and social preferences is examined 
• Both injunctive and descriptive norms explain revealed social preferences 
• Descriptive social norms are more strongly related to social preferences 
 
Acknowledgments: I thank Fuat Ecer, Christian König, Franziska Lembcke, Gerhard 
Minnameier, Hannes Rau, Christiane Schwieren, Bertil Tungodden, Martin Vollmann as well 
as seminar audiences in Frankfurt and the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Bonn for valuable 
comments and suggestions.  
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4.1. Introduction 
Perceptions about social norms influence how individuals interpret social contexts, and they 
affect both intentions and behavior.55 Traditionally, the study of social norms has received less 
attention in economics than in other fields of social sciences, such as sociology (Coleman, 1990; 
Merton, 1957) or psychology (Cialdini et al., 1990; Sherif, 1936). During the last decades, 
however, social norms became a vital topic of research in economics (e.g., Elster, 1989; Ostrom, 
2000). By now, it is no longer disputed that social norm perception influences economic 
decisions, for example saving rates (Cole et al., 1992), consumer behavior (Bagozzi and 
Warshaw, 1990), financial reporting (Dyreng et al., 2012), job search (Stutzer and Lalive, 2004), 
or energy consumption (Allcott, 2011), to name just a few.56 
 Cialdini et al. (1990, 1991) argue that it is essential to differentiate between injunctive and 
descriptive social norms. Injunctive norms indicate perceptions about normatively appropriate 
behavior in a specific context. They reflect what kind of behavior is approved or disapproved 
by the community and thereby motivate actions through the anticipation of social rewards or 
punishment. By contrast, descriptive social norms refer to prevalent or common behavior, and 
they reflect perceptions about the likelihood that others engage in the normative behavior 
themselves.57 Experimental studies find that both types of norms explain behavior, but also that 
the two norms are conceptually different constructs that independently affect intentions and 
behavior (e.g., Kallgren et al., 2000; Reno et al., 1993; Rivis and Sheeran, 2003).58 
 There is also research on which type of norm has more explanatory power for actual 
behavior. Some studies argue that injunctive social norms are more influential because they 
refer to broader underlying principles. Therefore, they motivate behavior across a spectrum of 
situations, while descriptive social norms are to a stronger degree context-dependent (e.g., 
Cialdini et al., 2006; Manning, 2009; Reno et al., 1993). It is also argued that descriptive norms 
are associated with a boomerang effect (Cialdini, 2003), i.e., that salient descriptive social 
 
 55 We refer to social norms as shared perceptions about behavior. As Crawford and Ostrom (1995) formulate, 
this might be shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden. 
 56 As a result of that, the relevance of social norms is also often explicitly considered in economic models of 
human behavior (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 
1993). 
 57 Cialdini et al. (1990) summarizes injunctive norms as “norms of ought" and descriptive norms as “norms of 
is”. 
 58 A large part of studies on the behavioral relevance of social norms is dedicated to pro-environmental behavior 
(e.g., Cialdini et al., 2006; Göckeritz et al., 2010; Goldstein et al., 2008; Nolan et al., 2008; Schultz, 1999; Schultz 
et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2012) and health behavior (e.g., Borsari and Carey, 2003; Elek et al., 2006; Larimer et 
al., 2004; Lee et al., 2007; Neighbors et al., 2008; Walker et al., 2011). Typically, behavior rates are highest when 
injunctive and descriptive norms are aligned. 
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norms increase, rather than decrease, problematic behaviors. Therefore, it has been 
hypothesized that the manipulation of injunctive social norms is a more powerful intervention 
to affect behavior (e.g., Blanton et al., 2008). 
 However, there is also ample evidence that the manipulation of descriptive social norms, 
through the provision of information about peers, affects behavior. Changing descriptive norms 
can be powerful because of preferences for conformity (Asch, 1956). Also, the provision of 
information about descriptive norms is potentially effective when subjects tend to overestimate 
the prevalence of problematic behaviors (e.g., Baer and Carney, 1993; Baer et al., 1991; Carey 
et al., 2006). Indeed, both lab and field experiments show that the provision of information 
about peers significantly affects behavior in the desired direction (e.g., Frey and Meier, 2004; 
Gerber and Rogers, 2009; Goeschl et al., 2018; Mair and Bergin-Seers, 2010; Reese et al., 
2014). 
 The theoretical and empirical evidence on the competing relevance of injunctive and 
descriptive social norms is inconclusive. One problem with the mentioned evidence is that most 
studies examine aggregate effects of the provision of information or the manipulation of social 
norms. This approach helps to understand the behavioral effect of interventions, which in turn 
sheds light on the competing relevance of different types of norms. However, the approach to 
examine aggregate or treatment effects does only indirectly explain the association between the 
perception of a specific norm and a specific action on the individual level. 
 One important study in that context is Bicchieri and Xiao (2009). They consider Bicchieri 
(2006), who differentiates two types of expectations, that are conceptually related to injunctive 
and descriptive norms. Normative expectations refer to what an individual believes others think 
she ought to do and empirical expectations refer to what an individual expects others to do.59 
Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) conduct a series of treatments and exogenously manipulate dictators’ 
expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. They find that when normative 
and empirical expectations conflict, empirical expectations significantly predict a dictator's own 
choice, while normative expectations do not have a significant impact on dictator behavior after 
controlling for empirical expectations. 
 We contribute to this literature by examining under controlled conditions, whether 
injunctive or descriptive social norms elicited using coordination games are more strongly 
 
 59 Note that, although expectations and social norms are closely related, they are not identical. Instead, according 
to Bicchieri (2006), normative and empirical expectations are a building block for social norms to emerge, 
including norms for fairness, reciprocity, or cooperation. 
76 
related to social preferences measured in a series of dictator games. In a laboratory experiment, 
we elicit injunctive and descriptive social norms from dictators and recipients as well as beliefs 
about social norms held by others.60 That design differs from Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) in three 
aspects. First, instead of eliciting expectations, subjects coordinate on social norms according 
to the approach proposed by Krupka and Weber (2013).61 Second, the subjects´ perceptions are 
not exogenously manipulated through the provision of information beforehand. Third, 
injunctive and descriptive social norms are elicited in a between-subject design, which allows 
for separately assessing and comparing their explanatory power for individual decision-making. 
 Another paper that we relate to is Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (2016). They also study 
social preferences and social norms on the individual level, by examining whether revealed 
preferences are driven by heterogeneous sensitivity to social norms. That hypothesis is 
motivated by the observation that differences in payoffs hardly explain behavioral shifts across 
seemingly similar allocation settings (List, 2007). In an experiment, they elicit individual norm-
sensitivity and relate that measure to actual choices in a series of standard experimental 
paradigms. 62  Their results demonstrate that observed behavior is consistent with norm-
dependent preferences, i.e., a preference per se to obey a social norm, independent from social 
preferences. They conclude that the substantial degree of behavioral variation across contexts 
does not represent inconsistent preferences, but a consequence of the fact that people care about 
norms and that norms fundamentally differ across contexts.63 We contribute to that analysis by 
examining whether perceptions regarding the above-described differentiation (injunctive versus 
descriptive norms) better explain variations in revealed social preferences. 
 Finally, our paper is strongly related to the experiment conducted by Krupka and Weber 
(2013). They elicit injunctive social norms regarding behavior in different versions of the 
dictator game, and their results demonstrate that average coordination choices about injunctive 
norms predict behavioral changes between the different versions of the dictator game.64 The 
 
 60 By beliefs about social norms held by opponents, we mean that dictators (recipients) state their beliefs about 
social norms held by recipients (dictators). 
 61 In the approach of Krupka and Weber (2013), subjects are confronted with the description of a particular 
behavior and they have to coordinate on appropriateness ratings. Their approach assumes that social norms are 
constituted through shared perceptions (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), which thereby determine focal points in the 
coordination setting (Schelling, 1960; Sudgen, 1995). Consequently, subjects´ coordination choices reveal 
perceptions about prevailing social norms. 
 62 Specifically, they examine the public goods game, trust game, dictator game, and the ultimatum game. 
 63 As a result of that, social norms are considered to be a potentially powerful tool for nudging (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008). For an experimental analysis of using social norms as an instrument to affect behavior via 
nudging, see Bicchieri and Dimant (2019). 
 64 Krupka and Weber examine four variants of the dictator game: Dana et al. (2007), Lazear et al. (2012), 
List (2007), and Bardsley (2008). 
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analysis that we conduct is therefore similar to their analysis, as we attempt to explain changes 
in revealed social preferences by social norm perception elicited using coordination choices, 
but we differ from their experiment in three aspects. First, we do not apply a between-subject 
design to predict average changes across environments. Instead, preferences and norms are 
measured in a within-subject design, and they are related to one another on the individual 
level.65 Second, we do not use variations of the standard dictator game, but a series of varying 
mini-dictator games.66 Third, Krupka and Weber (2013) focus on the predictive power of 
injunctive social norms. Our experimental setup extends that analysis to the measurement of 
injunctive and descriptive social norms. 
 Our results show that both injunctive and descriptive social norms are significantly related 
to dictator behavior and recipients´ guesses on the subject level. Likewise, beliefs about social 
norms of others significantly predict social preferences. Comparing the relative importance of 
injunctive and descriptive norms shows that descriptive norms are significantly more strongly 
related to social preferences on the individual level in almost all specifications. We also conduct 
aggregate level analysis by comparing whether average injunctive or average descriptive norms 
better predict average behavior on the population level. While the relationship between average 
injunctive social norms and average allocation behavior is loose, we observe that average 
descriptive social norms accurately predict average allocation behavior. 
 Three main insights can be drawn from these results. First, perceptions about descriptive 
social norms are significantly more strongly related to social preferences on the individual level, 
than injunctive norms. This supports the idea that changing perceptions about prevalent 
behavior is a more fruitful behavioral intervention than changing perceptions about appropriate 
behavior (e.g., Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009). Second, the paper corroborates that the Krupka and 
Weber (2013) approach is a valid tool to elicit social norm perception on the individual level, 
as the individuals´ coordination choices in both types of norms are strongly related to their 
actual behavior. This indicates that an individual´s coordination choice in that approach 
represents a good estimator for their actual perception of social norms.67 Third, comparing the 
 
 65 The approach has already been used to relate coordination choices to decision making on the individual (e.g., 
Barr et al., 2018; Burks and Krupka, 2012; Gächter et al., 2013; Krupka et al., 2016). 
 66 Using a series of mini-dictator games allows us to vary distributive motives of allocation behavior (such as the 
degree of efficiency), while this is possible only to a smaller degree in the standard dictator game with fixed pie. 
 67 Several studies explain why coordination games are suited to reveal a participant´s own perception about the 
question at hand (e.g., Dawes, 1989; Epley et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2019c; Vanberg, 2019). This literature shows 
that, in order to successfully coordinate with others, subjects use their own type, when making predictions about 
the type of others (Prelec, 2004). In doing so, they overestimate the degree to which others perceive the question 
in a similar way as they do (Ross et al., 1977). Consequently, an individual´s coordination choice is indicative for 
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predictive power on the aggregate level indicates that average descriptive social norms are good 
predictors for behavior, while injunctive norms are almost unrelated to average behavior rates. 
This suggests that the elicitation of descriptive social norms using coordination games 
potentially is a powerful approach to predict behavior in settings that are otherwise difficult to 
explore. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we present the 
experiment, and in section 4.3, we report the results. Section 4.4 summarizes and concludes. 
 
4.2. Experimental Design and Procedure 
4.2.1. Experimental Design 
All treatments consist of three stages: an allocation stage, a norm elicitation stage, and a belief 
elicitation stage. The allocation stage is identical in all treatments and consists of a series of ten 
mini-dictator games. In the norm elicitation stage, injunctive and descriptive social norms are 
elicited using coordination games (Krupka and Weber, 2013). The norm elicitation stage is 
varied regarding the type of norm and the reference group for coordination, resulting in a 2×2 
factorial design. In the belief elicitation stage, beliefs about social norms held by others are 
elicited. Subjects earn money in each stage and receive the earnings from one randomly drawn 
stage at the end of the experiment. 
 Allocation stage: At the beginning of the allocation stage, subjects are randomly assigned 
to the roles of dictator or recipient, and subsequently matched in pairs.68 The dictator´s task is 
to decide in a series of ten mini-dictator games (MDG) how money is divided between herself 
and the recipient (see Table 4.1). The MDG are designed such that different distributive motives 
are varied between the two options.69 The subjects´ earnings in that stage are determined by the 
dictator´s decision in one randomly drawn MDG. While the dictators make the allocation 
decisions, recipients state their guesses about the dictators´ allocation behavior in each of the 
ten MDG.70 
 
her own perception about the question at hand. In an experiment on the elicitation of beliefs, Schmidt (2019c) 
finds that coordination choices are suited to reveal first-order beliefs about probabilities in an ultimatum game. 
 68 In the instructions, the dictator is labeled as “Player A” and the recipient as “Player B”. Subjects are informed 
that they remain in their role throughout the whole experiment. 
 69 Note that the MDG 1-5 correspond to MDG 6-10 in terms of distributive motives. 
 70 Recipients are asked to state their guess about the behavior of the dictator that they are matched with. In order 
to keep the instructions simple, the elicitation of these beliefs is unincentivized. If the recipients´ beliefs were 
incentivized, their payment in that stage would need to be randomly determined either by the dictators´ decisions 
or by the accuracy of the recipients´ beliefs. 
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Table 4.1. Mini-Dictator Games used in the Allocation Stage 
Decision Option 1 Option 2 Efficiency Egalitarianism Profit 
1 7, 4 5, 5 Option 1 Option 2 Option 1 
2 5, 4 4, 6 Option 2 Option 1 Option 1 
3 6, 4 5, 5 - Option 2 Option 1 
4 6, 3 5, 5 Option 2 Option 2 Option 1 
5 5, 5 5, 6 Option 2 Option 1 - 
6 11, 0 5, 5 Option 1 Option 2 Option 1 
7 5, 0 0, 10 Option 2 Option 1 Option 1 
8 10, 0 5, 5 - Option 2 Option 1 
9 7, 1 5, 5 Option 2 Option 2 Option 1 
10 5, 5 5, 10 Option 2 Option 1 - 
Notes: The numbers represent payoffs in Euro. The first payoff refers to the dictator and the second 
payoff to the recipient. 
 
 Norm elicitation stage: After completing the allocation stage, subjects coordinate on 
social norms regarding dictator behavior in the MDG. Two aspects are varied in a 2×2 between-
subject design. The first aspect that is varied is the type of norm. In treatments INJUNCTIVE, 
subjects coordinate on injunctive norms. In treatments DESCRIPTIVE, subjects coordinate on 
descriptive norms. Subjects always evaluate option 1 of an allocation decision. For injunctive 
social norms, subjects are asked for each MDG: “How appropriate is it to choose option 1 in 
the role of dictator?”, and they are provided with four answer options: “very appropriate”, 
“somewhat appropriate”, “somewhat inappropriate” or “very inappropriate”. For descriptive 
social norms, subjects are asked for each MDG: “How many dictators choose option 1 in the 
role of dictator?”, and they are provided with four answer options: “a large majority”, “a 
majority”, “a minority”, “a small minority”. The subjects´ task is to choose the answer option 
of which they think that it will be chosen by the majority of subjects that participate in the 
coordination game. Subjects that manage to pick the modal answer in one randomly drawn 
MDG earn 10€ in that stage (and zero otherwise). 
 Second, the reference group for coordination is varied. In the current setting, where subjects 
with different roles coordinate on social norms, two variants of coordination are possible. 
Dictators and recipients could either separately coordinate, or they could jointly coordinate on 
social norms. Both variants are applied in the experiment. In the SUBJECTIVE treatments, 
dictators and recipients coordinate only with participants that have the same role as themselves 
in a session. In the OBJECTIVE treatments, dictators and recipients altogether coordinate on 
social norms. Table 4.2 summarizes the 2×2 factorial design of the norm elicitation stage. 
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Table 4.2. 2×2 Factorial Design of the Norm Elicitation Stage 
  Reference Group for Coordination 
  Subjective Objective 
 
 
• Treatment: INJUNCTIVE_SUBJECTIVE 
• Subjects are asked about the appropriate 
behavior of dictators 
• Dictators and recipients separately 
coordinate on the answers 
• Treatment: INJUNCTIVE_OBJECTIVE 
• Subjects are asked about the appropriate 
behavior of dictators 
• Dictators and recipients jointly coordinate 
on the answers 
 
• Treatment: DESCRIPTIVE_SUBJECTIVE 
• Subjects are asked about the most common 
behavior of dictators 
• Dictators and recipients separately 
coordinate on the answers 
• Treatment: DESCRIPTIVE_OBJECTIVE 
• Subjects are asked about the most common 
behavior of dictators 
• Dictators and recipients jointly coordinate 
on the answers 
  
 Belief elicitation stage: After completing the norm elicitation stage, subjects state their 
beliefs about the coordination outcomes of their opponents.71 In the SUBJECTIVE conditions, 
dictators (recipients) state their belief about the coordination outcome of recipients (dictators). 
In the OBJECTIVE conditions, both dictators and recipients state their belief about the modal 
choice made by dictators and by recipients. That is, each subject states her belief about the 
modal choice entered by subjects in the role of dictator and her belief about the modal choice 
entered by subjects in the role of recipient. In the belief elicitation stage, subjects earn 10€ in 
case of a correct belief in one randomly drawn MDG (and zero otherwise). 
 
4.2.2. Procedure 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and recruitment was done via 
hroot (Bock et al., 2014) and ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Experimental sessions were conducted 
at the experimental laboratories of the University of Heidelberg and the University of Frankfurt 
(both Germany) between June and December 2016. 72  In total, 328 subjects participated. 
Sessions lasted about 35 minutes and subjects earned on average 9.01€, including a show-up 
 
 71 The modal choice of participants is considered the coordination outcome. 
 72 In each treatment, one session was conducted in Frankfurt. The shares of observations collected in Heidelberg 
and Frankfurt is thus similar across treatments (between 21% and 29% per treatment). 
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fee of 4€. Mean age was 22.5 years, 56.1% were female, and 32.0% had an economics 
background in their studies.73 Table 4.3 gives an overview of the treatments and the sample.74 
Table 4.3. Number of Subjects by Treatment and Location 
Treatment 
Subjects in 
Heidelberg 
Subjects in 
Frankfurt 
Total N 
(Subjects) 
Total N 
(Pairs) 
INJUNCTIVE_SUBJECTIVE 66 18 84 42 
INJUNCTIVE_OBJECTIVE 60 24 84 42 
DESCRIPTIVE_SUBJECTIVE 58 22 80 40 
DESCRIPTIVE_OBJECTIVE 58 22 80 40 
 Σ = 242 Σ = 86 Σ = 328 Σ = 164 
 
 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Descriptive Results on the Aggregate Level 
To get an impression about social preferences and social norms on the population level, we 
report average behavior in the allocation stage and the norm elicitation stage. We start by 
analyzing allocation behavior of dictators and corresponding guesses of recipients (n = 164 
pairs of dictator and recipient). Figure 4.1 shows the share of dictators that choose option 1 in 
the respective allocation decision, and the share of recipients that believe that the dictator 
matched with them would choose option 1. Conducting Mann-Whitney-U tests, we find that 
items 1, 2, and 5 marginally differ between dictators and recipients (p < 0.1). These differences 
vanish after applying the correcting procedure à la Bonferroni. 75  The results indicate that 
recipients are well able to predict allocation behavior of dictators.76 This suggests that the two 
groups have a similar prior regarding actual behavior in the given allocation setting, which 
implies that subjects have a common ground for the evaluation of social norms. 
  
 
 73 Mann-Whitney-U tests indicate that the two samples (Heidelberg and Frankfurt) do not differ in terms of socio-
demographics. 
 74 A replication package, including instructions in German and English language, raw data, and data analysis 
files is available at the repository for research data of Heidelberg University: https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de. 
 75 We account for the fact that multiple items are used to detect differences between dictators and recipients in 
that test. In order to take care of the inflation of the overall type-I-error rate, we therefore multiply the p-values by 
the number of items (i.e., by ten). 
 76 This indicates that the lack of incentivization of recipients in the allocation stage was not a problem for 
properly extracting recipients´ beliefs. 
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Figure 4.1. Allocation Behavior and Guesses 
 
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of dictators choosing option 1 in the mini-
dictator games, as well as corresponding guesses from recipients. Recipients are asked 
to guess the behavior of the dictator that they are matched with. 
 
 To shed light on the predictive power of elicited norms on the aggregate level, and to 
compare injunctive and descriptive norms in that regard, we conduct simple descriptive 
analyses. 77  Figure 4.2 shows the average results from the allocation stage and the norm 
elicitation stage of the four treatments. To graphically depict norms, these are quantified such 
that the resulting scores are normalized between -1 and 1.78 The more positive (negative) the 
score for injunctive norms, the more appropriate (inappropriate) it is considered to choose 
option 1 in the respective decision. The more positive (negative) the score for descriptive norms, 
the more (less) common choosing option 1 is considered in the respective decision. Dictator 
choices and recipient guesses depicted in Figure 4.1 are adapted to that scale.79 
 As can be observed in Figure 4.2, in all panels the blue lines (average injunctive norm) are 
rather loosely related to the black line (average choice/guess), while the red lines (average 
descriptive norms) are remarkably similar to the black lines. In that simple graphical analysis, 
we thus observe that averages of descriptive norms much better capture the pattern of allocation 
behavior. This applies independently from the reference group for coordination (SUBJECTIVE 
vs. OBJECTIVE), and it applies both for dictators and recipients. 
 
 77 Note that the comparison of social preferences and social norms on the aggregate level is possible only in a 
descriptive manner, since the scales used to measure social norms are verbal. This makes it difficult to compare 
them to behavior rates. Still, the direction in which averages of elicited norms vary when actual behavior varies is 
a sensible comparison in terms of predictive power on the aggregate level. 
 78 Coordination choices are quantified as follows. For injunctive norms: 1 = ”very appropriate”, 1/3 = ”somewhat 
appropriate”, -1/3 = “somewhat inappropriate”, -1 = “very inappropriate”. For descriptive norms: 1 = ”a large 
majority”, 1/3 = ”a majority”, -1/3 = “a minority”, -1 = “a small minority”. Note that subjects always evaluate the 
choice of option 1. 
 79 For that sake, option 2 is coded with the value -1 instead of 0 (as in Figure 4.1). 
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Result 1. Graphical analysis indicates that descriptive social norms better predict average 
behavior on the population level than injunctive norms. 
 
Figure 4.2. Averages of Allocation Behavior and Social Norms 
Panel A. Subjective Dictator Norms Panel B. Objective Dictator Norms 
  
Panel C. Subjective Recipient Norms Panel D. Objective Recipient Norms 
  
Notes: “Choice” indicates allocation behavior of dictators, and “Guess” indicates the recipients´ guesses about dictator 
behavior. In “Choice” and “Guess”, option 1 is coded as “1”, and option 2 is coded as “-1”. 
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4.3.2. Individual Level Analysis 
We proceed by analyzing the relationship between social norm perception and social 
preferences on the individual level.80 For that sake, we regress the choices from the allocation 
stage on the choices made in the norm elicitation stage.81 In Table 4.4, we analyze dictator 
choices, and in Table 4.5, we analyze recipient guesses about dictator choices. Panels A of these 
tables refer to elicited injunctive norms, and panels B refer to elicited descriptive norms. 
Regression analyses are conducted with (i) a Probit-model and (ii) an OLS-model.82 
 We find that, in each specification, the regressor that refers to elicited norms (“Injunctive 
Norm” in panels A and “Descriptive Norm” in panels B) is statistically significant, independent 
from the regression model. This holds in either treatment condition SUBJECTIVE and 
OBJECTIVE, and it holds for both types of social norms. We interpret this as evidence that 
injunctive and descriptive norms elicited in the norm elicitation stage are related to social 
preferences measured in the allocation stage. 
Result 2. Both injunctive and descriptive social norms are statistically significantly related to 
dictator behavior and recipients´ guesses about dictator behavior. 
 We proceed by comparing whether injunctive or descriptive norms are more strongly 
related to choices in the allocation stage. For that sake, one needs to column-wise compare the 
regressions contained in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. We find that the size of the p-values of the 
relationship between descriptive norms and allocation behavior (contained in panels B) is 
smaller in all specifications than the corresponding p-values for injunctive norms (contained in 
panels A). This holds for all specifications that refer to dictators (Table 4.4) and to all 
specifications that refer to recipients (Table 4.5). This indicates that social norms elicited in the 
DESCRIPTIVE treatments are more strongly related to social preferences than social norms 
elicited in the INJUNCTIVE treatments. In order to test whether these differences are 
statistically meaningful, we conduct regression analyses with interaction terms. We first pool 
the observations from the conditions INJUNCTIVE and DESCRIPTIVE. Then, we perform the 
same analysis, i.e., we regress allocation behavior on norm perception, but we add an interaction 
 
 80 For simplicity, we refer to “social preferences” as choices made in the allocation stage, i.e., actual dictator 
choices as well as recipients´ guesses about dictator choices. 
 81 We code the decisions made in the allocation stage by a dummy variable which takes a value of “1” if a dictator 
chooses option 1 in a MDG (and “0” for option 2). Respectively, the dummy indicates that a recipient´s guess in 
a MDG is that the dictator chooses option 1. In the norm elicitation stage, the evaluation of injunctive and 
descriptive norms is coded as in the analyses on the aggregate level in section 4.3.1. 
 82 We employ a Probit-model in order to account for the binary nature of the dependent variable. The OLS-
regressions serve as robustness checks. 
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term between (i) the variable that indicates norm perception and (ii) a dummy that indicates 
whether that norm was elicited in the INJUNCTIVE or the DESCRIPTIVE condition of the 
respective treatment. 83  The interaction term yields a significance test about whether the 
relationship between the norm choice and the choice made in the allocation stage is statistically 
significantly different between injunctive and descriptive norms. 
 As can be seen in panels C of Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, the interaction term is positive and 
significant in all specifications, i.e., both for dictator behavior and recipient guesses about 
dictator behavior (again independent from the regression model). We interpret this as evidence 
for descriptive social norms being more strongly related to behavior in the allocation stage, than 
injunctive norms. 
Result 3. Descriptive norms are statistically significantly more strongly related to dictator 
behavior and recipients´ guesses about dictator behavior than injunctive norms. 
 
 
 83 The dummy takes a value of 0, if the norm is injunctive, and a value of 1, if the norm is descriptive. 
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Table 4.4. Social Norms and Dictator Choices 
Panel A. Injunctive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
  
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Injunctive 
Norm 
0.488*** 
(0.162) 
0.169*** 
(0.056) 
 
0.418*** 
(0.135) 
0.136*** 
(0.044) 
Constant 
1.336* 
(0.811) 
0.944*** 
(0.272) 
 
-0.330 
(0.686) 
0.414* 
(0.232) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 420 420  420 420 
Panel B. Descriptive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Descriptive 
Norm  
1.042*** 
(0.180) 
0.367*** 
(0.051) 
 
1.240*** 
(0.157) 
0.401*** 
(0.041) 
Constant 
1.092 
(0.913) 
0.854*** 
(0.292) 
 
-1.168 
(0.800) 
0.188 
(0.225) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 400 400  400 400 
Panel C. Comparison of Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Norm 
0.495*** 
(0.163) 
0.171*** 
(0.057) 
 
0.412*** 
(0.133) 
0.136*** 
(0.044) 
Norm × 
Descriptive 
0.521** 
(0.243) 
0.187** 
(0.076) 
 
0.820*** 
(0.215) 
0.262*** 
(0.061) 
Constant 
1.611*** 
(0.594) 
1.043*** 
(0.196) 
 
-0.302 
(0.507) 
0.453*** 
(0.157) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 820 820  820 820 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Each participant yields ten observations. 
Standard errors are clustered on the subject level and reported in parentheses. The independent variable “Dictator 
Choice” is a dummy variable that indicates whether dictators choose option 1 in a mini-dictator game. In all 
regressions, we control for gender, age, economics study, and the location of the experimental laboratory 
(Heidelberg or Frankfurt). In the regressions that analyze interaction effects, we also control for the treatment 
condition (injunctive or descriptive). As a further robustness check, we conduct logit regressions and find the 
same results. 
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Table 4.5. Social Norms and Recipient Guesses about Dictator Choices 
Panel A. Injunctive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
  
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Injunctive 
Norm 
0.641*** 
(0.131) 
0.211*** 
(0.043) 
 
0.625*** 
(0.140) 
0.206*** 
(0.042) 
Constant 
0.722 
(1.059) 
0.770** 
(0.371) 
 
-1.352 
(0.949) 
0.081 
(0.277) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 420 420  420 420 
Panel B. Descriptive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Descriptive 
Norm  
1.366*** 
(0.211) 
0.402*** 
(0.049) 
 
1.292*** 
(0.167) 
0.417*** 
(0.034) 
Constant 
0.341 
(0.630) 
0.571*** 
(0.174) 
 
0.260 
(0.442) 
0.595*** 
(0.118) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 400 400  400 400 
Panel C. Comparison of Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
 Treatment SUBJECTIVE  Treatment OBJECTIVE 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Norm 
0.573*** 
(0.137) 
0.184*** 
(0.044) 
 
0.618*** 
(0.133) 
0.206*** 
(0.040) 
Norm × 
Descriptive 
0.656*** 
(0.234) 
0.212*** 
(0.064) 
 
0.691*** 
(0.214) 
0.215*** 
(0.053) 
Constant 
0.419 
(0.604) 
0.663*** 
(0.190) 
 
0.211 
(0.473) 
0.595*** 
(0.139) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 820 820  820 820 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Each participant yields ten observations. 
Standard errors are clustered on the subject level and reported in parentheses. The independent variable 
“Recipient Guess” is a dummy variable that indicates whether recipients believe that dictators choose option 1 
in a mini-dictator game. In all regressions, we control for gender, age, economics study, and the location of the 
experimental laboratory (Heidelberg or Frankfurt). In the regressions that analyze interaction effects, we also 
control for the treatment condition (injunctive or descriptive). As a further robustness check, we conduct logit 
regressions and find the same results. 
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4.3.3. The Relationship between Beliefs about Social Norms and Social Preferences 
We continue by analyzing the relationship between beliefs about social norms and social 
preferences. We conduct the same analysis as in the previous sections, but instead of using data 
from the norm elicitation stage, we use the data from the belief elicitation stage. Remember that 
the belief elicitation stages do slightly differ between the SUBJECTIVE and the OBJECTIVE 
conditions. In the SUBJECTIVE conditions, dictators (recipients) state their beliefs about the 
modal choices of recipients (dictators) in the norm elicitation stage. In the OBJECTIVE 
conditions, all subjects (i.e., independent from their roles) state their beliefs about the modal 
choices of both dictators and recipients. In Table 4.6, we analyze beliefs from dictators, and in 
Table 4.7, we analyze beliefs from recipients.84 As in the previous section, panels A of these 
tables refer to injunctive norms, panels B refer to descriptive norms, and panels C contain the 
combined data with interaction terms. 
 The separate analyses in panels A and panels B show the same general pattern as observed 
in the previous section. In most of the specifications, beliefs about injunctive and descriptive 
norms are significantly related to allocation behavior of dictators (Table 4.6) and to recipient 
guesses about allocation behavior (Table 4.7). However, the relationship between behavior in 
the allocation stage and beliefs about norms is less strong than the relationship between 
behavior in the allocation stage and actual norms. 
Result 4. In most of the specifications, beliefs about injunctive and descriptive social norms 
are statistically significantly related to dictator behavior and recipients´ guesses about dictator 
behavior. 
 Again, we compare whether the relationship between social preferences is stronger with 
beliefs elicited in the INJUNCTIVE or the DESCRIPTIVE conditions in panels C of Table 4.6 
and Table 4.7. Though the results are less clear than in the previous section, the general pattern 
is identical. Specifically, most of the interaction terms are positive, and the majority of them 
are statistically significant. This indicates that beliefs about descriptive social norms are more 
strongly related to allocation behavior than beliefs about injunctive social norms. 
Result 5. In most of the specifications, beliefs about descriptive norms are statistically 
significantly more strongly related to dictator behavior and recipients´ guesses about dictator 
behavior than beliefs about injunctive norms. 
 
 84 Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 are contained in the appendix. The analyses are fully equivalent to the analyses 
conducted in tables 4.4 and 4.5, except that the choices from the allocation stage are not regressed on the data from 
the norm elicitation stage, but on the data from the belief elicitation stage. 
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4.4. Summary and Conclusion 
We study the relationship between social norms and social preferences in a series of dictator 
games. Subjects first undergo an allocation stage where dictators decide about the division of 
money, and recipients state their beliefs about the behavior of dictators. Subsequently, subjects 
evaluate allocation behavior, by coordinating on injunctive and descriptive social norms as 
proposed by Krupka and Weber (2013). Finally, both types of players state their beliefs about 
the coordination outcomes of their opponents. We find that both injunctive and descriptive 
norms are significantly related to dictator behavior and recipients´ beliefs about dictator 
behavior. Likewise, beliefs about social norms held by others significantly predict social 
preferences. Comparing the relative importance of injunctive and descriptive norms shows that 
descriptive norms are significantly more strongly related to social preferences in almost all 
specifications. 
 The paper yields three contributions. The first contribution refers to the literature on the 
relative importance of different types of social norms as determinants of behavior. While there 
is mixed evidence on whether injunctive or descriptive social norms are more related to 
individual decision making, our paper supports the hypothesis that the explanatory power of 
perceptions about descriptive social norms is behaviorally more relevant than perceptions about 
injunctive social norms. Apparently, the analysis of this paper does not identify causal effects 
of injunctive or descriptive norm perception on actual behavior. However, in line with Bicchieri 
and Xiao (2009), the results support the view that changing perceptions about prevalent 
behavior is a more fruitful behavioral intervention than changing perceptions about appropriate 
behavior. 
 The second contribution is methodological, as the paper provides a direct test on the 
informativeness of coordination choices à la Krupka and Weber (2013) as a measure for social 
norm perception on the individual level. Our results suggest that individual coordination 
choices are a valid tool to elicit social norm perception on the subject level, as the participants´ 
coordination choices are significantly related to their actual behavior. In line with previous 
studies, this supports the idea that predictions about others are informative about a subject´s 
own perception about the question at hand (Dawes, 1989; Epley et al., 2004; Ross et al., 1977; 
Schmidt, 2019c; Vanberg, 2019), i.e., in this case about the own perception about prevailing 
social norms. This enlarges the potential scope of the Krupka and Weber (2013) method, as it 
indicates that not only the aggregate outcome of elicited norms is suited to predict behavioral 
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changes across contexts on the group level. Instead, a subject’s coordination choice also 
explains behavioral changes across different contexts on the individual level. 
 The third contribution is again methodological. Although the experiment is designed to 
investigate the relationship between social preferences and social norms on the individual level, 
we conducted descriptive analyses on the aggregate level. For that sake, we compared average 
outcomes from the social preference tasks with average behavior from the tasks where subjects 
coordinate on injunctive and descriptive social norms. While the relationship between average 
injunctive social norms and average allocation behavior is rather loose, average descriptive 
social norms accurately predict average allocation behavior. That observation is particularly 
remarkable as the scale used to measure social norms is verbal, because it was not the focus of 
the elicitation of descriptive norms to extract accurate estimations about behavior rates, which 
could then serve as a prediction device. That result supports the idea from Krupka and Weber 
(2013) to use social norms elicited using coordination games as a device to predict how 
behavior changes across environments. In fact, our data suggest that coordination games are 
not only suited to make prediction about shifts in behavior but to make point predictions about 
precise behavior rates. This is particularly appealing to predict behavior in contexts that are 
otherwise difficult to explore. We hope that further experiments are conducted to follow up on 
that observation and to examine coordination games as a tool to predict behavior, both on the 
individual and the aggregate level. 
  
  
91 
Appendix 4 
Table 4.6. Beliefs about Social Norms and Dictator Choices 
Panel A. Beliefs about Injunctive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
  
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Belief 
Injunctive 
Norm 
0.173 
(0.165) 
0.060 
(0.055) 
 
0.582*** 
(0.145) 
0.193*** 
(0.046) 
 
0.298** 
(0.138) 
0.098** 
(0.044) 
Constant 
1.325 
(0.857) 
0.964*** 
(0.294) 
 
-0.657 
(0.643) 
0.310 
(0.215) 
 
-0.310 
(0.685) 
0.411* 
(0.235) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 420 420  420 420  420 420 
Panel B. Beliefs about Descriptive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Belief 
Descriptive 
Norm  
0.048 
(0.148) 
0.019 
(0.058) 
 
1.684*** 
(0.161) 
0.489*** 
(0.034) 
 
0.103 
(0.153) 
0.040 
(0.055) 
Constant 
0.777 
(0.857) 
0.805** 
(0.336) 
 
-1.882** 
(0.820) 
0.061 
(0.180) 
 
-1.039 
(0.756) 
0.111 
(0.271) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 400 400  400 400  400 400 
Panel C. Comparison of Beliefs about Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
 
Dictator 
Choice 
Dictator 
Choice 
Belief 
Norm 
0.171 
(0.161) 
0.059 
(0.054) 
 
0.558*** 
(0.137) 
0.186*** 
(0.044) 
 
0.298** 
(0.136) 
0.100** 
(0.043) 
Belief 
Norm × 
Descriptive 
-0.121 
(0.217) 
-0.040 
(0.078) 
 
1.120*** 
(0.207) 
0.306*** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.201 
(0.204) 
-0.062 
(0.069) 
Constant 
1.215** 
(0.601) 
0.945*** 
(0.218) 
 
-0.750 
(0.491) 
0.351** 
(0.136) 
 
-0.438 
(0.506) 
0.342* 
(0.175) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 820 820  820 820  820 820 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Each participant yields ten observations. Standard 
errors are clustered on the subject level and reported in parentheses. The independent variable “Dictator Choice” is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether dictators choose option 1 in a mini-dictator game. In all regressions, we control 
for gender, age, economics study, and the location of the experimental laboratory (Heidelberg or Frankfurt). In the 
regressions that analyze interaction effects, we also control for the treatment condition (injunctive or descriptive). As a 
further robustness check, we conduct logit regressions and find the same results. 
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Table 4.7. Beliefs about Social Norms and Recipient Guesses 
Panel A. Beliefs about Injunctive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
  
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Belief 
Injunctive 
Norm 
0.356** 
(0.161) 
0.130** 
(0.058) 
 
0.680*** 
(0.167) 
0.232*** 
(0.054) 
 
0.564*** 
(0.168) 
0.188*** 
(0.050) 
Constant 
0.156 
(1.170) 
0.581 
(0.426) 
 
-1.773* 
(0.997) 
-0.052 
(0.296) 
 
-0.996 
(0.936) 
0.179 
(0.286) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 420 420  420 420  420 420 
Panel B. Beliefs about Descriptive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Belief 
Descriptive 
Norm  
1.395*** 
(0.195) 
0.416*** 
(0.041) 
 
1.289*** 
(0.160) 
0.416*** 
(0.034) 
 
0.824*** 
(0.144) 
0.292*** 
(0.043) 
Constant 
0.592 
(0.679) 
0.640*** 
(0.187) 
 
0.532 
(0.433) 
0.686*** 
(0.133) 
 
0.175 
(0.438) 
0.566*** 
(0.146) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 400 400  400 400  400 400 
Panel C. Comparison of Beliefs about Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
 
Treatment SUBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Dictator Norms 
 
Treatment OBJECTIVE: 
Beliefs about Recipient Norms 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
 
Recipient 
Guess 
Recipient 
Guess 
Belief 
Norm 
0.281* 
(0.154) 
0.106* 
(0.055) 
 
0.654*** 
(0.167) 
0.227*** 
(0.054) 
 
0.581*** 
(0.160) 
0.193*** 
(0.048) 
Belief 
Norm × 
Descriptive 
0.999*** 
(0.226) 
0.308*** 
(0.064) 
 
0.619*** 
(0.231) 
0.185*** 
(0.064) 
 
0.263 
(0.213) 
0.105 
(0.063) 
Constant 
0.321 
(0.654) 
0.634*** 
(0.212) 
 
0.330 
(0.478) 
0.614*** 
(0.158) 
 
0.312 
(0.405) 
0.610*** 
(0.135) 
Model Probit OLS  Probit OLS  Probit OLS 
# Obs. 820 820  820 820  820 820 
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Each participant yields ten observations. Standard 
errors are clustered on the subject level and reported in parentheses. The independent variable “Recipient Guess” is a 
dummy variable that indicates whether recipients believe that dictators choose option 1 in a mini-dictator game. In all 
regressions, we control for gender, age, economics study, and the location of the experimental laboratory (Heidelberg or 
Frankfurt). In the regressions that analyze interaction effects, we also control for the treatment condition (injunctive or 
descriptive). As a further robustness check, we conduct logit regressions and find the same results. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Norms in the Lab: Inexperienced versus Experienced 
Participants 
 
 
Robert J. Schmidt, Christiane Schwieren & Alec N. Sproten 
 
 
Abstract: Using coordination games, we study whether social norm perception differs between 
inexperienced and experienced participants in economic laboratory experiments. We find 
substantial differences between the two groups, both regarding injunctive and descriptive social 
norms in the context of participation in lab experiments. By contrast, social norm perception 
for the context of daily life does not differ between the two groups. We therefore conclude that 
learning through experience is more important than selection effects for understanding 
differences between the two groups. We also conduct exploratory analyses on the relation 
between lab and field norms and find that behaving unsocial in an experiment is considered 
substantially more appropriate than in daily life. This appears inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that social preferences measured in lab experiments are inflated and indicates a distinction 
between revealed social preferences as measured commonly and the elicitation of normatively 
appropriate behavior. 
 
Highlights: 
• Social norm perception of inexperienced and experienced lab participants is compared 
• Substantial differences are observed in lab norms, but not in field norms 
• The evidence suggests that learning is more important than selection-effects 
 
Acknowledgments: We thank seminar participants at the UPF Barcelona, the GATE Lyon 
Saint Etienne, the Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, the 9th International Conference of the 
ASFEE in Nizza, the ESA-World Meeting in Berlin, and the ESA Asia-Pacific Meeting in Abu 
Dhabi for very valuable comments.  
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5.1. Introduction 
Economic research makes extensive use of laboratory experiments for studying individual 
behavior in a controlled environment. Since the 1980s, the share of experimental studies 
published in general interest journals has risen continuously (Falk and Heckman, 2009). By 
now, lab experiments are an important source to inform economic theory and public policy 
(Nikiforakis and Slonim, 2015). However, methodological limitations of lab experiments, in 
particular the generalizability from the lab to the field, are regularly discussed (e.g., Dana et al., 
2007; Galizzi and Navarro-Martínez, 2018; Levitt and List, 2007, 2008; Zizzo, 2010). 
 Recently, more specific aspects of the recruitment process have been examined, such as 
the representativeness of registered students for the underlying student population (Abeler and 
Nosenzo, 2015; Cleave et al., 2013; Eckel and Grossman, 2000; Falk et al., 2013; Krawczyk, 
2011; Slonim et al., 2013) or whether participants behave differently depending on the number 
of previous participations (Benndorf et al., 2017, Matthey and Regner, 2013). 
 In this study, we contribute to these literatures by examining two questions. First, we test 
whether social norm perception differs between inexperienced participants and experienced 
participants.85 Second, by comparing differences between the two groups both for the lab and 
the field context, we attempt to investigate whether potential differences between the two 
groups are rather caused by learning through experience (when participating repeatedly) or by 
selection effects (through systematic differences in the probability to drop out from the pool 
depending on the participants´ characteristics). 
 To investigate these questions, we conduct a laboratory experiment and compare the two 
groups in a series of items that measure social norm perception. Precisely, we elicit social norm 
perception (i) regarding allocation behavior in the lab, (ii) regarding a series of unsocial 
behaviors in the lab and the field and (iii) regarding the evaluation of generalizability of 
behavior from the lab to the field. All questions are examined using the approach proposed by 
Krupka and Weber (2013) to elicit social norm perception via coordination games. In that 
approach, subjects are confronted with descriptions of behavior, and their task is to coordinate 
on appropriateness ratings. Assuming that social norms reflect shared perceptions about 
appropriate behaviors (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), the coordination outcome (i.e., the modal 
choice) reveals social norm perception within the participants´ population. We adopt that 
 
 85 In our study we classify the degree of experience as follows: Inexperienced subjects did not yet participate in 
any economic (or psychological) experiment and experienced subjects participated at least ten times in an 
economic laboratory experiment. 
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approach and sometimes adapt the set of available answers, such that the questions are suited 
to measure the kind of perceptions that we are interested in.86 
 A crucial assumption of the methodology applied in this experiment is that a coordination 
choice in the Krupka and Weber (2013) method is informative about a subject´s own perception 
about the question at hand. This view is justified if a respondent uses her own perception about 
a question when predicting the perception of others, in order to successfully anticipate the 
coordination outcome. Such behavior is implied by the false-consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977; 
Marks and Miller, 1987; Mullen et al., 1985), a well-documented phenomenon that follows 
Bayesian reasoning (Dawes, 1989, 1990; Engelman and Strobel, 2012; Schmidt, 2019c; 
Vanberg, 2019). Building on that assumption, we consider coordination choices as informative 
signals about the subjects´ actual types.87 This allows us to draw conclusions on how the 
subjects themselves perceive the questions that they “answer” in the coordination games. 
 Our experiment yields three insights. First, social norm perception regarding behavior in 
the context of participation in a laboratory experiment differs significantly between 
inexperienced and experienced subjects. In a series of hypothetical dictator games, 
inexperienced subjects pronounce egalitarianism, while experienced subjects pronounce 
efficiency and the maximization of their earnings. Consistent with Matthey and Regner (2013), 
this indicates that behavior in experiments that involve allocation settings systematically 
depends on a subject’s number of previous participations in lab experiments. Moreover, in the 
lab context, experienced subjects consider exploitation and deception as more appropriate than 
inexperienced participants, indicating that the two groups differ in experiments that involve 
these behaviors. 
 Second, by contrast to lab norms, neither field norms nor perceptions about the relation 
between the lab and the field differ between the two groups. This indicates that learning through 
experience is more important than selection effects for understanding the observed differences 
regarding lab norms. 
 Third, conducting exploratory analyses on whether norm perception in the lab corresponds 
to norm perception in the field, we find that norm perception between the lab and the field is 
correlated. However, using the same items to evaluate unsocial behaviors, once framed to the 
 
 86 For example, in some items, we do not do ask whether a particular behavior is appropriate or not. Instead, we 
state that a particular behavior would be appropriate and the subjects´ task then is to coordinate on the degree of 
consent with that statement. 
 87 For example, Schmidt (2019b) shows that injunctive and descriptive social norms elicited using coordination 
games are strongly related to revealed social preferences in a series of mini-dictator games on the subject level. 
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lab and once framed to the field context, shows that these contexts differ substantially. 
Specifically, behaving unsocially is considered significantly more appropriate in the lab than in 
the field. This appears inconsistent with the hypothesis that social preferences measured in 
economic experiments are inflated (e.g., Bardsley, 2008; Levitt and List, 2007; List, 2007) and 
indicates a distinction between revealed social preferences as measured commonly and the 
elicitation of normatively appropriate behavior using coordination games. 
 Our main conclusion is that, when conducting economic laboratory experiments, the degree 
of experience of participants needs to be taken care of. Since it is difficult to control explicitly 
for the exact number of previous participations by eliciting that information from subjects (as 
is done with gender or age), that characteristic needs to be properly randomized between 
treatments, when sessions are organized.88 To ensure this, the recruitment bias identified by 
Benndorf et al. (2017), i.e., that the share of inexperienced subjects tends to be lower in early 
recruitment waves, needs to be considered. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a literature 
overview and derives hypotheses. Section 5.3 presents the experiment and section 5.4 the 
experimental results. Section 5.5 contains exploratory analyses on generalizability from the lab 
to the field and on socio-demographics. Section 5.6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
5.2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
5.2.1. Related Literature 
Our paper relates to studies which examine selection effects associated with recruitment to lab 
experiments. Two types of selection effects need to be distinguished in that regard: selection 
into the subject pool and selection out of the subject pool. Selection into the subject pool results 
if subjects with specific characteristics have a higher probability of entering the subject pool 
through registration.89  Selection out of the subject pool results if registered subjects with 
 
 88 Note that it is difficult to simply use the number of participations of a subject as recorded in the data base, 
since this would require to give up the anonymity of participants towards the experimenter. This is because it 
would be necessary to connect a participant’s profile from the database with the data she produced in the 
experiment, which would require to identify which individual is sitting at which slot in the laboratory. Making that 
connection, however, is not in accordance with the usual policy to have subjects participate in economics 
experiments in a fully anonymous manner. 
 89 The evidence on selection into the subject pool is mixed, although the majority of studies examining that kind 
of selection report null results. While Eckel and Grossman (2000) do identify differences in social preferences 
between registered and non-registered subjects, Abeler and Nosenzo (2015), Cleave et al. (2013), Falk et al. (2013), 
and Slonim et al. (2013) do not identify meaningful differences. Krawczyk (2011) examines optimal advertisement 
of participation in experiments and finds that recruitment is more effective when emphasizing pecuniary benefits 
of participation. Subjects that were recruited with advertisement of pecuniary benefits were less altruistic. 
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specific characteristics vary in the probability to drop-out after having participated once. In our 
study, we contribute to the topic of selection out of the subject pool by comparing first-time 
participants with those who participated many times, i.e., with the group of subjects that tends 
to remain in the pool.  
 For example, Casari et al. (2007) find that subjects are more likely to participate in a follow-
up study, the more successful they were in monetary terms in a previous experiment. Similarly, 
Guillén and Veszteg (2012) find that earnings in previous experiments positively correlate with 
the probability of participating in future experiments. Thus, it has been hypothesized that more 
selfish subjects, which consequently earn more money in experiments, are more likely to 
regularly participate. As a result, it might be that common subject pools contain over-
proportionally large shares of selfish individuals. 
 Another literature related to our study examines differences between inexperienced and 
experienced participants. Matthey and Regner (2013) use data about participants´ behavior in 
previously conducted dictator games, ultimatum games, and trust games and find that the 
number of participations is negatively correlated with sharing behavior in all three games. 
Based on post-experimental questionnaires, they conclude that repeated participation in 
experiments involving allocation decisions leads to learning effects through negative 
experiences. Benndorf et al. (2017) directly test for behavioral differences between participants 
with extensive lab experience and first-time participants across four one-shot two-player games 
(trust game, beauty contest, ultimatum game, and traveler’s dilemma) and two individual 
decisions (lying task and risk preferences). In the trust game, experienced subjects trust less 
often, and they also behave significantly more selfish as second movers. In the risk elicitation 
tasks, experienced participants submit fewer non-monotonic strategies. The authors also 
document a recruitment bias as the share of inexperienced subjects was lower in early 
recruitment waves (i.e., in initial sessions of an experiment). 
 
5.2.2. Hypotheses 
We elicit social norm perception both for the lab and the field context. Based on the results 
from Benndorf et al. (2017) and Matthey and Regner (2013), which identify that behavior in 
the lab is related to experience, we hypothesize that this relationship is reflected in social norm 
perception. 
Hypothesis 1. The perception of social norms for the context of lab experiments differs between 
inexperienced and experienced participants. 
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 Regarding real-world norms, we again test the hypothesis that inexperienced and 
experienced participants differ. This hypothesis follows the idea that selection effects lead to 
an over-proportionally large share of selfish participants in the subject pool, as suggested by 
the literature on selection effects that result from drop-out (Casari et al., 2007; Guillén and 
Veszteg, 2012). Differences in field norms would thus indicate that selection also potentially 
explains differences in lab norms between inexperienced and experienced participants. By 
contrast, little or no differences in field norms would support the hypothesis that such 
differences mainly result from learning through repeated participation. 
Hypothesis 2. The perception of social norms for the context of daily life differs between 
inexperienced and experienced participants. 
 
5.3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
5.3.1. Experimental Design 
Conceptually, the experiment is divided into three parts and structured in five modules. In part 
1, injunctive social norms and descriptive social norms are elicited in a series of hypothetical 
mini-dictator games. In part 2, injunctive social norms regarding unsocial behaviors in the lab 
and the field are measured. In part 3, subjects evaluate the generalizability from the lab to the 
field. Each module contains five items, and we use coordination games to measure social norm 
perception throughout the whole experiment (Krupka and Weber, 2013). In each item, subjects 
are asked a question, and they coordinate on one of four answer possibilities. At the end of the 
experiment, one of the 25 items is selected at random. If a subject´s answer in that item matches 
the modal choice in the current session, the subject earns 10€ (and 0€ otherwise).90 
 Modules 1 and 2: Allocation decisions in the lab. We elicit injunctive social norms 
(module 1) and descriptive social norms (module 2) in a series of hypothetical allocation 
decisions. Injunctive norms indicate perceptions about normatively appropriate behavior in a 
specific context. They reflect what kind of behavior is approved or disapproved by the 
community and thereby motivate actions through the anticipation of social rewards or 
 
 90 We take care to make sure that subjects understand the coordination mechanism by reminding them before 
each item that their task is not to state their own opinion, but to coordinate with the remaining participants in the 
room. Only one item is paid in order to avoid hedging and ensure incentive compatibility (Azrieli et al., 2018). 
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punishment. In contrast, descriptive social norms refer to what kind of behavior is assumed to 
be common or prevalent (Cialdini et al., 1990).91 
 Five mini-dictator games are used that allow differentiating between competing 
distributional motives: efficiency, egalitarianism, and profit maximization. At the beginning of 
the modules, subjects learn the rules of the classical dictator game paradigm92 used in economic 
lab experiments and they are instructed to imagine that these allocation decisions would be used 
in an actual lab experiment.93 Table 5.1 shows the five hypothetical mini-dictator games and 
how the choices correspond to the distributional motives. 
Table 5.1. Hypothetical Mini-Dictator Games used in Module 1 and 2 
 Option 1 Option 2 Distributive Motives 
Game Dictator Recipient Dictator Recipient Efficiency Egalitarianism Profit max. 
1 15€ 5€ 11€ 11€ Option 2 Option 2 Option 1 
2 10€ 10€ 10€ 15€ Option 2 Option 1 - 
3 15€ 5€ 9€ 9€ Option 1 Option 2 Option 1 
4 10€ 9€ 9€ 11€ Option 2 Option 1 Option 1 
5 12€ 8€ 10€ 10€ - Option 2 Option 1 
 
  
 For simplicity, we always ask to evaluate option 1.94 For injunctive norms in module 1, 
subjects indicate “how appropriate it would be, to choose option 1” in the role of the dictator 
by coordinating on these answer options: “very appropriate”, “somewhat appropriate”, 
“somewhat inappropriate” or “very inappropriate”. For descriptive social norms in module 2 
subjects indicate “which of the two options would be chosen more often” by coordinating on 
these answer options: “option 1 much more often”, “option 1 somewhat more often”, “option 2 
somewhat more often” or “option 2 much more often”. 
 Modules 3 and 4: Evaluation of unsocial behaviors. We study social norm perception in 
the lab and the field by eliciting injunctive social norms regarding a series of unsocial behaviors: 
selfishness, exploitation, spitefulness, deception, and willful ignorance. Subjects are confronted 
 
 91 Cialdini et al. (1990) summarizes injunctive norms as “norms of ought” and descriptive norms as “norms of 
is”. Experimental studies find that both types of norms explain behavior, but also that the two norms are 
conceptually different constructs that independently affect intentions and behavior (e.g., Cialdini and Kallgren, 
1993; Kallgren et al., 2000; Rivis and Sheeran, 2003). This research also shows that behavior rates are typically 
highest when injunctive and descriptive norms are aligned. 
 92 Each step of the classical dictator game paradigm (anonymity, randomization of roles, matching, decision 
rights, and payout function) is explained in detail. We use the term „Player A“ for the dictator and „Player B“ for 
the recipient. 
 93 Precisely, they should imagine that the allocations would take place in an experiment like the one they are 
located in at that moment. 
 94 Note that option 1 is always dominant for the dictator in terms of profit maximization. 
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with the statement that the respective behavior would be appropriate and they then indicate the 
degree of consent with the respective statement by coordinating on: “fully agree”, “somewhat 
agree”, “somewhat disagree” or “fully disagree”. We use the identical set of items and frame 
them once to the lab (module 3) and once to the field (module 4). Table 5.2 shows the statements 
we use in the two modules. 
Table 5.2. Items used in Modules 3 and 4 
As a participant in a laboratory experiment, it is appropriate to / In daily life, it is appropriate to 
1) … mainly consider the own well-being. 
2) … take advantage of other subjects, when this leads to a material advantage for oneself. 
3) … harm other subjects, even when this does not lead to a material advantage for oneself. 
4) … deceive other subjects, in order to materially gain from it. 
5) … remain ignorant about the consequences that the own decisions have on other people. 
Notes: The wording “As a participant in an experiment, it is appropriate to…” refers to module 3 and “In 
daily life, it is appropriate to…” refers to module 4. 
 
 Module 5: Generalizability of lab behavior. In module 5, we elicit perceptions about the 
generalizability of lab behavior. Again, we confront subjects with a set of statements and have 
them coordinate on the degree of consent. Table 5.3 contains the items used in module 5. 
Table 5.3. Items used in Module 5 
1) As a participant in an experiment, I have the same moral standards regarding my own 
behavior as in daily life. 
2) As a participant in an experiment, I have the same moral standards regarding the behavior 
of others as in daily life. 
3) Selfishness in the lab is not the same as selfishness in daily life. 
4) Social norms in the laboratory are not the same as social norms in daily life. 
5) My behavior as a participant in an experiment is representative of my behavior in daily 
life. 
Notes: In the experiment, none of the words were printed boldly. The bold print here is to illustrate which 
of the statements are affirmations (suggesting similarity between the two contexts) and which of the 
statements are negations (suggesting dissimilarity between the two contexts). 
 
 Order of modules. To mitigate order effects, we vary the order of modules as well as the 
order of items within modules. Moreover, we avoid that those modules which are subject to 
comparison (module 1 and 2; module 3 and 4) appear consecutively, in order to reduce spillover 
effects between modules. Also, we elicit norms of daily life always at the end to avoid priming 
field context before eliciting perceptions about the lab context. We test for order effects but do 
not find an interaction between the different order variants and the subjects´ choices. 
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5.3.2. Procedures 
We conducted sessions either only with inexperienced subjects (no prior participation) or only 
with experienced subjects (at least 10 participations). Subjects were not informed about the fact 
that they were recruited as a specific subpart of the participant pool. In total, we recruited 82 
inexperienced subjects and 68 experienced subjects. From the 82 inexperienced participants, 9 
were excluded from the analysis because they stated in a post-experimental questionnaire that 
they already participated in at least one economic or psychological lab experiment before. Thus, 
73 inexperienced and 68 experienced subjects remained in the analysis, leaving us with a total 
N of 141 observations and fairly balanced sample sizes for the two groups. The experiment was 
programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), recruitment was done via hroot (Bock et al., 2014), 
and the sessions were conducted at the experimental laboratory of the University of Heidelberg, 
Germany, between November 2016 and May 2017. A typical session lasted about 35 minutes 
and subjects earned on average 10.30€ including a show-up fee of 3€.95 
 
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Part 1: Allocation Decisions in the Laboratory 
To analyze modules 1 and 2, we quantify the answers such that the resulting scores are 
normalized between -1 and 1. For injunctive norms in module 1, we quantify the answers as: 1 
= ”very appropriate”, 1/3 = ”somewhat appropriate”, -1/3 = “somewhat inappropriate”, -1 = 
“very inappropriate”. Thus, the more positive (negative) the score in module 1, the more 
appropriate (inappropriate) it is considered to choose option 1 in the respective decision. For 
descriptive norms in module 2, we quantify the answers as: 1 = “option 1 much more often”, 
1/3 = “option 1 somewhat more often”, -1/3 = “option 2 somewhat more often”, -1 = “option 2 
much more often”. The more positive (negative) the score in module 2, the more common 
choosing option 1 (option 2) is considered in the respective decision. Figure 5.1 provides 
descriptive analysis to give an impression about coordination outcomes. 
 In order to draw statistical inferences on differences between inexperienced and 
experienced participants and to control for potential confounds, we conduct regression analyses 
(Table 5.4). Regression results suggest that inexperienced and experienced subjects differ both 
concerning injunctive norms and descriptive norms in most of the allocation decisions, with the 
 
 95 A replication package, including instructions in German and English language, raw data, and data analysis 
files is available at the repository for research data of Heidelberg University: https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de. 
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latter diverging more strongly. In module 1, the two groups differ in three items before the 
correction procedure (items 2, 3, and 5), but two of these differences vanish after applying the 
Bonferroni correction.96 The results regarding injunctive norms indicate that the two groups 
differ in particular regarding their evaluation of the competing motives captured in item 3. In 
that item, a dictator chooses between advantageous efficiency and egalitarianism. While opting 
for advantageous efficiency is considered rather inappropriate by inexperienced subjects (score 
for injunctive norm of -0.19), it is evaluated as rather appropriate by experienced subjects (score 
for injunctive norm of 0.18). In module 2, the differences are considerably stronger than in 
module 1. Four items (1, 2, 3, and 5) differ between the two groups, and all of these 
significances survive the correction procedure. 
Figure 5.1. Allocation Decisions in the Laboratory 
Panel A. Injunctive Norms (Module 1) Panel B. Descriptive Norms (Module 2) 
  
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% without correcting for multiple testing; Mann-
Whitney-U tests. Positive (negative) values on Panel A represent that it is considered to be appropriate 
(inappropriate) to choose option 1 in the respective mini-dictator game. Positive (negative) values on Panel B 
represent that option 1 (option 2) is considered to be chosen more often in the respective mini-dictator game. 
 
 
 96  We account for the fact that multiple items are used within modules to detect differences between 
inexperienced and experienced participants. In order to take care of the inflation of the overall type-I-error rate, 
we therefore multiply the p-values by the number of items within a module (i.e., by five). 
-0,50
0,00
0,50
1,00
1 2 3 4 5
In
ju
n
ct
iv
e 
N
o
rm
Inexperienced Experienced
* *** *** ***
-0,50
0,00
0,50
1,00
1 2 3 4 5
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e 
N
o
rm
Inexperienced Experienced
*** *** *** ***
  
103 
Table 5.4. Regression Analysis on Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
 Panel A. Injunctive Social Norms (Module 1) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Experienced 
0.302 
(0.194) 
-0.404* 
(0.211) 
0.608***/### 
(0.195) 
0.123 
(0.213) 
0.447** 
(0.197) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 
 Panel B. Descriptive Social Norms (Module 2) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Experienced 
0.555***/## 
(0.196) 
-0.545***/## 
(0.203) 
0.668***/### 
(0.202) 
0.145 
(0.254) 
0.524***/## 
(0.205) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions. *, **, *** indicates levels of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
before correcting for multiple testing. #,##, ### indicates levels of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
after correcting for multiple testing according to the Bonferroni method. Standard errors are clustered on 
the individual level and reported in parentheses. Controls are gender, age, and field of study (economics or 
not). 
 
 We further analyze the distributive motives reflected in social norm perception. To this end, 
we calculate scores that reflect the relative importance of efficiency, egalitarianism, and profit 
maximization on the individual level and run regression analyses (Table 5.5).97 The results 
show that experience is systematically related to these motives. Consistent with Benndorf et al. 
(2017) and Matthey and Regner (2013), inexperienced subjects pronounce egalitarianism, while 
experienced subjects pronounce efficiency and profit orientation. The results from modules 1 
and 2 support hypothesis 1. 
Result 1. Inexperienced and experienced participants differ both concerning injunctive and 
descriptive social norms in allocation decisions. Regarding both types of norms, egalitarianism 
is more pronounced in inexperienced subjects, while efficiency and profit orientation are more 
pronounced in experienced subjects. 
 
 97 Precisely, a score on the individual level for a particular distributive motive (efficiency/egalitarianism/profit) 
is calculated as follows. We take the choice of a particular subject in a particular item. We then multiply a dummy 
variable that indicates if option 1 is the efficient/equal/profit maximizing option (dummy = 1) or not (dummy = -
1) with the choice score of the subject (i.e., 1, 1/3, -1/3 or -1) in that item. For each distributive motive, this is done 
for each item. The resulting scores are then averaged within the five items of a module regarding a specific 
distributive motive. This procedure is done for each subject, both for injunctive and for descriptive norms. The 
resulting scores then reflect the importance of a particular distributive motive in module 1 and module 2 on the 
subject level. In Appendix A5.2 the reader finds an example of how we calculated the scores. 
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Table 5.5. Regression Analysis on Distributive Motives 
 Panel A. Injunctive Social Norms Panel B. Descriptive Social Norms 
 Efficiency Egalitarianism 
Profit 
maximization 
Efficiency Egalitarianism 
Profit 
maximization 
Experienced 
0.081** 
(0.039) 
-0.194*** 
(0.063) 
0.152*** 
(0.057) 
0.075** 
(0.034) 
-0.272*** 
(0.062) 
0.210*** 
(0.064) 
Constant 
-0.113 
(0.092) 
0.376** 
(0.146) 
-0.095 
(0.133) 
-0.137* 
(0.079) 
0.038 
(0.146) 
0.173 
(0.150) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Notes: OLS regressions. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level without correcting for 
multiple testing. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level and reported in parentheses. Controls are 
gender, age, and field of study (economics or not). As a robustness check, we conduct Tobit regressions which 
yield the same results. 
 
5.4.2. Part 2: Evaluation of Unsocial Behaviors 
To analyze module 3 (module 4), we again first present descriptive results in Figure 5.2 and 
then run regression analyses on the degree of consent that the described behaviors are 
considered to be appropriate in the laboratory (the field).98 Comparing perceptions about the 
laboratory context, we find that for experienced subjects, it is significantly more appropriate to 
exploit and deceive other participants within the lab context (see the regressions in Panel A of 
Table 5.6). The results are highly significant and robust to the correction procedure. The 
observed differences further support hypothesis 1. 
 By contrast to lab norms, real-world norms are homogenous with respect to experience (see 
Panel B of Table 5.6). Item 1, which refers to selfishness, is marginally significantly different 
between the groups, indicating that selfishness in daily life is considered more appropriate by 
experienced participants. This difference, however, is not robust to the correction procedure. 
The results thus do not support hypothesis 2.  
Result 2. Lab norms differ between the two groups, as it is significantly more appropriate to 
exploit and deceive other participants within the lab context for experienced subjects. By 
contrast, real-world norms are homogenous with respect to experience. 
  
 
 98 Figure 5.2 shows that behaving unsocial in the lab is considered significantly more appropriate than behaving 
unsocial in the context of daily life (we elaborate on that finding in section 5.5.1). 
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Figure 5.2. Unsocial Behaviors in the Lab and the Field 
Panel A. Lab Norms (Module 3) Panel B. Field Norms (Module 4) 
  
Notes: *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% without correcting for multiple testing; Mann-Whitney-
U tests. Positive (negative) values indicate that the behavior described in an item is considered more (less) appropriate. 
 
Table 5.6. Regression Analysis on Appropriateness of Unsocial Behaviors 
 Panel A. Unsocial Behavior in the Lab (Module 3) 
 Selfishness Exploitation Spitefulness Deception Ignorance 
Experienced 
0.134 
(0.193) 
0.639***/### 
(0.200) 
-0.019 
(0.231) 
0.640***/### 
(0.198) 
-0.041 
(0.193) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 
 Panel B. Unsocial Behavior in the Field (Module 4) 
 Selfishness Exploitation Spitefulness Deception Ignorance 
Experienced 
0.384* 
(0.204) 
0.216 
(0.204) 
0.109 
(0.327) 
-0.166 
(0.209) 
0.222 
(0.210) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions. *, **, *** indicates levels of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
before correcting for multiple testing. #,##, ### indicates levels of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
after correcting for multiple testing according to the Bonferroni method. Regressions in Panel A (Panel B) 
are ran on the degree of consent that the respective behavior is considered to be an appropriate behavior in 
the lab (field) context. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level and reported in parentheses. 
Controls are gender, age, and field of study (economics or not). 
 
5.4.3. Part 3: Perceptions about Generalizability 
In module 5, subjects are asked to evaluate the generalizability of lab behavior. Table 5.7 shows 
regression analyses on the degree of consent with the items used in module 5. Item 1 indicates 
that experienced subjects less strongly agree to the statement that, in the lab, they have the same 
moral standards regarding their own behavior as in daily life. That is, experienced subjects less 
strongly agree to a statement that suggests that the two contexts are similar. However, the 
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difference is not robust to the correction procedure. We therefore do not find that the two groups 
differ in how they evaluate the generalizability of lab behavior. 
Result 3. Inexperienced and experienced subjects do not differ in how they perceive the relation 
between behavior in the lab and behavior in the field. 
Table 5.7. Regression Analysis on Perceptions about Generalizability 
 Item 1 (+) Item 2 (+) Item 3 (-) Item 4 (-) Item 5 (+) 
Experienced 
-0.398** 
(0.200) 
-0.022 
(0.196) 
-0.285 
(0.198) 
0.002 
(0.197) 
-0.191 
(0.199) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions. *, **, *** indicates uncorrected levels of significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. #,##, ### indicates levels of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level after correcting for 
multiple testing according to the Bonferroni method. Regressions are ran on the degree of consent with 
the respective item. The (+) and (-) indicate whether the statements represent affirmations (implying 
similarity between the lab and field) or negations (implying dissimilarity between the lab and field). 
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level and reported in parentheses. Controls are gender, age, 
and field of study (economics or not). 
 
5.5. Exploratory Analyses 
5.5.1. Generalizability of Lab Norms 
Although it is not the focus of this study, the data allows us to study generalizability by 
comparing modules 3 and 4 and testing whether lab and field norms correspond. As we hold 
the content of the items fixed and vary the framing of the context (lab vs. field), we can isolate 
the effect of the context. For that sake, we again quantify the answers such that the resulting 
scores are normalized between -1 and 1. The more positive (negative) the score, the stronger 
subjects agree (disagree) with the statement that a particular behavior is considered to be 
appropriate in the respective context. 
 We first conduct correlation analyses between lab norms and field norms. Table 5.8 shows 
that these are positive and mainly significant. We next compare the absolute values of the 
degree of consent between the two modules. Table 5.9 shows the same data as presented in 
Figure 5.2, but now the results regarding the two contexts are compared. The results indicate 
that perceptions about the appropriateness of the unsocial behaviors described in the items differ 
substantially between the two contexts, as each behavior is considered significantly less 
appropriate in the field than in the lab. This applies independently from the degree of 
experience. All differences remain highly statistically significant after the correction procedure. 
The finding stands in contrast with the hypothesis, that social preferences measured in the lab 
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are inflated (e.g., Levitt and List 2007) and the results indicate a distinction between revealed 
social preferences as elicited commonly and the elicitation of normatively appropriate behavior 
using coordination games. 
Result 3. Unsocial behavior in the lab context is considered substantially more appropriate than 
in the context of daily life. 
Table 5.8. Correlations between Laboratory and Field Norms 
 Selfishness Exploitation Spitefulness Deception Ignorance 
Inexperienced 0.204* 0.302***/## 0.291**/# 0.204* 0.260** 
Experienced 0.103 0.091 0.526***/### 0.268** 0.041 
All subjects 0.157* 0.237***/## 0.404***/### 0.220***/## 0.157* 
Notes: Spearman rank correlation. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level before 
correcting for multiple testing. #,##, ### indicates levels of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level after 
correcting for multiple testing according to the Bonferroni method. 
 
Table 5.9. Comparison Between Laboratory and Field Norms 
  Selfishness Exploitation Spitefulness Deception Ignorance 
Inexperienced 
participants 
Lab context 0.15 -0.16 -0.73 -0.19 0.00 
Field context -0.62 -0.58 -0.93 -0.56 -0.61 
Difference -0.77***/### -0.42***/### -0.20***/### -0.37***/### -0.61***/### 
Experienced 
participants 
Lab context 0.20 0.18 -0.73 0.08 -0.03 
Field context -0.45 -0.49 -0.93 -0.62 -0.56 
Difference -0.65***/### -0.67***/### -0.20***/### -0.70***/### -0.53***/### 
Notes: Two-sided t-tests. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level before correcting for 
multiple testing. #,##, ### indicates levels of significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level after correcting for multiple 
testing according to the Bonferroni method. The numbers represent the degree of consent that the behavior stated 
in an item is considered to be an appropriate behavior in the respective context. 
 
5.5.2. Socio-Demographics: Age, Gender, and Field of Study 
Throughout all analyses, we control for age, gender, and economic study. In Appendix A5.1, 
we report complete regression analyses including coefficients of control variables (age, gender, 
and field of study). In this section, we report those findings that are significant at the 5%-level 
without correction for multiple testing. 
 We find that all differences between inexperienced and experienced participants are fully 
independent of differences in age after controlling for experience. However, we identify some 
interesting patterns regarding gender and field of study. First, consistent with previous studies 
on gender effects in dictator game giving (e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Eckel and 
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Grossman, 1998), female subjects are significantly more guided by egalitarianism and 
significantly less guided by efficiency in experimental allocation tasks than male subjects (see 
Table 5.11). However, females consider it to be more appropriate to ignore the consequences 
that their own decisions have on other people in a lab experiment. Second, economics students 
consider several unsocial behaviors (exploitation, spitefulness, and deception) in the laboratory 
context as more appropriate than non-economics students (see Table 5.12). These differences, 
however, only refer to norm perception in the laboratory context. Regarding norm perception 
in the field context, all sub-group differences vanish. 
Result 4. Injunctive and descriptive social norms of female subjects are guided more strongly 
by egalitarianism and less strongly by efficiency than social norms of male subjects. 
Result 5. In the lab context, economics students consider exploitation, spitefulness, and 
deception as more appropriate than non-economics students. 
 
5.6. Summary and Conclusion 
We compare social norm perception of inexperienced and experienced participants in economic 
laboratory experiments using the Krupka and Weber (2013) approach. We find that the two 
groups differ both concerning injunctive norms and descriptive norms in allocation decisions 
in the lab, with the latter diverging more strongly. Consistent with Benndorf et al. (2017) and 
Matthey and Regner (2013), egalitarianism is more pronounced in norm perception of 
inexperienced subjects, while efficiency and profit maximization dominate in experienced 
subjects. We complement these results with the finding that experienced subjects consider 
exploitation and deception of other participants in the lab as more appropriate than 
inexperienced subjects. The results demonstrate that not only revealed social preferences 
(Matthey and Regner, 2013) are related to the number of participations, but that also social 
norm perception, which potentially mediates the differences in behavior, is different between 
subjects with varying degrees of experience. 
 We also compare norm perception for the context of daily life and find that these do not 
differ between the two groups. We thus do not find support for the hypothesis that selection 
effects through drop-out lead to an over proportionally large share of selfish individuals in the 
subject pool (Casari et al. 2007, Guillén and Veszteg 2012). We therefore conclude that learning 
is more important than selection effects for explaining differences that are linked to experience. 
For a conclusive analysis of the relative importance of learning and selection, however, further 
research is necessary. In particular, it might be interesting to compare field behavior more 
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comprehensively, as the scope of analyses of that context was smaller than the scope on the 
analysis of the lab context in our study. 
 Finally, we conduct exploratory analyses in order to contribute to the generalizability 
debate by comparing social norm perception between the lab and the field. We find that norm 
perception between the two contexts is correlated. However, independent from the degree of 
experience, behaving unsocially in the lab is considered significantly more appropriate than in 
the real-world. This finding stands in contrast with the hypothesis that social preferences 
measured in the lab are inflated (e.g., Levitt and List 2007) and indicates a distinction between 
revealed social preferences and the elicitation of normatively appropriate behavior using 
coordination games. 
 Our results corroborate the idea that, when conducting economic laboratory experiments, 
the degree of “lab experience” of participants needs to be taken care of. We therefore conclude 
that it is essential to make sure that this characteristic is properly randomized between 
treatments, and that this should be monitored in the invitation phase of the recruitment process. 
To ensure this, the recruitment bias identified by Benndorf et al. (2017), i.e., that the share of 
inexperienced subjects tends to be lower in early recruitment waves, needs to be considered.  
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Appendix 5 
A5.1. Complete Regression Analyses reporting Coefficients of Control Variables 
A5.1.1. Complete Regression Analysis on Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
Table 5.10. Regression Analysis on Injunctive and Descriptive Social Norms 
 Panel A. Injunctive Social Norms (Module 1) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Experienced 
0.302 
(0.194) 
-0.404* 
(0.211) 
0.608*** 
(0.195) 
0.123 
(0.213) 
0.447** 
(0.197) 
Age 
0.024 
(0.018) 
0.000 
(0.018) 
0.020 
(0.018) 
0.003 
(0.019) 
0.023 
(0.019) 
Female 
0.141 
(0.191) 
0.749*** 
(0.208) 
0.035 
(0.191) 
0.119 
(0.211) 
-0.131 
(0.192) 
Economics 
0.223 
(0.191) 
-0.133 
(0.207) 
0.175 
(0.191) 
-0.274 
(0.209) 
0.056 
(0.193) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 
 Panel B. Descriptive Social Norms (Module 2) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Experienced 
0.555*** 
(0.196) 
-0.545*** 
(0.203) 
0.668*** 
(0.202) 
0.145 
(0.254) 
0.524*** 
(0.205) 
Age 
-0.011 
(0.017) 
0.020 
(0.019) 
0.022 
(0.020) 
0.077* 
(0.043) 
0.045* 
(0.027) 
Female 
-0.244 
(0.192) 
0.565*** 
(0.201) 
-0.154 
(0.197) 
0.256 
(0.249) 
-0.208 
(0.202) 
Economics 
-0.009 
(0.191) 
-0.074 
(0.201) 
0.136 
(0.197) 
-0.085 
(0.248) 
0.093 
(0.203) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
without correcting for multiple testing. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level and 
reported in parentheses. 
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A5.1.2. Complete Regression Analysis on Distributive Motives 
Table 5.11. Regression Analysis on Distributive Motives 
 Injunctive Social Norms Descriptive Social Norms 
 Efficiency Egalitarianism 
Profit 
maximization 
Efficiency Egalitarianism 
Profit 
maximization 
Experienced 
0.081** 
(0.039) 
-0.194*** 
(0.063) 
0.152*** 
(0.057) 
0.075** 
(0.034) 
-0.272*** 
(0.062) 
0.210*** 
(0.064) 
Age 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
Female 
-0.127*** 
(0.039) 
0.112* 
(0.062) 
0.010 
(0.056) 
-0.078** 
(0.034) 
0.156** 
(0.062) 
-0.058 
(0.064) 
Economics 
0.028 
(0.039) 
-0.082 
(0.062) 
0.028 
(0.056) 
0.026 
(0.034) 
-0.034 
(0.062) 
0.018 
(0.064) 
Constant 
-0.113 
(0.092) 
0.376** 
(0.146) 
-0.095 
(0.133) 
-0.137* 
(0.079) 
0.038 
(0.146) 
0.173 
(0.150) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Notes: OLS regressions. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level; standard errors are 
clustered on the individual level and reported in parentheses. As a robustness check, we conduct Tobit regressions 
which yield the same results. 
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A5.1.3. Complete Regression Analysis on Evaluation of Unsocial Behaviors 
Table 5.12. Regression Analysis on Appropriateness of Unsocial Behaviors 
 Panel A. Unsocial Behavior in the Lab (Module 3) 
 Selfishness Exploitation Spitefulness Deception Ignorance 
Experienced 
0.134 
(0.193) 
0.639*** 
(0.200) 
-0.019 
(0.231) 
0.640*** 
(0.198) 
-0.041 
(0.193) 
Age 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.024) 
-0.028 
(0.019) 
0.018 
(0.018) 
Female 
-0.014 
(0.191) 
0.230 
(0.195) 
0.367 
(0.230) 
0.249 
(0.193) 
0.561*** 
(0.195) 
Economics 
0.037 
(0.191) 
0.453** 
(0.196) 
0.636*** 
(0.221) 
0.628*** 
(0.197) 
0.154 
(0.192) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 
 Panel B. Unsocial Behavior in the Field (Module 4) 
 Selfishness Exploitation Spitefulness Deception Ignorance 
Experienced 
0.384* 
(0.204) 
0.216 
(0.204) 
0.109 
(0.327) 
-0.166 
(0.209) 
0.222 
(0.210) 
Age 
-0.012 
(0.019) 
0.000 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.036) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
-0.003 
(0.019) 
Female 
-0.248 
(0.200) 
-0.221 
(0.203) 
0.416 
(0.336) 
-0.082 
(0.206) 
0.260 
(0.208) 
Economics 
0.175 
(0.200) 
-0.074 
(0.203) 
-0.021 
(0.320) 
-0.087 
(0.207) 
-0.066 
(0.207) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
without correcting for multiple testing. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level and 
reported in parentheses. Regressions in Panel A (Panel B) are ran on the degree of consent that the 
respective behavior is considered to be an appropriate behavior in the lab (field) context. 
 
  
113 
A5.1.4. Complete Regression Analysis on Perceptions about Generalizability 
Table 5.13. Regression Analysis on Perceptions about Generalizability 
 Agreement with Statements 
 Item 1 (+) Item 2 (+) Item 3 (-) Item 4 (-) Item 5 (+) 
Experienced 
-0.398** 
(0.200) 
-0.022 
(0.196) 
-0.285 
(0.198) 
0.002 
(0.197) 
-0.191 
(0.199) 
Age 
-0.003 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
0.016 
(0.018) 
Female 
-0.115 
(0.196) 
0.098 
(0.194) 
0.123 
(0.196) 
0.001 
(0.195) 
0.065 
(0.196) 
Economics 
0.133 
(0.196) 
0.133 
(0.195) 
0.048 
(0.196) 
0.313 
(0.197) 
0.302 
(0.198) 
# Obs. 141 141 141 141 141 
Notes: Ordered probit regressions. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level without 
correcting for multiple testing. Standard errors are clustered on the individual level and reported in 
parentheses. Regressions are ran on the degree of consent with the respective item. The (+) and (-) indicate 
whether the statements represent affirmations (implying similarity between the lab and field) or negations 
(implying dissimilarity between the lab and field). 
 
A5.2. Example Calculation of Scores for Distributive Motives 
We illustrate how we calculate the scores that reflect the relative importance of efficiency, 
egalitarianism, and profit maximization on the individual level. The following table depicts 
choices of an exemplary subject in module 1 or module 2. The columns “Efficiency-Dummy” 
/ “Egalitarianism-Dummy” / “Profit-Dummy” indicate if Option 1 in the respective item is the 
efficient / egalitarian / profit-maximizing choice. 
 
Item Choices in Module 1 Choices in Module 2 
Efficiency-
Dummy 
Egalitarianism-
Dummy 
Profit-
Dummy 
1 
Somewhat 
inappropriate (-1/3) 
Option 2 somewhat 
more often (-1/3) 
-1 -1 1 
2 
Very inappropriate 
(-1) 
Option 2 much more 
often (-1) 
-1 1 - - - 
3 
Somewhat 
inappropriate (-1/3) 
Option 1 somewhat 
more often (+1/3) 
1 -1 1 
4 Very appropriate (+1) 
Option 1 much more 
often (+1) 
-1 1 1 
5 
Somewhat appropriate 
(+1/3) 
Option 1 much more 
often (+1) 
- - - -1 1 
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The score representing the importance of the distributive motives in the two modules are then 
calculated as follows: 
• Efficiency (injunctive): [(-1/3)*(-1)+(-1)*(-1)+(-1/3)*1+1*(-1)+(1/3)*0]/5=0.00 
• Egalitarianism (injunctive): [(-1/3)*(-1)+(-1)*1+(-1/3)*(-1)+1*1+(1/3)*(-1)]/5=0.07 
• Profit max. (injunctive): [(-1/3)*1+(-1)*0+(-1/3)*1+1*1+(1/3)*1]/5=0.13 
 
• Efficiency (descriptive): [(-1/3)*(-1)+(-1)*(-1)+(1/3)*1+1*(-1)+1*0]/5=0.13 
• Egalitarianism (descriptive): [(-1/3)*(-1)+(-1)*1+(1/3)*(-1)+1*1+1*(-1)]/5=-0.20 
• Profit max. (descriptive): [(-1/3)*1+(-1)*0+(1/3)*1+1*1+1*1]/5=0.40 
 
In Table 5.5 and Table 5.11, the level of experience is then regressed on these values. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Point Beauty Contest: Measuring the Distribution of Focal 
Points on the Individual Level 
 
 
Robert J. Schmidt 
 
 
Abstract: We propose the Point Beauty Contest, a mechanism to identify the distribution of 
focal points on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination, subjects 
coordinate by the distribution of points. This allows for nuanced coordination strategies, as 
subjects can invest in multiple alternatives at the same time and weigh their choice. A subject´s 
strategy choice then reveals her perception of the distribution of focal points. In an experiment 
on the elicitation of social norms, we compare the mechanism with conventional coordination. 
The data confirms the theoretical predictions regarding coordination behavior and demonstrates 
that the proposed technique is suited to identify the distribution of focal points on the individual 
level. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the proposed mechanism identifies focal 
points on the population level more efficiently than conventional coordination. We point to the 
possibility of using the mechanism as a simple method to directly measure strategic uncertainty. 
 
Highlights: 
• A method to identify the distribution of focal points on the individual level is proposed 
• In an experiment, the proposed method is compared to conventional coordination 
• The data demonstrates that the technique reveals focal points on the individual level 
• On the aggregate level, the proposed technique identifies focal points more efficiently 
 
Acknowledgments: I thank Dietmar Fehr, Florian Kauffeldt, Marco Lambrecht, Gerhard 
Minnameier, Illia Pasichnichenko, Hannes Rau, Christiane Schwieren, Stefan Trautmann, 
Marie Claire Villeval, Adam Zylbersztejn as well as seminar audiences in Frankfurt, 
Heidelberg, GATE Lyon Saint Etienne, the 9th International Conference of the ASFEE in 
Nizza, the ESA World Meeting in Berlin, and the ESA Asia-Pacific Meeting in Abu Dhabi for 
very valuable comments and suggestions. 
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6.1. Introduction 
Schelling (1960) argues that in coordination games with multiple equilibria, subjects perceive 
varying degrees of saliences regarding the available alternatives. This renders some of the 
equilibria more or less “focal” and constitutes an implicit coordination device.99 Focal points 
are interesting not only because they help subjects coordinate, but because of their potential to 
reveal shared perceptions. For example, in the original version of the Keynesian Beauty Contest 
(Keynes, 1936), respondents are provided with pictures of women, and their task is to 
coordinate on the most attractive pictures. According to Schelling´s concept, focal points might 
be induced by prevalent beauty ideals within the guessers´ population. Capitalizing on the same 
mechanism, Krupka and Weber (2013) propose using coordination games to elicit social norm 
perception.100 
 In the described settings, however, subjects choose only one alternative. As a result, the 
coordination choice of a single participant only reveals which alternative she considers most 
focal. For example, a subject´s coordination choice in the Keynesian Beauty Contest reveals 
which picture the respondent considers most salient, but it is not identified which picture is 
ranked second or third. In order to analyze how one alternative relates to other alternatives in 
terms of focality and to determine a ranking, it is necessary to combine the choices of many 
participants.101 Yet, such a ranking would only emerge on the population level, i.e., based on 
the choices of many participants. By contrast, the ranking of focal points on the individual level, 
i.e., regarding a single respondent, remains unidentified. This results from the nature of the 
technique since subjects can only bet on one alternative. 
 We propose the Point Beauty Contest, a method that allows eliciting the ranking of focal 
points on the individual level. The Point Beauty Contest allows participants to bet on multiple 
outcomes and to weigh their choices. In contrast to conventional coordination, where subjects 
 
 99 Schelling (1960) himself conducted a series of informal experiments to illustrate this effect. For example, he 
asked subjects whether they would pick either “heads” or “tails” in a coordination game. Of the 42 respondents, 
36 chose heads. As no formal differences between the strategies or the respective equilibria were present in that 
setting, he concluded that the obvious presence of a coordination device could only be attributed to shared 
perceptions and that, apparently, “heads” appeared to be more focal than “tails”. Since then, both experimental 
and theoretical work has corroborated the relevance of focal points in a variety of coordination settings (e.g., 
Binmore and Samuelson, 2006; Casajus, 2000; Crawford et al., 2008; Fehr et al., 2019; Isoni et al., 2013, 2014, 
2019; Janssen, 2001, 2006; Metha et al. 1992, 1994a, 1994b; Pope et al., 2015; Sudgen, 1995; Sugden and 
Zamarrón, 2006). 
 100 In that approach, subjects are confronted with the description of a particular behavior and they have to 
coordinate on appropriateness ratings. The method assumes that social norms are constituted through shared 
perceptions (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), which thereby determine the focality of alternatives. Consequently, 
subjects´ coordination choices reveal perceptions about prevailing social norms. 
 101 The term focality is meant to represent the degree to which an alternative appears to be focal to a player. 
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coordinate by choosing one alternative, subjects are equipped with a budget of points that they 
can distribute among multiple alternatives. Like in conventional coordination games, subjects 
are incentivized to reveal their beliefs about the other participants´ behavior, as they are paid 
according to the precision with which they anticipate the other participants´ choices. While 
coordination with a single choice reveals the most focal alternative, this approach allows the 
elicitation of the ranking of focal points on the level of a single participant. 
 Fine-grained coordination is present in many real-world coordination settings. In a bank 
run, for example, depositors might not only think about withdrawing none of their money or all 
of their money from a bank. Instead, due to a conflict of pecuniary incentives (play withdrawal) 
and social preferences (play no withdrawal), a subject might want to engage in both strategies 
simultaneously. The proposed mechanism captures two aspects of such a setting. First, subjects 
can invest in multiple alternatives in a coordination setting. Second, accordingly, the 
coordination outcome not only depends on the number of subjects choosing a particular 
alternative, but also on the weights that are put on the alternatives. Thus, the Point Beauty 
Contest provides a framework that reflects the interaction between subjects when nuanced 
strategy choices are feasible.102 
 We analyze the Point Beauty Contest both theoretically and experimentally. In the 
theoretical part, we derive predictions for coordination behavior that depend on risk preferences 
and strategic uncertainty. In an experiment on the elicitation of social norms (Krupka and 
Weber, 2013), we compare the proposed mechanism with conventional coordination. On the 
aggregate level, we find that the coordination outcomes correspond, i.e., the average ranking 
produced by the Point Beauty Contest matches the ranking elicited using the conventional 
approach. Looking at the choices on the subject level confirms the theoretical predictions and 
demonstrates that the proposed technique is suited to identify the ranking of focal points on the 
individual level. Moreover, using Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the Point Beauty 
Contest identifies focal points on the population level more efficiently, as it yields a given level 
of precision about the underlying distribution with significantly fewer subjects. 
 We see several fields of application for the Point Beauty Contest. First, the mechanism is 
suited to reflect coordination settings where fine-grained coordination is feasible. This allows 
to study coordination behavior when subjects opt for nuanced coordination strategies that 
involve engagement in multiple alternatives. Second, the mechanism allows to uncover the 
 
 102 Note that such kind of nuanced strategies conceptually differ from mixed strategies, where subjects assign 
probabilities to every pure strategy. Instead, in the Point Beauty Contest, subjects engage in multiple strategies at 
the same point in time. 
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distribution of focal points in coordination games on the individual level. That is, subjects not 
only reveal the most salient alternative in a coordination setting but reveal their ranking of 
saliences. Third, the mechanism is useful when an experimenter is interested in the 
identification of focal points on the population level with fewer resources since the Point Beauty 
Contest yields results that are as precise as the results from conventional coordination with 
substantially fewer subjects. 
 The Point Beauty Contest also contributes to the elicitation of social norms using 
coordination games. As Krupka and Weber (2013) state, their results show that “a social norm 
is not always a single action that should or should not be taken, but rather a profile of varying 
degrees of social appropriateness for different available actions”.103 Social norms as such a 
profile can only be detected on the population level with conventional coordination, while the 
Point Beauty Contests elicits such profile of social norm perception on the subject level. 
 Finally, the Point Beauty Contest serves as a simple and direct tool to measure strategic 
uncertainty in coordination games, as the assignment of points depends on the risk preferences 
and the degree of strategic uncertainty that the subjects perceive. Controlling for risk 
preferences thus allows isolating the degree of strategic uncertainty on the individual level. For 
example, Heinemann et al. (2009) propose to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty 
equivalents and identify the payment that renders a subject indifferent between the certain 
payoff and an uncertain payoff that is subject to strategic uncertainty. Our approach would 
facilitate the elicitation of uncertainty in strategic settings, as the subject´s behavior (i.e., the 
distribution of points) reflects a direct measure for that kind of uncertainty. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 contains the theoretical 
framework to derive predictions for coordination behavior. Section 6.3 presents the experiment 
and section 6.4 the experimental results. Section 6.5 contains simulations results on efficiency 
measurement. Section 6.6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
6.2. Theoretical Framework 
6.2.1. The Game 
Consider a one-shot coordination game where subjects 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 see alternatives 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚. 
Each subject receives a budget of 𝑋 points and distributes the points between alternatives. The 
 
 103 See the abstract of Krupka and Weber (2013). 
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number of points that individual 𝑖 assigns to 𝑗 is denoted as 𝑥𝑖𝑗. All points must be used, i.e., 
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 = 𝑋. We refer to the vector 𝑋𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑚) as a subject´s coordination choice. 
After all subjects decided about 𝑋𝑖, the average number of points 𝑥?̅? assigned to alternative 𝑗 is 
calculated as 𝑥?̅? = (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛 . The alternative that received most points on average is 
considered the winning alternative 𝑗∗ . If more than one alternative received the maximum 
number of points, 𝑗∗  is determined randomly among these alternatives. 104  Finally, each 
participant receives a payoff 𝜋𝑖  that is proportional to the number of points 𝑥𝑖𝑗∗  that she 
assigned to the winning alternative, i.e., 𝜋𝑖~𝑥𝑖𝑗∗. 
 
6.2.2. Belief Formation, Preferences, and Strategic Uncertainty 
Focal Points and Belief Formation. For each alternative 𝑗, a subject perceives focality 𝜑𝑖𝑗 ≥
0 and the vector 𝛷𝑖 = (𝜑𝑖1, … , 𝜑𝑖𝑚) determines a subject´s ranking of focalities. A subject´s 
𝛷𝑖 is induced by the framing of the game, i.e., the question at hand. By definition, subjects 
assume that perceptions about focalities are correlated among participants and that the 
remaining subjects use it as a coordination device (Sudgen, 1995). Based on 𝛷𝑖 , a subject 
derives beliefs 𝑝𝑖𝑗  which reflect the probability that alternative 𝑗  becomes the winning 
alternative 𝑗∗ . Specifically, stronger focality renders the respective alternative as a more 
promising bet for the investment of points: 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑝𝑖𝑘 > 𝑝𝑖𝑙 for two alternatives 𝑘 and 𝑙. 
The vector 𝑃𝑖 = (𝑝𝑖1, … , 𝑝𝑖𝑚) , with ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 = 1 , is the perceived probability distribution 
about the coordination outcome of an individual 𝑖. 105 The translation of focalities into actual 
probabilities allows viewing the agent´s problem as a game against nature (Luce and Raiffa, 
1957). 
 Preferences. Subjects exhibit von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. For 
convenience, we normalize 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗∗ , so that profit will simply equal the number of points 
assigned to 𝑗∗. As a result, utility simplifies to 𝑈𝑖 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑢(𝑥𝑖𝑗). The utility function 𝑢 is 
continuous and twice differentiable with 𝑢´(𝑥) > 0. Subjects can be risk-averse (𝑢´´(𝑥) < 0), 
risk-neutral (𝑢´´(𝑥) = 0), or risk-seeking (𝑢´´(𝑥) > 0). 
 
 104 It is necessary that only one 𝑗 becomes the winning alternative. This ensures that subjects are not incentivized 
to equalize points among all alternatives which would maximize the profit of all participants, but render the 
outcome uninformative. 
 105 We assume that subjects perceive the probabilities to be exogenous, i.e., they do not strategically assign points 
in an attempt to influence the probability distribution. This assumption is adequate when the number of participants 
is sufficiently large. 
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 Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Behavior. A subject is certain if she is sure 
about the outcome of the game: 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1 for some 𝑗. A subject is partially uncertain if she 
considers at least one alternative 𝑘 to be more promising than another alternative l, without 
being fully confident: 0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑙 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘 < 1 for some 𝑘 and 𝑙. A subject is fully uncertain if she is 
clueless concerning the outcome of the game: 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝑚 for all 𝑗. 
 Accordingly, we say that a subject is gambling if she assigns all points to one alternative: 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋 for some 𝑗. A subject is ranking if she assigns more points to one alternative 𝑘 than to 
another alternative l: 0 < 𝑥𝑖𝑙 < 𝑥𝑖𝑘 < 𝑋. A subject is hedging if she fully hedges her profit by 
assigning equally many points to all alternatives: 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋/𝑚 for all 𝑗. 
 
6.2.3. Predictions for Coordination Behavior and Revelation of Focalities 
For simplicity, predictions refer to a game with two alternatives 𝑘  and 𝑙 , without loss of 
generality. Table 6.1 shows predictions for coordination behavior depending on risk preference 
and strategic uncertainty. If subjects are either risk-averse or if subjects are certain about the 
coordination outcome, then a subject´s coordination choice 𝑋𝑖  reflects her perception of 
underlying focalities 𝛷𝑖. That is, subjects are gambling in case of certainty, they are ranking in 
case of partial uncertainty, and they are hedging in case of full uncertainty. In these cases, 
subjects reveal their ranking of focal points, as they assign more points to alternatives that are 
considered more promising: 𝑝𝑖𝑘 > 𝑝𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 > 𝑥𝑖𝑙 . Since we assume that subjects derive 
success probabilities of alternatives based on their degree of focalitity, i.e., 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑝𝑖𝑘 >
𝑝𝑖𝑙, a subject´s ranking of points will correspond to her ranking of focalities, i.e., 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔
𝑥𝑖𝑘 > 𝑥𝑖𝑙 in these cases.
106 
Proposition 1. If an individual is risk-averse or certain about the coordination outcome, then 
she fully reveals her ranking of focalities by assigning more points to alternatives that she 
considers more focal. 
Proof. See Appendix A6.1. 
  
 
 106 This also holds in a game with more than two alternatives, because the predictions apply to all pairwise 
comparisons of alternatives. 
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Table 6.1. Predictions for Coordination Behavior 
 
Certainty: 
𝑝𝑘 = 1 
Partial uncertainty: 
0 < 𝑝𝑙 < 𝑝𝑘 < 1 
Full Uncertainty: 
𝑝𝑘 = 𝑝𝑙 
Risk-averse 𝒙𝒌 = 𝑿 𝟎 < 𝒙𝒍 < 𝒙𝒌 < 𝑿 𝒙𝒌 = 𝒙𝒍 
Risk-neutral 𝒙𝒌 = 𝑿 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑋 Indifferent 
Risk-seeking 𝒙𝒌 = 𝑿 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑋 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑋 or 𝑥𝑙 = 𝑋 
Notes: The bold printing refers to those cases where a subject’s coordination choice fully 
reflects her beliefs. 
 
6.3. Experiment 
6.3.1. Design 
We experimentally test our predictions by applying the Point Beauty Contest to elicit social 
norm perception. The idea to use coordination games to measure social norm perception has 
been proposed by Krupka and Weber (2013). In their approach, subjects are asked to evaluate 
a particular behavior (e.g., “how appropriate is it to do X?”), and they are provided with 
different answer alternatives to evaluate that behavior (e.g., “very appropriate”, “somewhat 
appropriate”, “somewhat inappropriate”, “very inappropriate”). The subjects´ task is to choose 
the answer of which they think the majority of participants would choose it. That approach is 
equivalent to the classical Keynesian Beauty Contest, in which it is not optimal for subjects to 
state their own opinion, but to anticipate the modal choice of the group. We compare their 
method, where subjects can only bet on one alternative, with our approach, where subjects can 
bet on multiple alternatives and weigh their choices. Note that the elicitation of social norm 
perception is just one context to test the proposed mechanism. Any experimental setting, in 
which participants coordinate, would be suited for an experimental test. 
 We conduct two treatments: Classical Beauty Contest (CBC) and Point Beauty Contest 
(PBC). In both treatments, we elicit injunctive social norms (part 1) and descriptive social 
norms (part 2) for five daily life behaviors. Injunctive social norms refer to perceptions of 
normatively appropriate behavior while descriptive social norms refer to perceptions of 
common behavior, i.e., the behavior practiced by most people (Cialdini et al., 1990). Table 6.2 
shows the five behaviors that we use for the elicitation of injunctive and descriptive social 
norms. 
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Table 6.2. Items Used for the Elicitation of Social Norms 
1. Taking some money out of a found wallet before bringing it to the lost-property office. 
2. Lying for reasons of courtesy. 
3. Treating unfairly a person of which one has been treated unfairly before. 
4. Keeping the money when the cashier accidentally returned too much change. 
5. Mainly paying attention to the own well-being in daily life. 
 
 
 For the elicitation of injunctive social norms, subjects are confronted with a particular item 
and they are asked, how they evaluate the respective behavior regarding its appropriateness. 
Subjects then have to coordinate on the answer options: “very appropriate”, “somewhat 
appropriate”, “somewhat inappropriate”, “very inappropriate”. For the elicitation of descriptive 
social norms, subjects are confronted with a particular item, and they are then asked how many 
people would engage in the described behavior. Subjects then coordinate on the answer options: 
“a large majority”, “a majority”, “a minority”, “a small minority”. 
  In CBC, we employ conventional coordination, as done by Krupka and Weber (2013). 
That is, for each item, a subject receives 10€ if she manages to pick the answer alternative that 
is chosen by the majority of the respondents in the session (and zero otherwise). In the PBC, 
subjects are endowed with 100 points in each item, and their task is to distribute the 100 points 
between the available alternatives. In each item, subjects gain 0.10€ for each point that they 
assign to the winning alternative, i.e., the alternative that receives most points on average. 
Therefore, the payoff profile of CBC is also feasible in PBC, since assigning all 100 points to 
one alternative in PBC is equivalent to CBC in payoff terms. 
 In both treatments, subjects receive detailed instructions on the coordination mechanisms 
in parts 1 and 2 and about how their payment is determined. Specifically, subjects are provided 
with several examples to illustrate how their payment is calculated depending on their behavior 
and the behavior of others. Subjects answer several control questions in which they compute 
profits in a series of hypothetical scenarios. In particular, we pay attention to make clear that 
subjects are not asked about their own opinion. To make sure that subjects consider this feature, 
we remind them on each screen, on which they enter a coordination choice, that their task is not 
to state their own opinion but to coordinate with the remaining participants in the room. 
 Finally, in part 3, we elicit risk preferences using the Eckel and Grossmann (2008) 
approach, in order to test whether risk preferences affect coordination behavior in PBC as 
predicted by our theory. In part 3, subjects have to choose one of the lotteries from the menu 
shown in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3. Lotteries Choices Used to Elicit Risk Preferences 
Lottery 50% 50% EV Risk Preference 
1 4.00 4.00 4.00 RA 
2 3.50 5.00 4.25 RA 
3 3.00 6.00 4.50 RA 
4 2.50 7.00 4.75 RA 
5 2.00 8.00 5.00 RA 
6 1.50 9.00 5.25 RA 
7 1.00 10.00 5.50 RA / RN 
8 0.50 10.50 5.50 RN / RS 
Notes: EV = expected value; RA = risk-averse; RN = risk-neutral; RS = risk-seeking. In 
the experiment, subjects only see the first three columns. 
 
 At the end of a session, one of the three parts is drawn by chance to determine the payment. 
If part 1 or part 2 are drawn, then one item within that part is drawn by chance, and it determined 
the payment of a subject. If part 3 is drawn, then subjects play the lottery that they previously 
chose. 
 
6.3.2. Procedure 
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and recruitment was done via 
hroot (Bock et al., 2014). In total, 158 subjects participated, and the sessions were conducted at 
the experimental lab of Heidelberg University in January and February 2018. We conducted 8 
sessions, each with 20 participants (except for one session with 18 participants in PBC). 80 
subjects participated in the CBC and 78 participated in the PBC. Participation in either treatment 
took about 35 minutes, and subjects earned on average 9.40€ (including a show-up fee of 5€).107 
 
6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Comparison of Coordination Outcomes 
To analyze coordination choices, we quantify the answers such that the resulting scores are 
normalized between -1 and 1. Injunctive social norms are quantified as: 1 = ” very appropriate”, 
1/3 = ”somewhat appropriate”, -1/3 = “somewhat inappropriate”, -1 = “very inappropriate”. 
Descriptive social norms are quantified as: 1 = “a large majority”, 1/3 = “a majority”, -1/3 = “a 
minority”, -1 = “a small minority”. Thus, the more positive (negative) the score in part 1, the 
 
 107 A replication package, including instructions in German and English language, raw data, and data analysis 
files is available at the repository for research data of Heidelberg University: https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de. 
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more appropriate (inappropriate) it is considered to engage in the described behavior. The more 
positive (negative) the score in module 2, the more common the described behavior is 
considered to be. 
 Figure 6.1 shows a comparison of mean norms elicited in CBC and PBC. Mann-Whitney-
U tests are conducted to test whether mean outcomes differ between the treatments. We find 
that four items differ on the 5%-level (items 1, 7, 9, and 10). After correcting for multiple testing 
using the Bonferroni procedure, three items remain significant on the 5%-level (items 1, 7, and 
10).108 Generally, the results in PBC tend to be somewhat flatter than the results in CBC. 
Figure 6.1. Comparison of Mean Coordination Results 
 
Notes: Items 1 to 5 are injunctive norms from part 1, and items 6-10 are descriptive norms from part 2. 
The more positive (negative) the score in items 1-5, the more appropriate (inappropriate) it is considered 
to engage in the described behavior. The more positive (negative) the score in items 6-10, the more 
common the described behavior is considered to be. 
 
 We next compare ordinal rankings (Table 6.4). In CBC, alternatives in each item are ranked 
with respect to the share of subjects that chose a particular alternative. In PBC, alternatives in 
each item are ranked with respect to the average number of points assigned to the alternatives. 
We do not find that the rankings systematically differ. Precisely, the rankings produced by CBC 
and PBC correspond in eight of the ten items. In two items (4 and 10), we find that the rankings 
do marginally differ, as the order of two of the four alternatives is switched. These differences, 
 
 108 We account for the fact that multiple items are used to detect treatment differences. In order to take care of 
the inflation of the overall type-I-error rate, we multiply the p-values by the number of items (i.e., by ten). 
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however, seem to result from noise, as the alternatives that do not correspond are extremely 
close to one another.109 
Result 1. One the aggregate level, the coordination outcomes of PBC and CBC do not differ. 
 
Table 6.4. Comparison of Rankings of Alternatives 
 Point Beauty Contest Classical Beauty Contest  
Item + + + - - - Mean + + + - - - Mean 
Ranks 
identical 
1 6 13 29 51 -0,50 1 5 40 54 -0,64 
2 27 42 22 8 0,26 15 73 11 1 0,34  
3 14 32 40 14 -0,02 11 33 53 4 0,01  
4 (19) 28 35 (17) -0,01 (13) 34 40 (14) -0,03 x 
5 22 42 27 9 0,18 25 45 29 1 0,29  
6 13 31 35 21 -0,09 4 36 44 16 -0,15  
7 58 28 10 4 0,60 75 20 4 1 0,79  
8 35 43 16 6 0,38 26 68 5 1 0,46  
9 37 38 18 7 0,37 43 44 13 1 0,52  
10 (39) (41) 14 6 0,42 (51) (46) 3 0 0,66 x 
Notes: Items 1-5 are injunctive social norms, and items 6-10 are descriptive social norms. Responses are: “very 
appropriate” (+ +), “somewhat appropriate” (+), “somewhat inappropriate” (-), “very inappropriate” (- -) in 
items 1-5 and “large majority” (+ +), “majority” (+), “minority” (-), “small minority” (- -) in items 6-10. For 
PBC, the numbers represent the average numbers of points that have been assigned to the respective alternatives. 
For CBC, the numbers represent the share (in percent) of subjects that chose the respective alternative. The 
modal response is shaded. Means are calculated using the above-described scoring. The numbers in parentheses 
in items 4 and 10 indicate those numbers, where the ranking of alternatives is not identical between the two 
treatments. 
 
6.4.2. Coordination Behavior and the Role of Risk Preferences in the PBC 
We look at all 780 decisions made in PBC (78 participants times 10 items per subject) and 
classify whether subjects apply gambling, ranking, or hedging. We observe almost no hedging 
(less than 0.1%), but some gambling (9.1%). In most of the decisions, subjects apply ranking, 
i.e., they assign varying numbers of points to the available alternatives (90.8%). More precisely, 
in 34.2% of cases, subjects fully rank their choices by assigning varying numbers of points to 
all four alternatives. In 53.4% of cases, subjects assign three different numbers to the four 
alternatives, and in 3.3% of cases, subjects assign two different numbers to the four alternatives. 
 
 109 For example, in item 4, in the CBC alternative 1 is chosen by 12.5% and alternative 4 by 13.8%. By contrast, 
in the PBC, alternative 1 received 18.9 points on average and alternative 4 received 17.4 points on average. That 
is, in the CBC, alternative 4 is more popular, while in the PBC, alternative 1 is more popular. From a qualitative 
point of view, however, the two alternatives seem to be equally popular in both treatments. We therefore conclude 
that the differences concerning their ranking are not systematic, but result from noise. 
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 Our theoretical framework predicts that subjects “manage” the degree of payoff risk, such 
that it suits their risk preference. Indeed, we find that the proportion of gambling is over-
proportionally high in participants with low or negative risk aversion. While the share of 
gambling decisions is 22.4% for subjects that chose lottery 7 or lottery 8 (i.e., subjects that are 
potentially risk-neutral or risk-seeking as measured by the lottery task), it is only 3.0% for 
participants that chose lottery 1-6 (subjects that are clearly risk-averse as measured by the 
lottery task). Moreover, we examine risk induced in coordination choice. Table 6.5 reports 
regression results on the standard deviation of the assignment of points. We find that behavior 
in the risk elicitation task is significantly related to the standard deviation of the distribution of 
points. The more risk-averse subjects are in the lottery choice, the more balanced is the 
distribution of points, i.e., the lower the standard deviation implied in the coordination choice 
𝑋𝑖. Also, older subjects are more prone to coordinate in a risky manner in the PBC. By contrast, 
gender and economics study remain insignificant, once we control for risk-attitude. 
Result 2. In the PBC, most of the subjects rank their alternatives by assigning different numbers 
to the available alternatives. The more risk-averse subjects are, the less dispersed is the 
assignment of points. 
Table 6.5. Risk Induced in Coordination Choice 𝑋𝑖 
 Standard deviation of points assigned to alternatives 
Risk attitude 
1.830*** 
(0.480) 
 
1.792*** 
(0.521) 
Female  
-5.384*** 
(2.007) 
-1.953 
(1.985) 
Age  
0.569** 
(0.231) 
0.658*** 
(0.186) 
Economics  
0.179 
(0.460) 
0.420 
(0.429) 
Constant 
18.609*** 
(1.979) 
15.343*** 
(5.728) 
2.484 
(5.780) 
N 780 780 780 
Notes: Tobit regressions. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level. The variable “risk attitude” indicates which of the lotteries (coded as number 
between 1 and 8) a subject chose. The higher the number, the less risk-averse is a 
subject. Robust standard errors are clustered on the individual level and reported in 
parentheses. As a robustness check, OLS regressions are conducted that yield the 
same results. 
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6.5. Simulation 
We run Monte Carlo simulations in order to test which of the techniques uncovers the 
underlying ranking more efficiently, i.e., with fewer observations. We consider the realized 
coordination outcomes from the 78 subjects in PBC and the 80 subjects in CBC as benchmark 
(i.e., the results described in section 6.4.1.). We then run Monte Carlo simulations and mimic 
our original experiment with varying numbers of n participants, with n = 1, …, 100. For each 
of the ten items, each n is simulated 10.000 times both for the CBC and the PBC. We then use 
the simulated data to study how fast the simulated results converge to the benchmark when n 
grows larger. The degree of convergence is measured using convergence of the mean and 
convergence of the ordinal ranking of the alternatives.110 Convergence of the mean is measured 
as realized confidence intervals (50% and 90%) of the simulated means. Convergence of ordinal 
rankings is measured as the share of simulated items, in which the ordinal ranking corresponds 
to the benchmark. The more efficient the mechanism, the smaller should the confidence 
intervals of means become when n grows larger. Equivalently, the more efficient the 
mechanism, the higher should be the share of simulated items in which the ordinal ranking 
produced by the simulation is identical with the benchmark when n increases. Holding a 
particular n constant thus allows us to compare the degree of efficiency between PBC and CBC. 
 The simulation results show that in the PBC, the examined confidence intervals are lower 
for each n in either of the 10 items (see Figure 6.2).111 That is, the precision with which the 
mean is approached when the number of participants increases is higher for the PBC for each 
size of n. Regarding convergence to the ordinal rankings, the PBC converges faster to the 
underlying ranking in 9 of the 10 items, while in one item the CBC converges faster. 
 The efficiency gains are particularly strong for the usual numbers of participants used in 
economic experiments. For example, both the 90%-confidence and the 50%-confidence 
intervals for the mean that are realized in the CBC with n = 50 participants are reached in the 
PBC with n = 30 participants already. The share of ordinal rankings that corresponds to the 
benchmark that is produced in the CBC with n = 50 is reached in the PBC already with n = 16. 
This indicates that the PBC is more efficient as an experimental method, in particular regarding 
the elicitation of ordinal rankings of focal points. 
 
 110 To derive the mean, we use the same scoring system as in the results section. That is, the ratings are 
normalized between -1 and 1. 
 111 Figure 6.2 shows the average of all 10 items. In Appendix A6.2 the reader finds figures of simulations results 
separately for each item. 
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Result 3. The PBC is more efficient than the CBC in identifying the means and the ordinal 
rankings of coordination choices on the population level. 
Figure 6.2. Simulation Results 
Panel A. Convergence to the Mean Panel B. Convergence to the Ordinal 
Ranking 
 
 
Notes: The x-axis of both graphs indicates the n, i.e., the number of participants that is being simulated. Panel 
A shows confidence intervals of means. Panel B shows the share of simulation runs in which the ordinal ranking 
of a simulation run corresponds with the ranking of the benchmark. Both graphs contain the data of 100.000 
simulation runs (10.000 simulation runs for each of the ten items). Appendix A.2 contains graphs of simulations 
separately for each item. 
 
6.6. Summary and Conclusion 
We propose a Point Beauty Contest to identify the ranking of focal points in coordination games 
on the individual level. By contrast to conventional coordination where subjects can only bet 
on one alternative, subjects are endowed with points, which they assign to the available 
alternatives. This enables subjects to bet on multiple outcomes and to weigh their choices. We 
examine the proposed method both theoretically and experimentally. In the theoretical part, we 
derive that the assignment of points depends on strategic uncertainty and risk preferences. In 
an experiment, we find that the mechanism is suited to identify the heterogeneity of focal points 
on the individual level, as most of the subjects assign varying numbers of points to the different 
alternatives. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we find the mechanism to be more efficient 
regarding the identification of focal points on the population level. 
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 We see four contributions. First, the Point Beauty Contest provides a framework to 
formally represent coordination settings in which subjects do not coordinate by exclusively 
choosing one alternative, but in which subjects coordinate in a fine-grained manner by choosing 
multiple alternatives at the same time. For example, the framework is useful to model a bank-
run if one assumes that depositors do not only think about withdrawing none of their money or 
all of their money from a bank, but want to engage in both strategies simultaneously. Second, 
the mechanism allows to uncover the distribution of focal points in coordination games on the 
individual level. This allows, for example, to measure social norms on the individual level as a 
profile, i.e., varying degrees of social appropriateness for different available actions (cf. Krupka 
and Weber, 2013). Third, the Point Beauty Contest provides a possibility to measure focal 
points on the population level with significantly fewer participants compared to conventional 
coordination. Fourth, the Point Beauty Contest serves as a simple and direct tool to measure 
strategic uncertainty in coordination settings (Heinemann et al., 2009), as the assignment of 
points in the Point Beauty Contest yields a measure that is directly related to that kind of 
uncertainty. 
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Appendix 6 
A6.1. Proof of Proposition 1 
We suppress the script 𝑖 from now on and analyze a representative individual. If 𝜋 = 𝑥𝑗
∗, the 
utility function is 𝑈 = ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∗ 𝑢(𝑥𝑗). 
 Risk aversion. Take two arbitrary alternatives 𝑘  and 𝑙 . Assume 𝜑𝑘 > 𝜑𝑙 ⇔ 𝑝𝑘 > 𝑝𝑙 . 
First-order conditions require that 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑢´(𝑥𝑘) ≡  𝑝𝑙 ∗ 𝑢´(𝑥𝑙). If 𝑝𝑘 > 𝑝𝑙, then 𝑢´(𝑥𝑘) < 𝑢´(𝑥𝑙). 
Since utility is marginally decreasing in case of risk aversion, it needs to be that 𝑥𝑘 > 𝑥𝑙. As a 
result, for each comparison of two arbitrary alternatives and independent from strategic 
uncertainty, utility maximization requires to assign more points to alternatives that are more 
focal: 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 > 𝑥𝑖𝑙. 
 Risk-neutrality. Take two arbitrary alternatives 𝑘 and 𝑙. Assume 𝜑𝑘 > 𝜑𝑙 ⇔ 𝑝𝑘 > 𝑝𝑙. In 
case of “certainty”, it is the dominant strategy to assign all points to the alternative that is 
expected to become the winning alternative with certainty. The same reasoning applies to a 
subject that perceives “partial uncertainty”, i.e., assigning all points to the more promising 
alternative is dominant. Risk-neutral subjects that face “full uncertainty” are indifferent 
between all possible distributions of points, since they can neither control expected profit nor 
can they affect the expected payoff. Therefore, in case of risk-neutrality, 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 >
𝑥𝑖𝑙 applies if subjects are certain, while it does not when subjects are partially uncertain or fully 
uncertain. 
 Risk-seeking. Take two arbitrary alternatives 𝑘 and 𝑙. Assume 𝜑𝑘 > 𝜑𝑙 ⇔ 𝑝𝑘 > 𝑝𝑙 . In 
case of “certainty”, it is the dominant strategy to assign all points to the alternative that is 
expected to become the winning alternative with certainty. This maximizes the expected payoff, 
while risk cannot be affected in case of certainty. The same reasoning applies to a subject that 
is “partially uncertain”. In case of “full uncertainty”, risk-seeking subjects will invest all points 
into a random alternative, because, although they cannot affect expected payoff in case of full 
uncertainty, gambling will maximize risk, thus it maximizes utility. Therefore, in case of risk-
seeking, 𝜑𝑖𝑘 > 𝜑𝑖𝑙 ⇔ 𝑥𝑖𝑘 > 𝑥𝑖𝑙 applies if subjects are certain, while it does not when subjects 
are partially uncertain or fully uncertain. ∎ 
A6.2. Figures of Simulation Results for each Item 
The graphs show simulation results separately for each of the ten items. Each simulation 
contains 10.000 simulation runs. 
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A6.2.1. Convergence to the Mean 
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Chapter 7 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
There are multiple conclusions that can be drawn from the results presented in this dissertation, 
most of which have already been stated in the conclusion sections of the respective chapters. 
This chapter aims to provide conclusions that consider the implications of the research results 
from a broader perspective, while also taking into account the limitations and shortcomings of 
the respective studies. 
 For that sake, I divide the dissertation into two parts: Chapter 2 on the one hand and 
Chapters 3 to 6 on the other hand. This split is guided by the methodology used in the respective 
parts. While subjects make choices about payoffs in the experiment presented in Chapter 2, the 
experiments in Chapters 3 to 6 are devoted to examining choices in coordination settings. 
Section 7.1 provides concluding remarks about Chapter 2 by discussing a shortcoming of our 
study and by providing avenues for future research on process fairness. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 
provide concluding remarks about Chapters 3 to 6, by discussing the methodology of using pure 
coordination games to answer research questions and by evaluating the limitations of my 
dissertation to draw inferences about that methodology. 
 
7.1. Futures Avenues for Research on Process Fairness 
The main aim of chapter 2 is to examine how institutions that are in charge of allocating 
indivisible goods need to be designed so that decision-makers adhere to process fairness. This 
is motivated by the idea that process fairness, ceteris paribus, is valuable and should be aimed 
for from a prescriptive perspective (e.g., Andreozzi et al., 2013; Bolton et al., 2005; Krawczyk, 
2011; Saito, 2013; Trautmann, 2009; Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2016; Trautmann and 
Wakker, 2010). In accordance with the existing literature, our results demonstrate the 
detrimental effects of lack of perceived process fairness: subjects´ perceptions about outcome 
fairness are negatively affected by low perceptions of process fairness (although the level of 
outcome inequality is constant across treatments) and recipients engage more in costly 
punishing the allocator. Thus, our results are consistent with previous research results 
demonstrating that perceptions of process fairness are crucial for the success of social and 
economic interactions (e.g., Kollock, 1998; Ostrom 1990). 
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 A significant part of previously conducted research on process fairness deals with 
understanding the factors that shape fairness perceptions, the interaction of different concepts 
of fairness, and the consequences that are associated with low levels of perceived fairness. 
However, I think that the importance of process fairness, the detrimental effects of lack of 
process fairness, and its necessity in social interactions are well understood (e.g., Adler et al., 
1983; Alm et al., 1995; Andreoni et al., 1998; Bowles and Gintis, 2000; Brockner, 2002; Falk 
et al., 2017; Fehr, 2018; Garonzik et al., 2000; Kessler and Leider, 2016; Skarlicki and Folger, 
1997; Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2016). Thus, the direction of research that we step into is 
innovative in that we conduct empirical research pursuing to understand how it can be made 
sure (or at least more probable) that process fairness is actually implemented and maintained 
in situations where a fair process is not easily feasible. In particular, what our study 
demonstrates is that it is not granted that subjects are always able to implement process fairness, 
even though they might have a preference for doing so. Based on our results, I believe that it is 
worth to follow that path and to try to understand more thoroughly how the implementation of 
process fairness can be fostered in real-world allocation settings. 
 Likewise, I think it is worthwhile to continue researching to better understand how 
perceptions of process fairness can be maximized in settings where outcome inequality is 
unavoidable. Since process fairness serves as a cushion for outcome inequality, it is essential 
to learn more about how groups, organizations, and the society can mitigate the detrimental 
effects of distributional inequality through proper implementation of fair allocation processes. 
This seems to be particularly necessary, given that both income inequality and wealth inequality 
will tend to rise in our society in the future (e.g., Piketty, 2014). Under this premise, outcome 
fairness progressively becomes less feasible, so that society has to make an effort wherever it 
can to help allocators to apply fair procedures and to maximize perceptions of process fairness 
on the side of recipients. 
 Before providing ideas for how future research could extend the study presented in Chapter 
2, I want to state a shortcoming that is associated with our experiment. In our setting, we present 
two subjects as being equally deserving, but we do not induce a situation in which one 
participant is clearly more entitled than another recipient, based on some objective measure 
(e.g., a real-effort task or through different endowments). In order to corroborate the claim that 
subjects actually exhibit favoritism, it would have been interesting to confront the decision-
maker with such treatments. Specifically, having varying constellations of relative entitlements, 
combined with varying measures of relative similarity (i.e., less/more deserving participant has 
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higher/lower relative similarity with the allocator) in a 2×2 factorial design, would allow to 
examine the trade-off between preferences for process fairness and preferences for favoritism 
in a more comprehensive manner. As our design is not suited to explore this trade-off, I hope 
that further studies will devote to examining this aspect. 
 In addition to considering this limitation, I want to sketch three further aspects in which 
future research could extend our experimental allocation setting. First, it might be worthwhile 
to examine how subjects make use of the possibility to communicate in the given setting, and 
how communication affects fairness perceptions. Here, different treatments are thinkable. For 
example, one could provide the allocator with the possibility to explain her decision to 
recipients. This is a feature that is present in a series of real-world allocation settings, e.g., when 
assigning jobs or promotions among candidates. One hypothesis could be that decision-makers 
make use of their possibility to explain their decision and to help recipients understand the 
dilemma in which the allocator is situated. It is not implausible to expect that this affects the 
recipients´ interpretation of the allocator´s behavior, in particular if the allocator uses the 
opportunity to verbally signal that she is seeking to implement a fair procedure. As a result, it 
might positively affect perceptions of process fairness on the side of recipients. Further 
treatment variations could allow for communication between all involved players, or allow for 
asymmetric communication, where only a part of the recipients has the possibility to 
communicate with the allocator. 
 Second, it might be interesting to vary the kind of information that is transmitted between 
participants. While we use political profiles to create relative distance between the allocator and 
the recipients, there are other interesting ways to create such differences. One straight-forward 
example would be to examine the effect of revealing the gender of subjects. This might be 
interesting because it potentially helps understanding gender concentrations in different areas 
if one assumes that selection decisions have similar characteristics as our allocation setting (i.e., 
decisions are one-shot, and multiple independent allocators determine allocations). Further 
possibilities include socio-economic background or the level of income. Also, one could think 
about using a catalog of questions, as we did, but with a different emphasis. 
 Third, it might be interesting to study the given setting in a dynamic context. In our 
experiment, we apply a one-shot interaction. However, one shot-interactions conceptually differ 
from dynamic settings where subjects repeatedly interact over multiple periods. In the real-
world, allocation decisions sometimes appear one shot, and the recipients do not have the 
possibility to further interact with the allocator. However, there are also settings where the 
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participants interact in a repeated manner (take, for example, the assignment of attractive tasks 
or projects within a company). Therefore, it would be worth studying whether in repeated 
interactions, the allocator simply repeats the actions that she takes in the one-shot setting, or 
whether she varies her behavior. Another limitation of studying one-shot settings is that it is 
not possible to detect whether an allocator would have implemented process fairness in the long 
run by alternating which recipient receives the favorable outcome. Additionally, it would be 
interesting to examine how recipients´ retaliation behavior, as well as fairness perceptions of 
all involved individuals look like in dynamic environments. 
 Finally, one could think about various further interventions, since the interventions that we 
examine are only a small section of possible mechanisms. I thus hope that further research uses 
our design to continue exploring the underlying research question while taking care of our 
limitations and by enriching our experimental setting in sensible ways. 
 
7.2. The Informativeness of Coordination Choices on the Individual Level  
Regarding Chapters 3 to 6, I want to draw joint conclusions about the methodology used in 
these studies. In all experiments contained in these chapters, we use coordination games to draw 
inferences about subjects based on their coordination choices. The implicit assumption that 
underlies this approach is that it is appropriate to use such decisions to draw inferences about 
beliefs (Chapter 3) or social norm perception (Chapters 4 to 6) of participants. In that regard, 
we go one step further than Krupka and Weber (2013), who propose that coordination games 
are suited to predict changes across contexts and treatment variations on the aggregate level (cf. 
abstract of Krupka and Weber, 2013). Looking at the combined data of my projects, my 
conclusion is that coordination choices are also indicative of subjects´ traits on the individual 
level. 
 To make that point, I first recapitulate the results from Chapters 3 and 4. Remember that in 
these experiments, we not only elicit coordination choices from subjects, but we additionally 
elicit beliefs (Chapter 3) and social preferences (Chapter 4) in an incentive-compatible manner 
using standard procedures from experimental economics. Beliefs are elicited using a scoring 
rule that pays subjects based on precision, and social preferences are measured via incentivized 
allocation settings (i.e., dictator games, which are a workhorse in experimental economics to 
measure social preferences). In both studies, we find that coordination choices are statistically 
significantly related to the respective trait of interest on the individual level (i.e., either to 
subjects´ beliefs or to their revealed social preferences). More precisely, in Chapter 3, 
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coordination choices do not differ from first-order beliefs, neither on the aggregate nor on the 
individual level. In Chapter 4, we find that when subjects coordinate on social norms, their 
individual coordination choices are strongly related to their actual decisions in the dictator 
games. 
 The results, however, need to be put into perspective, given one fundamental 
methodological limitation that is shared by the studies contained in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
Since we are eliciting individual level traits, we cannot rule out the existence of spillover effects 
between the two kinds of decisions that subjects take. In Chapter 3, in treatment 
COORDINATION, it might be that spillover effects emerge between elicited coordination 
choices (elicited in stage 1 of the treatment) and first-order beliefs (elicited in stage 2). 
Equivalently, in Chapter 4, it might be that spillover effects emerge between elicited social 
preferences (in the allocation stage) and coordination choices (in the norm elicitation stage). 
Put differently, there are two competing explanations for the close relationship: A subject could 
choose to coordinate in a particular manner either (i) because it corresponds to her actual trait 
(which is our claim when applying that methodology), or (ii) because of spillover effects that 
occur between the two kinds of decisions that individuals make. The fundamental 
methodological problem with this approach is that it is difficult to refute the hypothesis of 
spillover effects since this would require to independently elicit two individual decisions from 
one subject at the same point in time. Therefore, since the decisions that subjects make in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are not independent, spillover effects between the two choices cannot 
be ruled out. 
 Arguing with the data provided in these chapters therefore suffers from that fundamental 
limitation, as the results are only consistent with the hypothesis that coordination choices are 
informative, while the data is not suited to refute the hypothesis of spillover effects. In order to 
get around that problem, one needs to design an experiment where subjects play coordination 
games, and the coordination choices would need to be compared to another measure on the 
individual level that is either (i) not elicited in the same experiment (so that a direct spillover 
effect is avoided), or that is (ii) fixed (so that it is not affected by spillover effects, even if 
spillover effects do exist). If the relationship between the subject´s type and her coordination 
choice remains tight, this would not be explained by spillover effects. 
 However, the experiment from Chapter 3 provides additional support for the hypothesis 
that spillover effects do not explain the relationship between coordination choices and first-
order beliefs. The fact that first-order beliefs in treatment BELIEF and first-order beliefs elicited 
140 
in stage 2 of treatment COORDINATION do not differ on average indicates that having subjects 
coordinate beforehand (in stage 1 of treatment COORDINATION), does on average not affect 
their first-order beliefs. Although this data does not refute the hypothesis that spillover effects 
do exist, it provides support for the hypothesis that they do not play a significant role. 
 The data in Chapter 5 also supports that conclusion, when looking at the coordination 
choices of females and males. These indicate that female subjects are significantly more guided 
by egalitarianism and significantly less guided by efficiency in experimental allocation tasks 
than male subjects. This is in accordance with previous studies on gender effects in dictator 
game giving (e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 1998) and supports 
the idea that individual characteristics shape how subjects choose to coordinate. The 
relationship between a subject´s coordination choice and her gender cannot be explained by 
spillover effects. 
 However, one limitation in that regard is that the experiment in Chapter 5 was not designed 
to test for such (gender) differences. Therefore, one needs to be cautious when using this data 
to evaluate hypotheses (otherwise, one would fall short regarding the issue of multiple testing, 
i.e., to use the very same data to shed light on more than one hypothesis). I therefore document 
that the gender differences identified in Chapter 5 are consistent with the idea that coordination 
choices of males and females are indicative of gender-specific social preferences found by 
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) as well as Eckel and Grossman (1998). However, in order to 
produce more profound experimental evidence, one would need to design an experiment whose 
intention it is to explicitly test for gender differences. 
 Taken together, the data of these projects lead me to conclude that coordination games are 
an interesting tool to draw inferences about individual participants. Our combined results 
support the idea that subjects use their own type when predicting the coordination choices of 
others (Dawes, 1989; Vanberg, 2019). The methodological value of this insight is that 
coordination games are a powerful tool to identify traits of subjects that are otherwise difficult 
to explore. This includes beliefs about unobservable facts (“what is the probability that some 
hypothetical event materializes until year 2100?”) or preferences that are difficult to measure 
(“how much would you donate if you would win a million dollar?”). More generally, it includes 
all kinds of traits and characteristics that are difficult to explore using the standard approaches 
of experimental economics, i.e., observing how subjects express their actual traits in properly 
incentivized decision situations (Smith, 1976). However, in order to corroborate that claim, 
more experiments, which fundamentally rule out spillover effects, are necessary. 
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 Finally, the mechanism proposed in Chapter 6 does not explicitly yields further insights 
regarding the previous conclusion. However, given that the above conclusion would be valid, 
the Point Beauty Contest would allow drawing inferences about subjects on the individual level 
in a more fine-grained manner. A limitation of the experiment in Chapter 6 is that we examine 
the Point Beauty Contest only for the elicitation of social norms. In order to generate further 
support for the claim that focal points on the individual level are measurable using that approach, 
it would be desirable to test it with other coordination games. 
 
7.3. Coordination Games as an Incentivized Crowd Wisdom Device 
Finally, I want to conclude on the idea of using coordination games as a prediction or crowd 
wisdom device. To do so, I again briefly recapitulate the experiments conducted in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4. In Chapter 3, the subjects´ task is to estimate realized probabilities about 
behavior in an ultimatum game conducted by Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014). Subjects 
are confronted with a particular event, and their task is to coordinate on the realized probability 
of that event. Each subject states an integer between 0 and 100 that is meant to represent 
probability in percentage terms, and the closer their number is to the average number stated by 
the crowd (i.e., all subjects within a session), the higher their payoff. In Chapter 4, subjects 
have a similar task, as they have to coordinate on descriptive social norms, which represent how 
prevalent a particular behavior is considered to be. Subjects are confronted with the description 
of a particular behavior in the dictator game, and their task is to coordinate on one of the four 
categories: “a large majority”, “a majority”, “a minority”, “a small minority”. 
 In both experiments, we find that the coordination outcomes very well correspond to the 
observed behavior. In Chapter 3, the average probabilities elicited using coordination games 
correspond to actual behavior rates in the ultimatum game conducted by Trautmann and van de 
Kuilen (2014), and in Chapter 4, the elicited descriptive norms yield accurate estimations about 
actual dictator behavior. 
 In particular, Chapter 3 yields interesting insights about the suitability of using 
coordination games as crowd wisdom or prediction device. First, the assessments of realized 
probabilities using the conventional elicitation of first-order beliefs are not more accurate than 
the elicitation of beliefs using coordination games. Second, by contrast, beliefs elicited in a non-
incentivized manner seem to differ from incentivized beliefs, and their external validity is also 
lower. Although the second result needs to be considered with caution due to the small sample 
of subjects that state their beliefs in a non-incentivized manner, descriptive analysis indicates 
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that beliefs elicited using coordination are a better indicator for actual first-order beliefs than 
are non-incentivized beliefs. This suggests that using coordination games to elicit beliefs or 
descriptive social norms are a potentially powerful tool to generate predictions about questions 
that are otherwise difficult to incentivize. 
 Of course, the evidence in this dissertation that leads me to these conclusions is limited, 
since the experiments comprise only a small number of possible fields of applications. In order 
to back up these conclusions, one needs to run experiments in further areas, such as sports 
matches, political events, events on the financial market, and the like. That data could then be 
compared to predictions generated in other settings (e.g., prediction markets). My impression 
is that coordination games are an interesting tool to make incentivized predictions in such 
settings, and I believe that it would be worthwhile to employ a “horse race” to compare that 
approach with other mechanisms. I hope that further experimental work will be conducted to 
explore that claim. 
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